A Quick Look at the Origins of the Islamic Republic of Iran

 

For Iranians, the relationship with the U.S. began in 1952 when the CIA cooperated with the British in instigating a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and transformed Shah Rez Pahlevi from a largely symbolic figure into a powerful ruling monarch. The new regime played heavily on Iranian nationalism rooted in the glorious heritage of 2500 years of the Persian Empire. The Shah was determined to modernize Iran economically and socially while suppressing any political development. Particularly in the cities, oil revenue was used to create a more balanced economy, a wealthy aristocracy, and an increasingly well educated and westernized middle class. Resentment over the abandonment of traditional social and religious values (westoxification*) in the rural areas and among recent migrants to cities and over the harsh repression of any political dissent among the growing middle class led to widespread unrest and resistance in 1979 and when the military and security forces deserted the regime, the Shah and the regime collapsed.

*a term coined by an Iranian intellectual critical of his countrymen's fascination with Western culture and society and dismissal of traditional values

Much of the opposition was led by religious clergy; Shi'a mullahs have a long tradition of providing secular as well as religious leadership. Shi'a clergy (mullahs) played a leading role in channeling popular discontent with the regime. Capitalizing on the Shah's failing health and disarray among the ruling elite, the mullahs launched a revolution that called for a return to traditional religious values. The new regime emphasized Persian identity as opposed to minority groups, with a central, charismatic figure (the Supreme Leader) and strongly authoritarian style. Ayatollah Khomeini could have dubbed his movement MIGA, making Iran great again.

The foreign policy of the new regime stressed the importance of coming to the aid of oppressed Shi'a minorities in majority Sunni Arab regimes*, combating global imperialism (exemplified by the United States) and combating Israel (a Jewish outpost of Western colonialism in the very heartland of Islam.) Iran damned the United States as "The Great Satan" and the U.S. responded by defining Iran as an enemy.

*Shi'a Islam emerged during a conflict over who was Mohamed's rightful successor. The conflict had more to do with secular issues of Arab versus non-Arab communities than it did with theological questions or the details of prayer. Iran is the only country in the Middle East with a Shi'a majority; elsewhere Shi'a communities were discriminated against.

A good example of the convergence of those themes is Hezbollah which originated as an armed oppositon group in Lebanon's shi'a community. Lebanon's Christian and Sunni Arab elites have historically not only dominated the country but more or less actively excluded the Shi'a minority. When Hezbollah emerged as a powerful counterweight to a pro-Western government. dominated by Christians and Sunni Muslims and willing to cooperate with Israel, Iran saw a natural ally to be supported and encouraged. It is intellectually lazy and very misleading to reduce Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen and other Iranian-backed groups to mere proxies or tools of Teheran. They are indigenous groups with local issues and grievances who are allies, not puppets, of Iran.

The JCPOA

The new Islamic Republic's hostility to modernity led to an early exodus of professionals who had trained in the U.S. or Western Europe. In addiditon,the purge of the Shah's supporters in government and business spurred an exodus of the wealthy upper class. In the face of crippling economic sanctions from the West, the regime came to embrace the remaining engineers and scientists who could develop Iranian technology and manufacturing systems. The nuclear energy sector, perhaps ironically in an oil rich nation, became not only a point of pride in Iranian know-how but an increasingly important component of electricity generation.

Thirty years after the revolution, perspectives among decision makers in the United States and Western Europe had shifted enough to make it possible to contemplate negotiating with Iran to forestall nuclear weapons. (Russia and China did not regard Iran as an enemy but were not happy with the idea of a nuclear armed Islamic Republic.) After a number of false starts, increasing western sanction and credible evidence that Iran was developing a nuclear industry that could develop the resources to create a nuclear weapon, a new round of talks started in 2013 The result was an interesting mix of interlocutors (the U.S., the UK, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union) who negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The JCOPA offered Iran significant relief from crippling economic sanctions in return for limits on nuclear technology and a srict inspection regime. (Back in the day I tried for a more thorough analysis of the JCOPA negotiations. See https://www.blogger.com/u/2/blog/post/edit/4398193451691859469/6127416897469986096 and https://www.blogger.com/u/2/blog/post/edit/4398193451691859469/6127416897469986096)

