In the last few weeks President Trump has taken steps to fulfill one
of his campaign promises, to extricate America from "endless"
wars. He has heralded the major progress his special envoy to
Afghanistan has made in talks with the Taliban to pave the way for
the U.S. to leave Afghanistan. The reaction from observers both
within and outside the administration made it clear that he did not
consult the military or foreign policy professionals but, apparently,
has relied on his gut instincts.
Since I think the
war in Afghanistan is unwinnable and I do not think our departure
will mean the return of the horrors of the Taliban regime of 20 years
ago, I think this is a good decision. I also think it may represent
the first small step away from the militarized policy that has marked
America's relationship with both the Middle East and Africa since
2001.
The immediate
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 was, as Shakespeare
would have it, "Cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war!"
The rhetoric from President Bush and his administration and
Congress's Joint resolution of September 14 authoring the use of the
military force against those responsible for the attacks and any
"associated forces" has led to almost two decades of
open-ended "war on terror"* and given unchallenged primacy
to the national security establishment's++ definition of American
interests in the Middle East and Africa.
*President Obama did try to retire the phase and was blasted by
hawkish critics. But a major factor in his administration's
faltering and tepid response to the emerging tragedy of civil war in
Syria was the desire to find groups to support whose rhetoric and
ideology had no trace of political Islam, because so many national
security "experts" equate every expression of political
Islam with "terrorism."
++ the senior military officers, civilian scholars and analysts with
a particular interest in military affairs who can be found at the
upper levels of the Pentagon and often move between universities or
research institutions and governmental positions. Their shared world
view emphasizes detecting and countering threats to the U.S.
A major consequence
of the preeminence of the emphasis on security is that the U.S.
Central Command has become far more powerful in shaping policy toward
countries in the Middle East than the diplomats and officials in the
State Department. President Obama created the Africa Command to
coordinate the U.S. military involvement in Africa and fight
terrorism in North Africa, the Sahara, and countries like Kenya and
Nigeria. Not only has that meant the Defense Department's definition
of U.S. interests has overshadowed an emphasis economic, political
and social development goals in those countries but it has also
colored America's approach to the entire continent. This has given
China even more opportunities for economic involvement in sub-Saharan
Africa.
There are two
fundamental problems with the ascendance of the national security
perspective over the other dimensions of international relations.
The first is an institutional bias toward seeing threats. Any
profession trains its practitioners to be very sensitive to specific
problems. For example, police officers are trained to look for
potential crime, medical professionals are trained to look for
disease, and Political Scientists tend to see everything as
political. National security experts consider the most important
aspect of every other country in the world is whether they are a
direct threat to the United States, an ally against threatening
states or largely irrelevant.
If you think Iran is
a major threat to the United States and Saudi Arabia is, after
Israel, the most important counter to Iran in the Middle East, then
human rights, treatment of women or foreign workers, even the
execution of a journalist are of secondary importance.
The second
fundamental problem with the national security emphasis is that it
emphasizes a restricted set of tools for dealing with the world. The
military and civilian defense intellectuals dress the primacy of hard
power over soft power. "Hard power" refers to resources
that can be used for coercion (do it my way or you'll be sorry) or
deterrence (if you do that you'll be sorry) while "soft power"
refers to resources, particularly intangible resources, like prestige
or admiration for a country's culture or technology, that can be used
to persuade. From a national security perspective, sophisticated jet
fighters really matter; a commitment to human rights and democracy is
somewhat beside the point.
I do not think that
one's gut is a reliable guide to coping with complex problems and it
is usually oblivious to the devils lurking in the details. If my
stomach hurts I prefer the physician who asks about symptoms and runs
some tests before making a diagnosis to the non-physician who wanders
by and says his gut tells him I've got an ulcer. If it's gut versus
judgment based on expertise, I'll go with informed judgment.
But, just as even a
blind hog can find an acorn some of the time, the gut can be right.
And in the case of Afghanistan, I think Trump's gut trumps expertise.
