Thursday, November 29, 2012

On the Recent Violence In the Middle East

The latest round of fighting between Israelis and Palestinians seems to be winding down with incoming rockets, helicopter gunships, fighter bombers and drones being replaced by the battle to control perceptions of who is right and wrong, who has gained and lost.   The oft cited “fog of war” is being replaced by an equally opaque “mist of spin.”   

Speculation about short and long term consequences of events can be pretty risky so I hope no one drags these notes up in six months or a year.   Nonetheless, there are some things that I think can be said about what might be some implications for both the short and longer range.   

Trying to describe events inevitably involves selectivity and some implicit bias.  But let’s start with an outline anyway.

After Operation Cast Lead, the 2008 Israeli air and ground incursion into Gaza, Hamas [click  here for a quick primer on Hamas and Gaza] declared a unilateral cease fire.  A couple of weeks ago Hamas announced that it was ending it and small groups began launching rockets into southern Israel. 

The initial Israeli response was the usual sort of tit for tat air strike that targeted a senior Hamas military commander.

But this series of attacks differed in two ways from the past.  First, in addition to the short range rockets launched from Gaza of the past – not much more than big mortar shells with a range of just a few miles pointed in the general direction of some village in southern Israel – there were now longer range rockets, traveling up to 40 or 50 miles and launched in the general direction of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, threatening and personally involving the majority of the population of Israel.  The second significant difference was the increasing deployment by Israel of batteries of anti-rocket missiles, the weapons system code named Iron Dome

In the face of an increasing barrage of rockets and increasing public outcry, Israel expanded its response to include hundreds of air strikes aimed at people suspected of launching rockets, suspected storage depots for rockets and public buildings in Gaza, including the parliament building.  And Israel made very public preparations for a ground assault on Gaza, a clear threat of major escalation if nothing changed.

Three days of negotiations led by Egyptian President Morsy culminated in the announcement of a cease fire by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Egyptian foreign minister Mohamed Kamel Amr.  While it is not clear who promised what to whom, the agreement had the necessary ambiguity to permit both Israel and Hamas to declare that they had gotten exactly what they had wanted all along.  Continuing negotiations, sponsored by Egypt and the U.S. will probably lead to some real easing of the Israeli blockade in exchange for pledges by Hamas (with assurances from Egypt and the U.S.) to curb rocket launchings.

On one hand there is a great temptation to announce winners and losers after a violent confrontation like this, as if it were a sporting match.  (One often gets this odd image of a British announcer noting “Hamas are leading one nil after the first period.”) On the other hand there is the safe academic stance of “it’s too soon to tell.”  (As in the probably apocryphal story of the British historian who had decided that the Roman era in Britain had been a generally positive time but it was still too early to tell about the Norman Conquest.)  Perhaps we can do something in between.

Implications for the Future.

The Palestinians (click here for a brief overview of Hamas and the Gaza Strip)

Hamas has emerged from this round of violence in a much improved position. 
   
     They are widely perceived in the Middle East and elsewhere as winning a military victory against Israel. 

    They are seen as the undisputed leader of the Palestinian resistance, eclipsing the Fatah led government in Ramallah.

    In exchange for promises to end rocket attacks, they seem likely to get major concessions on ending the blockade.

    They have emerged as major negotiating partners of the U.S., Egypt, and Israel, even if everyone pretends they aren’t [it’s a stylized drama: offstage  U.S. diplomats talk to Israelis; Egyptian officials talk to Hamas.  The Americans and Egyptians talk to each other on stage then return to the wings to talk to Israelis and Hamas.  After several scenes, the Egyptian and American diplomats announce an agreement and the curtain comes down, with no one having violated the tabu against talking to “those people.”]

     The Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, dominated by Fatah and ostensibly the government of both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, has lost ground in its struggle with Hamas.  Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Abbas will try to present United Nations recognition of the Palestinians as a “non-member” state as a major victory.