Supporters of the agreement either accepted Iranian assurances that there was no intent to produce weapons or believed that the inspection and limitations regime would delay an actual weapon for years. Opponents argued that Iran could not be trusted to live up to any agreements and its increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile systems and bad behavior causing terror and chaos around the world made it an existential threat to Israel and a major threat to the Untied States and Western Europe. The skeptics won out when Trump replaced Obama in the White House and loudly and proudly withdrew from the agreement,replacing JCPOA with "maximum pressure" on Iran. I think it is fair to say that in the seven years since the U.S. withdrew, Iran has gone from being a few years away from a full weapons capability to a few months before the recent bombing. Except for the triumphalists in the Trump administration, very few observers believe that Iran's nuclear capabilities have been "obliterated." Assessing the damage is very difficult without physical inspections of a large number of sites but some speculative estimates see delays of as little as a few months while others think Iran is now several years away from a nuclear weapon.

Regime Change?

Israeli politicians and analysts have been very clear in their belief that the Iranian regime must be replaced because its core ideology includes the destruction of Israel. The U.S. policy makers who negotiated the JCPOA believed that Iran could be contained and the regime would ultimately either morph into a "normal" regime or be replaced by internal forces. The Iran hawks who blasted Obama for pursuing the JCPOA and urged Trump to withdraw from it want regime change to be the primary goal of U.S. policy.

The regime is increasingly unpopular. The economy is suffering from the effects of U.S. and European Union sanctions. The excesses of the religious police and the level of repression from the security forces have sparked protests. And the ideology underlying the Islamic Revolution of 45 years ago has become stale and irrelevant in a country where over half the population was not even born then. Regardless of how noble and inspiring the ideology that underlies a regime (including liberal democracies) sooner or later the question becomes, "What have you done for me lately?

But bombing campaigns by hostile powers are notoriously ineffective in undermining support for a government or forcing a surrender. Instead of people thinking that their suffering is due to the policies their government is pursuing, bombing victims blame the (bleeping) foreigners who are dropping the bombs. The Israeli and U.S. assault has resulted in an upsurge of Iranian nationalism and anger and at least short run support for the regime.

YOU CAN'T TELL THE PLAYERS WITHOUT A PROGRAM: THE MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL GROUPS

 

In the past month three significant international groups have met: the G7, G20 and BRICS. For most of us the "G this and the G that" " could just as easily be Gee Whiz and Gee Willikers and BRICS might as well be the Pink Floyd lyric, "all in all, you're just another BRICS in the wall." But these groups actually do matter because they affect the international economic system and over time can affect the prices we pay for everyday goods and the jobs of many Americans.

In this blog I'll focus on who these groups are and what they are trying to do. In another entry I'l try to shed light on the structure of the international economic system and the forces that may lead to major changes in the next decade or so.

 

T he Group of Seven  (a short enough name you'd think they wouldn't really need an acronym) is the "Big Rich Guys" club -- the seven largest advanced capitalist economies: Canada, France, Gernany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the United States -- and the European Union as a "non-enumerated member." Since 1975 the G7 has held two meetings a year, one with heads of state, and the other with finance ministers. The major goal is to coordinate economic policies to try to stabilize the international, economic system. It has been a major force supporting economic liberalization, the spread of open markets and liberal democratic values. For example, the G7 played a major role in preventing the 2008 international financial crisis from becoming a global depression. The G7 members (other than Japan and the non-enumerated EU)) were present at the creation of the contemporary international order and remain its strongest advocates.

The G7 accounts for over half of global net worth, 35-40% of Gross World Product, and 10% of the world's population.

 

In the 1980's and 1990's sustained economic development fueled in part by international borrowing moved several large countries from the ranks of the less developed into middle income status. But the reliance on loans to kick start growth led to problems that threatened not just the debtor countries but the wealthy G7 group. The problems of excess debt and sporadic economic crises led to the creation of an organization that included both the very rich and large middle income countries in hopes of coordinating policies and stabilizing the global economy. The group started with 19 countries and the European Union in 1999 and then added the African Union (perhaps because all the stationary and business cards and email accounts said "G20" it seemed easier to leave it at that rather than re-brand everything as the G21.)

