A
potential catastrophe is brewing in the Persian Gulf. Both the United States
and Iran are taking steps that the other side views as aggressive and threatening
and responding in kind. By any sober analysis both the United States and Iran would
suffer enormous damage if things spiral out of control and a large scale military
conflict erupted.
In the
worst case, the United States would launch a massive aerial bombardment of Iran
designed to destroy their nuclear infrastructure, which would, most likely,
both fail to neutralize all the sites and cause immense harm to Iran's infrastructure
and already faltering economy. Iran's most obvious strategy would be to try to
stop oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. [for more than you might want
to know about the Strait, click here.] Since the U.S. is less dependent on imported
oil than Europe, Japan, or China, the loss of oil from the Middle East would
not cripple the U.S. economy but it would cause a spike in gasoline prices and have a substantial negative impact
on our major trading partners. Iran has
close working relationships with a number of groups throughout the Middle East,
from Hezbollah in Lebanon to a variety of forces in Iraq and various factions in
the Gulf States and elsewhere. The
standard American view that Iran controls these groups is probably a gross over
estimation, but Iran does have the capacity to inspire its allies to attack
American forces and interests in several countries and also threaten Israel.
While I
think both sides understand that a major military exchange would be the worst
possible outcome, there are three crucial dynamics that create the potential
for escalation to spiral out of control.
1.)
First,
each country’s decision making is influenced by hawks sees the other as an
implacable enemy who desires their destruction.
Decision
makers at the highest level of government are very much like you and me when it
comes to understanding history. What
matters is not a careful time line, detailed description and nuanced discussion
of events, complete with alternative explanations, but general impressions. The Iranian regime tends to see Iran as
initially a victim of Western Imperialism and then a beacon of resistance. America and Britain toppled a democratic
Iranian regime in 1952 and imposed their puppet Shah; the glorious 1979 revolution
created the modern Islamic Republic, liberating Iran from foreigners and giving
the world an ideology and living example of freedom from Western capitalist
domination.
From the U.S. perspective, the 1979 revolution replaced a friendly regime with a bunch of religious fanatics who loved to chant “Death to America”, called us the “Great Satan”, are sworn to the annihilation of Israel, and are constantly trying to foment turmoil and rebellion across the Middle East.
From the U.S. perspective, the 1979 revolution replaced a friendly regime with a bunch of religious fanatics who loved to chant “Death to America”, called us the “Great Satan”, are sworn to the annihilation of Israel, and are constantly trying to foment turmoil and rebellion across the Middle East.
If a
belief that a burning desire to destroy you lies at the very core of another country’s
policies, you will be powerfully predisposed to interpret whatever they do or
say in the worst possible light.
2) The
second pernicious dynamic is each side’s belief that its actions are a measured
and appropriate response to the provocative and dangerous actions of the other.
From Iran’s perspective, the current
confrontation began when the U.S. pulled out of the nuclear agreement and tried
to destroy Iran’s economy by blocking its access to global oil markets. Then the U.S. publicly backed Saudi Arabia’s
newly aggressive foreign policy whose centerpiece is an attempt to isolate Iran
and attack its friends and Allies in the Middle East.
Iran
responded by increasing work on medium range ballistic missiles, supporting the
Syrian regime, strengthening its ties to friendly militas in countries like
Iraq and Lebanon and supporting the rebels after Saudi Arabia intervened in the
civil war in Yemen.
After withdrawing
from the Paris nuclear accord, the United States has crippled the Iranian economy
with sanctions, escalated its extreme anti-Iranian rhetoric and begun to build
up its military forces in the Gulf. The
Iranian response has been to look to Europe to keep its promise to develop a
system that would allow the major oil companies to purchase Iran crude and European
companies to do business with Iran without being punished by the U.S. for
violating America’s unilateral sanctions on Iran.
The biggest obstacle is the fact
that the global financial system ultimately rests very heavily on the U.S.
dollar. Not only are most transactions priced
in dollars but most transactions use U.S. banking institutions, either directly
or indirectly, to complete the deal.
U.S. sanctions foreclose access to U.S.. financial institutions. The second stumbling block is a fear that a European
company doing business with Iran will have its U.S. operations penalized or curtailed
by the U.S. Treasury Department..
The European Union promised last year to
develop an alternative financing mechanism for Iranian business but that has
not been fully implemented. Iran’s most recent
moves, the attack on two tankers in the Strait of Hormuz* and the threat to withdraw
from the nuclear deal within a week can be understood from Tehran’s perspective
as a modest reminder that shipping lanes are vulnerable and a much more pointed
demand that the EU moves very rapidly to keep its promise.