Israel

    If the primary goal of the attacks on Gaza was to stop the rocket attacks once and for all, I think it is fair to say that the operation was not very successful.  There will be a period of calm during which the Hamas authorities will monitor the border more carefully and the smuggling of rockets and other weaponry will continue at a reduced pace.  But ultimately the authorities in Gaza cannot completely control the bands of fighters who operate out of the refugee camps and slums of Gaza City and Rafah.  At some point I think the rockets will resume.  However, the lull in attacks will give Israel time to expand the deployment of the Iron Dome system which will further reduce the effectiveness of the rockets.

    The violent confrontation with Hamas will play a role in the election next January but it is too early to say what that will be.  Much may depend on whether people come to see the latest military adventure as a necessary step to defend civilians or see it as a mistake flowing from a larger reliance on military solutions to the problems posed by the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 

    In the longer run, it is possible that this will mark a turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.  Many observers believe that the status quo [add link] is unsustainable.  The optimists wonder if 1973 is a precedent.  In 1973 Egypt launched a surprise attack across the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula, driving Israeli forces back.  After several days of fierce fighting, Israel gained the upper hand and, regaining all the territory it had lost and refraining from totally destroying the Egyptian army only because of the intervention of the United States and Soviet Union through UN mediated peace talks.  But Anwar Sadat and other Arab leaders were able to portray the initial success as a great victory that shattered the myth of Israeli invincibility and Israeli confidence in their invulnerability to attack was shaken.  The result was Sadat’s daring proposal for peace talks, met by Menachim Begin’s equally bold acceptance, that led to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.  The fact that Hamas and other Palestinian voices are calling their recent battle a victory and the apparent psychological effect of the otherwise ineffective rocket attacks on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem on Israeli public opinion may make both sides amenable to serious talks about their political future.  That would be extremely unlikely to involve some dramatic breakthrough, but continuing discussions mediated by Egypt and the United Sates might be a way forward.

    I do not think this has been another mindless spasm of violence in an interminable clash of people who have always hated each other.  Nor do I think this is the turning point so often fervently sought that will lead to peace.  But it may prove to be a small but significant step in the right direction.

Egypt

Because of its 1973 peace treaty with Israel and physical proximity to the Gaza Strip, Egypt has always been a major player.  There were some worries in Israel and elsewhere that the replacement of Mubarak by Mohamed Morsy would mean a radical tilt towards groups like Hamas and hostility to Israel.  But Egyptian diplomats proved both adept and reliable partners with the U.S. in achieving a cease fire.  Egypt has maintained, if not actually improved, its position as an indispensable participant in whatever the future holds.

The United States

    The United States, like Egypt, reasserted its status as an indispensable player.  In fact I think the U.S. improved its position with both Egypt and Israel.  Relations with the new Egyptian regime have not always been smooth.  The fear that Egypt would tilt toward radical Islamists like Hamas and some worrying signs that President Morsy is more interested in building a regime based on political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood than one that is committed to democracy and inclusion of both secular Egyptians and Coptic Christians have caused some bumps in the road in the past year.  Establishing an effective working partnership to end the violence in Gaza was a significant positive step.  Egypt needs a good working relationship with the United States for economic support and the United States needs a good working relationship with Egypt for diplomatic and strategic reasons.

    The recent events have also affected the U.S.-Israeli relationship.  After the abject failure of Obama’s effort at peace making, the primary issue between the U.S. and Israel has been Iran, with the Israeli government trying to push the U.S. into a much more aggressive stance toward Tehran and the U.S. working hard to prevent a unilateral Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.  It is an open secret that Obama and Netanyahu do not like each other and Netanyahu rather openly rooted for a Romney victory.  (Netanyahu’s social and economic conservative views plus his personal liking for Romney led one commentator to note that Netanyahu speaks English with a Republican accent.) Republicans tried to make Obama’s difficult relationship with Netanyahu a campaign issue.  Obama’s reelection victory and the fighting in Gaza changed all that.  Netanyahu’s political opponents in Israel began to openly criticize him for alienating the President and sounding far too hawkish on Iran.  Instead of the U.S. trying to persuade Israel to exercise restraint, the Israelis now found themselves asking the U.S. for help. 

I think it is very clear that the real winners here are the ordinary people of the Gaza Strip because the blockade will be eased and their lives will be improved.  We can only hope that there will be other positive results.

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