The G20 meets once a year in a three day session featuring heads of state and finance ministers. The emphasis of the meetings has typically been reforms to the international economic system to improve terms of trade and access to international finance for the middle income members of the group. Recent meetings have also addressed climate change and some global political issues. The meetings have typically ended with a consensus joint communique that more often than not offers lip service to shared values and goals but no concrete commitments to specific changes. This year's meeting chaired by India's Prime Minister Modi was more contentious than most, in part because of the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. The 2022 joint communique condemned the invasion and expressed support for Ukraine but this time Russia and China strongly opposed any statement and several members, including host India, Turkey and the African Union were ambivalent. This year's final communique avoided explicitly criticizing Russia while proclaiming support for territorial integrity of states and expressing a desire for peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The G20 accounts for 80% of the Gross World Product, 75% of international trade and two-thirds of the world population

 

Was initiated by diplomats from Brazil, Russia, India and China who met during the UN General Assembly session in 2006, taking its name from an article by an American economist about large emerging economies. It held its first summit in 2009 and added South Africa (making BRIC into BRICS) the following year. BRICS countries account for about 27% of the Gross World Product and 42% of the world's population. The group has become increasingly tight knit and aspires to serve as an alternative to the dominant international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank which are seen as biased against them as well as the rest of the global South.

Using "North" to refer to the advanced capitalist countries-- all of whom are in the northern hemisphere -- and 'South" to refer to everyone else, or sometimes just the leas developed countries, not all of whom are in the southern hemisphere, is more of a rhetorical device implying good guys and bad guys than a useful categorization of stages of economic development.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are at the center of "the liberal international order" created by the United States and Western Europe after World War II. An analysis of the current state of the global economic institutions will have to wait for the next blog.

China and Russia have been the most vocal advocates of creating a powerful counter weight to the dominance of the G7 and Western capitalist, liberal democratic values but the other BRICS share the sentiment. In an attempt to bolster the power of BRICS, the 2023 summit in South Africa invited six emerging market group countries (Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) to join the bloc.

So What?

The G7 has been the most successful of the three blocs in coordinating policy and actions among its members. The 2008 financial crisis could have been much worse if the G7 members had focused on their own narrow and immediate self interest. Instead they managed to coordinate their responses and avoid the worst potential damage to the global economy. In a host of more mundane and seemingly trivial ways, the G7 have synchronized and coordinated policies to prevent problems. Cooperation that prevents bad things from happening does not make news nor does it make us feel good. (An example of the broader principle that the satisfaction from a gain is less than the pain from a loss.)

The G20 has been far less successful in getting the already rich global actors and the middle income, rising powers on the same page on any key issues. That is in part because of dissatisfaction with the way the IMF, World Bank and other institutions like the World Trade Organization make decisions and in part because the non-G7 members are quite diverse and often have conflicting interests. It is nonetheless, I think, useful for two reasons. First, it provides a venue for the developing nations to articulate their interests and be heard. For example, its meetings have been an opportunity to advocate for compensation and assistance in coping with the consequences of climate change for less well off countries that have not been emitting tons and tons of CO² for the past two centuries. Secondly, it is an opportunity for national leaders to meet on the sidelines for private discussions and negotiations without the glare of publicity and extensive preparation that a state visit or summit requires.

BRICS has an ambitious long range goal of creating a set of new international financial institutions to rival the western dominated IMF, World Bank and the central position of the U.S. dollar in trade and finance. As the BRICS see it, the world today is bipolar -- the global North (the rich G7 countries) on one side and the global South (everyone else) on the other. The BRICS, particularly Russia and China, aspire to a multipolar world in which the rising middle income countries are the third side in the global economy. In particular they would like to see currencies other than the dollar used as the international standard in trade, loans for development projects that don't come with environmental or social strings, and less emphasis on capitalist and democratic values. Optimists see the addition of six more members next year as a major step toward a multipolar world, comparing it to the Bandung Conference of 1955,* Skeptics point to the great disparity of national interests, economic systems and international trading patterns that would make actually implementing a new scheme extremely difficult.

*The Bandung Conference was the first meeting of post-colonial Asia and African countries that launched the non-aligned movement as a counterweight to the Cold War US-USSR conflict. It is doubtful that the non-aligned movement had a significant impact.

The international financial system is not something we think about every day (at least I don't, perhaps you do) but it impacts our lives every day. For example, the IMF is central to world trade, using the U.S. dollar as the basis for setting prices for imports and exports. So when a store in California wants to order blouses form Bangladesh (taka), jeans from Viet Nam (dong), tv sets from Samsung (South Korean won), or Polish hams (zlotys) it does not have to worry about how much a taka or zloty is worth in "real" money or come up with a big wad of dongs to pay for the goods. The factory in Bangladesh or Korea sets its prices in dollars and accepts dollars in payment. That makes the imported goods less expensive than if buyers and sellers had to go physically exchange one currency for the other and pay an exchange fee. The impact on the price of a car, with parts produced from several countries around the world would be even more noticeable.