*I am assuming that Iran was the
source of the mines attached to the two tankers. The reluctance of our major
European allies to accept the U.S. assertion of Iranian culpability says less,
I think, about the likelihood of Iranian involvement and much more about the
level of mistrust of the Trump administration and its intentions.
From the U.S.
view, the original nuclear deal was fatally flawed because it did not permanently
prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and it did not stop Iran’s
promotion of terrorism and other “nefarious activities.” Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon:
wherever you look the Iranians are stirring up trouble and backing some pretty
bad actors. The recent small increase (a
few thousand) troops is in direct response to what the U.S. says are credible
threats to American citizens and interests.
3.) The
third vicious dynamic is a feeling of helplessness.
Aside from
a few super hawks, no one in either government wants things to escalate to a
major military clash. But since each
side firmly believes that it has no choice but to react to the hostile and threatening
actions of the other, it is the other side that must back down and stop making things
worse. If only the U.S. (or Iran) would change
its course, then Iran (or the U.S.) could stand down.
So what
will happen?
I want to
present an optimistic view based on three plausible assumptions.
1)
The U.S. government is deeply divided
between hawks and doves. The Iranian government may also be divided.
National
Security advisor John Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and several
prominent Republican Senators epitomize the “implacable enemy” view that the
Iranian regime must be overthrown sooner or later. They are strongly supported by Israel, Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States whose current stance is pretty close to “I’ll hold
your coat while you go beat them up.”
But
President Trump is, clearly opposed to a full scale war with Iran, as is a
significant portion of the foreign policy establishment (yes, “the Blob” is back.) Bolton, Pompeo and other major White House decision
makers have reportedly been given detailed and sober briefings on the enormous
costs and consequences of a full scale war with Iran. Ironically, Trump’s often
criticized tendency to replace the assessments of national intelligence agencies
with his own gut feelings is an important restraining force in this situation. The Defense Department is adamant that Iran deliberately
shot down a U.S. multi-million dollar drone in international air space in a
provocative violation of international law; President Trump says it was an Iranian
“mistake” and not a major escalation.
The Iranian
political system is convoluted and opaque.
While it is clear that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, is the
highest authority and the Council of Experts is the next most significant body,
there are two parallel governmental organizations making military policy and
day to day decisions. The formal
government features an elected legislature and President and the usual bureaus
and offices, including the military. At
the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is technically a branch
of the military but has become a functionally autonomous body with a complex of
businesses and factories that is capable of acting on its own. The IRGC, either under orders from the top or
a unit acting on its own, is quite capable of shooting down a U.S. drone
without the prior knowledge, let alone approval, of the civilian government.
2)
Both sides
so far have shown a certain amount of restraint.
So far
the American response to Iranian moves such as attacking oil tankers and shooting
down a drone has been muted: Sending
more troops to the region and threatening rhetoric is far milder than launching
a punitive air strike. President Trump’s
very public cancellation of an air strike on Iran to avoid casualties at the
very least avoids escalation and may mark the beginning of a de-escalation
spiral. Iran’s announcement that they
could have shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane but chose not to may also be a
small step back from the brink. Of
course, the danger of disastrous miscalculation remains and there is always the
possibility that we are in the same situation as the person who fell off a 30
story building and when someone on the 2nd floor called out “How are
you doing?” the answer was, “so far, so good!”
The fact that
the American government and, I think, the Iranian side, are both divided on how
evil and/or rational the adversary is good news … and bad news. The good news is that it opens up the possibility
of cooler heads prevailing and finding a way out of the immediate conflict; the
bad news is that the hawkish rhetoric and actions of the hard liners on either
side will be taken as representing the “real” position.
3)
While clearly there’s a sense that if only the other
side would back off this confrontation could be resolved, there also seems to
be a sense on both sides that they can control the situation and there are
options.
Both
sides have long term, non-negotiable demands (the U.S. insistence that there is
some sort of iron clad guarantee that Iran will never develop nuclear weapons;
the Iranian insistence that the U.S. end its campaign of economic coercion and rejoin
the 2015 Paris Agreement), neither has laid out a specific challenge that the
other must meet in the immediate future.
There is a potential path to a resolution that might be little more than
a gradual easing of tension.
It seems
fair to say that the recent history of U.S.-Iranian relations began when the
U.S. walked away from the nuclear accord and adopted a policy of highly coercive
measures to force Iran to renegotiate. A
reliance on threats and punishments to force someone to do what you want is the
basic definition of a compellance strategy.
It may be useful to devote a future blog to a more conceptual discussion
of compellance, deterrence and persuasion as strategies. It may not take six months to get around to
it …