For us in the United States, the fact that the current system rests on the dollar as the common currency means that there is a large and consistent market for U.S. Treasury bonds which funds the national debt.

The current system does at times impose our values on other countries. The G7 countries dominate the World Bank and often insist that loans for development projects include environmental protections or promote educational or economic opportunities for women and girls.

That is not to say that this is the best of all possible worlds or that there are not some valid points raised by critics of the current system. We will try to look at some of those in a future blog post.

Sudan's Suffering

 

On April 15 of this year the 5.7 million residents of Khartoum woke up in the middle of a vicious pitched battle between two heavily armed military forces. Tanks rumbled through normally quiet suburbs, artillery shells rained down on informal settlements, fighter jets roared overhead and soldiers raided the food and medical supply warehouses of international aid agencies and wandered the streets looting whatever they could find.  The road from the city to Port Sudan on the Red Sea was closed, cutting the city off from supplies and making escape from the city impossible.

To understand how the largest city in Sudan, its political, economic and social center turned into a battlefield with no escape and nowhere to hide, we need to revisit Sudan's recent history.

We can skip over some 5,000 years of recorded history by noting that the Blue Nile flowing from Ethiopia and the White Nile flowing from Tanzania meet at Khartoum and then flow north to create Egypt. The 1884 Berlin Conference on Africa "gave" Egypt to the United Kingdom although the British always had to pretend that they were really just guests of the Kingdom of Egypt. It also gave Britain control of the territory south of Khartoum through the Sahara desert down into sub-Saharan Africa and for good measure, the British territory extended far to the west. The arbitrary lines on a map lumped together a majority population that had been influenced by the Arab and Islamic invasion of the 8th and 9th centuries and is largely semi-nomadic camel and sheep herders, some of whom had been key middlemen in transporting Black African slaves across the Sahara. A significant minority of the people included in the south and west of Sudan are Black African subsistence farmers who were Christians or traditional animists. A final segment of the population are the urbanized citizens of Khartoum, linked to Egypt historically, culturally and economically.

A Hopeful Future

When Sudan gained independence in 1956, there was immense optimism that the waters of the Blue and the White Nile could be used to create an enormous agricultural area. There were dreams of Sudan as "The Bread Basket of the Middle East." But instead Sudan endured 40 years of political instability with weak and inept civilian governments alternating with equally inept military regimes. That ended in 1989 when Omar al-Bashir led yet another military coup but managed to consolidate power and create an increasingly repressive regime. Despite the facts that a significant minority of Sudanese were not Muslim and Islam as practiced in Sudan was tolerant and relaxed, al-Bashir forged an alliance with conservative Islamist clerics and announced plans to "Islamicize" Sudan. That led to two major revolts, one in the South and the other in the western province of Darfur. The brutal and bloody civil war in the South dragged on until 2011 when the al-Bashir regime gave up and a poplar referendum ratified the creation of the new nation of South Sudan. With the regular army preoccupied with the fighting in the South, the rebellion in Darfur was opposed by a series of militias from the semi-nomadic camel herders. The various militias were quickly organized into a single force by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo with direct support from al-Bashir as the "Janjaweed" and began a rampage of arson, rape, murder and looting against the Black African farming villages that resulted in an estimated 400,000 deaths and over 2 million refugees in camps dependent on international aid organizations. [The atrocities perpetrated in Darfur became an international cause celebre in the early 2000's and led the International Criminal Court to indict Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity.] al-Bashir worked with Hemedti to reorganize and re-brand the Janjaweed as the Rapid Support Force (RSF) as an important counter weight to the Sudanese military and additional prop for his rule.

Hopes Dashed Again

By 2021 Sudan was increasingly isolated and the foreign aid that was a major element of the economy was drying up. The government's response to shortages of food and supplies and spiraling inflation was so inept that a coalition of Khartoum civilian elites and senior military officers ousted al-Bashir and installed a transitional government with a strong civilian presence and both army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF's Hemedti. It seemed Sudan was on the verge of a democratic future. That dream did not last and al-Burban and Hemedti took power in (yet another) coup with al-Burban the ostensible number 1 and Hemedti as number 2. They oversaw the indictment and conviction of al-Bashir on bribery and corruption charges and put him in jail for two years but refused to turn him over to the International Criminal Court.

Almost immediately the pair began arguing over plans to integrate Hemedti's RSF forces into the Sudanese Armed Forces. Once the RSF disappeared into the regular army, Hemedti would be without a power base and source of income. The three years al-Burban offered was hardly enough time to prepare for a comfortable retirement; Hemedti figured ten years would be about right.

This was not an abstract argument about personnel and organizational flow charts. Most of the roughly 100,000 RSF fighters had come to the Khartoum area to support Hemedti's role in the coup leadership and it was not clear how long he could find the money to support them. Not surprisingly there were very tense relationships between the RSF fighters and the Sudanese soldiers as they patrolled the streets of Khartoum.

WAR 2023

It is not clear what ignited the violence between the two armed groups in April but much of the violence was aimed at controlling international aid agencies, medical facilities and food warehouses as well a civilian infrastructure like electricity generation, roads into and out of Khartoum, and the airport.

There is no easy escape for the millions of people caught in the fighting in the capital. The airport is a battleground and there are no flights. The United States, the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia manged to broker a brief cease fire to allow the evacuation of international aid workers and embassy personnel overland to Port Sudan on the Red Sea and on to Egypt. But the ceasefire evaporated and the highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan was closed again. Even when sporadic cease fires are negotiated to allow shipments of food and medical supplies into Khartoum, civilians are unable to leave since they lack transport and the all-important exit visas they need to leave Port Sudan.

The explanation for the attacks on international aid agencies, medical facilities and food storage sites lies, I think, in the nature of the RSF forces. The typical recruit is a young man from rural northern Sudan with little education and not much future beyond semi-nomadic camel herding. Joining a militia means getting a regular paycheck, meals and housing, a group to belong to and the thrill of firing an assault rifle. It is just plain cool to put on your camo fatigues and ride around in the back of a Toyota pickup with your gun and buddies. It also offers the chance to extort money or goods from villagers or even to attack and loot hapless farmers who are the traditional enemies of nomads. The RSF troops have the equipment and weapons of a modern army and some military training (from Wagner group mercenaries and others) but they do not have the discipline and focus of professional armies which puts civilians who cross their path in grave danger of robbery or worse. I do not know where the RSF gets its funding, but suspect it comes from oil-rich conservative Islamist individuals in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

In Khartoum, aid organizations and medical centers are attacked because they have things that are worth taking and civilians in their houses are attacked because city dwellers are resented and scorned for their Westernized ways and they have things worth taking. Once fighting broke out in the capital, it meant the government and regular army could no longer control the rest of the country and the RSF unleashed a furious assault in Darfur, resurrecting the nightmare of rape, mass murder and pillage of 2003 -2005. The fortunate ones will be able to make it to refugee camps in Chad which still shelter thousands of people from the horrors of 20 years ago.

Perhaps because of the limits on my knowledge of the situation and the key players, it is difficult to see and quick or easy solution. For the two major players: the Sudanese Armed Forces' al-Burban and the RSF's Hemedti, this is both business and personal. The business part is straightforward -- controlling the government presents opportunities to skim and divert foreign aid funds and tax revenues and to collect a little something for approving plans for construction or mining operations. (When al-Bashir was accused and convicted of bribery and corruption, his long time cronies in the government and military and Khartoum's civilian elites were shocked, yes, shocked and appalled to think that such things were being done ...) That might allow for some sort of power (and revenue) sharing agreement but the conflict is also personal. The two men neither like nor trust each other and any attempt to integrate the RSF into the regular forces means the end of Hemedti's career as player in Sudanese politics. There is no way to split the difference.

As I mentioned, the United States, the UK and Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, are playing the central role in trying to end the violence. Sudan's neighbors, such as Chad and Libya, are greatly concerned about Sudan's impact on their own stability and internal conflicts. I think the only hope for at least a temporary solution is the withdrawal of RSF forces from Khartoum and Darfur. As long as the fighting continues the 5.7 million citizens of Khartoum are trapped in their homes with dwindling food supplies, limited access to water and non-existent medical services. Thousands of Darfur citizens are reported on the move from their villages to the comparative safety of refugee camps in Chad amid rumors and reports of atrocities evoking the agony of 20 years ago.

Israel's Winter of Discontent

 

The term "existential crisis" has been so over used it has become a tired cliche. But sometimes issues do pose fundamental challenges to the physical or political survival of a country. The controversy in Israel over the judicial "reforms" and other items in the package of concessions Benjamin Netanyahu made to extreme ultra-Orthodox and settler parties to cobble together a ruling coalition is one such issue. What is at stake is not just the relationship between the judiciary and the Knesset (Israel's parliament) but the future of Israeli society.

Governmental Structure

Israel, like the United Kingdom, does not have a written constitution that limits the scope and power of the government. But there are 13 "Basic Laws" passed from 1950 to 1992 that the High Court of Israel has declared to be the equivalent of a written constitution and empower the Court to review and reject laws passed by the Knesset.

In Israel, as in the United Kingdom and all other parliamentary systems, a majority of the members of the Knesset select the Prime Minister and senior government officials. The tension between the executive and legislative branches that is a central feature of the Untried States constitution is absent. The only check on a Prime Minister is the necessity to keep a majority of the Knesset happy. Israel, unlike the United States or United Kingdom, has a single chamber legislature so there is no tension between an upper house (like the U.S. Senate with a Democratic majority) and lower house (like the U.S. House of Representatives with a Republican majority.) And in Israel, as in the United Kingdom and other parliamentary systems but quite unlike the United States, local provincial or state governments are not independent and in tension with the national government.

Israel uses a proportional representation system to allocate the 120 Knesset seats and a party with as little as 5% of the vote may have several seats. As a result Israeli politics can be highly fragmented and a government formed from a coalition of parties, sometimes proving the old adage that politics makes strange bedfellows. In a coalition government that has only a narrow majority, where every vote counts, a party with as few as four or five seats can wield disproportionate power and influence.

The changes the Netanyahu government proposed earlier this year would negate the High Court's role as arbiter of the unwritten constitution embodied in the Basic Laws, replacing judicial review of Knesset legislation with Knesset review of judicial decisions and giving the government of the day exclusive control of judicial appointments. The basic rationale for the changes is that unelected judges should not be able to override the actions of the democratically elected parliament.

The triggering incident for the reform agenda seems to have been the decision last January regarding Aryeh Deri, leader of the ultra-Orthodox party Shas whose 11 votes are critical to the ruling coalition. Netanyahu appointed Deri health and interior minister despite Deri's conviction for tax evasion. When that was challenged on the grounds that Israeli law forbids convicted felons from serving in the cabinet, the Knesset passed a new law stating that as long as the conviction did not involved jail time, it did not disqualify the person. The High Court declared that bit of legislation unconstitutional and Deri was fired from the cabinet (but not the Knesset.) The fact that Netanyahu himself is currently on trial for bribery and corruption is an important part of the context.

The deep divisions in Israeli society make the consequences of this crisis even more serious and explain the depth of the passion and commitment of the hundreds of thousands of protesters. This battle, serious as it is, is seen as only the first episode in a series of events that could change the fundamental nature of Israeli society.

Divisions in Society and Politics

The founding generation of Israeli leadership was marked by social democratic ideals of Western European Zionism and the Utopian socialism of many of the Jews who immigrated to Palestine in the 1920's and 30's. Well before independence in 1949 there was a well-developed system of support for new arrivals to meet their physical needs and to integrate them into the emerging society. The first arrivals after the end of World War II were Holocaust survivors and refugees from Central and Eastern Europe known as "Ashkenazim" or European Jews. The next wave, after Independence, were Jews from the Middle East and North Africa (known as Sephardim) who were culturally and socially more like their former Arab and Muslim neighbors than the Ashkenazim. Despite the best efforts of the settlement agencies, the differences in education and culture meant that many Sephardim and their children ended up with lower levels of education, income and social status.

The different perspectives and experiences of Ashkenazim and Sephardim led to the emergence of political movements opposed to the Labor Party which had dominated Israeli politics. The opposition coalesced around the Likud party. The party's base was Sephardic and its ideology placed more stress on Jewish identity and nationalism than social democratic values. In 1976 it eclipsed Labor in the Knesset and made Menachim Begin Prime Minister. Likud, the party of Benjamin Netanyahu, remains the single largest party in Israel with 32 of the 120 Knesset sets, while Labor has dwindled to a paltry 4 and its adherents have splintered into several centrist parties.

The Ultra-Orthodox

Haredi Judaism, often referred to as ultra-Orthodox, emerged in Eastern Europe in the early 20th Century alongside the earlier Hasidic movement. Both reject the intellectual, social and material transformations that began with the Enlightenment and define modern Europe and North America, as well as the large majority of Israelis. Religious, social and economic behavior is based on a very literal reading of the Torah. The rules and prescriptions in the book of Leviticus for example, are taken at face value.

Because its adherents wore distinctive traditional clothing and most lived in small towns, they were exceptionally vulnerable to being swept up in the Holocaust. Most of those who did survive arrived in Israel in the wave of post-war immigrants (others came to the United States.) But unlike other new arrivals, they had no interest in being assimilated into the emerging Israeli society, regarding themselves as the only authentic Jews and the only ones living a truly righteous life. In addition the ultra-Orthodox believe that a Jewish state will not be established until the Messiah comes which makes the Zionist vision of a modern state illegitimate and justifies refusal to comply with governmental regulations.

Successive Israeli governments have been generally tolerant of ultra-Orthodox views and concerns. Two of the concessions made to ultra-Orthodox communities are particularly significant (and irritating to many other Israelis): military service and education. All Israeli citizens are obliged to serve in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) (24 months for women; 32 for men) and then in the active reserve for at least ten years. (Active reserve means that you may be writing code for the latest killer app one day and driving an Abrams tank across the desert the next.) Ultra-Orthodox men and women are exempt. Ultra-Orthodox children may attend religious schools instead of secular state schools and ultra-Orthodox men usually continue their education in a yeshiva studying the Torah and rabbinic commentaries, often until they marry, often with a subsidy from the government. (Women do not go to school beyond the equivalent of high school but are expected to marry and have children as soon as possible.) Ultra-Orthodox and other conservative communities are much more common and influential in Jerusaled than most other cities, such as Tel Aviv.

Because of their narrowly religious education and traditional social roles, ultra-Orthodox men (women do not work outside the home) are usually confined to low paying jobs even as they are trying to support large families. Ultra-Orthodox communities have some of the highest poverty rates in Israel.

Despite deep reservations about the legitimacy of the state, ultra-Orthodox Israelis do participate in politics and there are several ultra-Orthodox parties in the Knesset. These parties have become increasingly important in the ruling coalitions Netanyahu has put together, wielding far more power than their 13% of the population would suggest. Over the past few decades they have become increasing important in social policy, from definitions of who is a Jew and thus entitled to a right of return, to increasing subsides for religious students.

Settlers

In the 1990's the demise of the Soviet Union freed Russian Jews to emigrate and some 190,000 came to Israel. The agencies charged with socializing new immigrants were not equipped to handle such a large number and many new arrivals quickly moved on to West Bank settlements. This major increase in settlers has led to rapid growth in new settlements (often despite High Court rulings that they are illegal,) increased the militancy of settlers' leadership and led to contentious, often violent interactions between settlers and Palestinians. Itamar Ben-Gvir is the leader of one of the most militant pro-settler parties in the current cabinet. He is proud of the fact that he has been indicted over 50 times for hate speech and inciting violence; only one of those indictments resulted in a conviction. One of the concessions Netanyahu made to get the settlers' parties into his coalition was to create a "national guard" to serve under Ben-Gvir's Interior ministry. The guard's vaguely defined mission would be to focus on unrest and violence in the West Bank, on the grounds that the IDF, Shin Bet (equivalent of the FBI), and the regular police force are too busy with other duties and issues.

The threat of a radical change in the role of the courts in Israeli politics, the proposal for a national guard outside the established security system, promises of increased support and benefits for the ultra-Orthodox have driven tens of thousands of Israelis to the streets in recent weeks. A particularly telling clue about how deeply disturbed many middle-of-the-road, moderate Israelis are about the issues is the fact that several hundred reserve officers signed a letter stating that they would not serve in the IDF if the judicial proposal went through. (This is more than 1960's "Hell no, I won't go" Vietnam resistance. The IDF is a proud symbol of Israeli strength and national pride. It is one of the most respected institutions in the country.

The protesters are clear: These proposals are a direct, existential threat to a democratic Israel. Netanyahu has agreed to delay consideration of his judicial program until the end of Passover, on April 13. There is undoubtedly some very serious discussions and negotiations going on behind the scenes, we may soon know if they will succeed.