The term "existential crisis" has been so over used it has become a tired cliche. But sometimes issues do pose fundamental challenges to the physical or political survival of a country. The controversy in Israel over the judicial "reforms" and other items in the package of concessions Benjamin Netanyahu made to extreme ultra-Orthodox and settler parties to cobble together a ruling coalition is one such issue. What is at stake is not just the relationship between the judiciary and the Knesset (Israel's parliament) but the future of Israeli society.
Governmental Structure
Israel, like the United Kingdom, does not have a written constitution that limits the scope and power of the government. But there are 13 "Basic Laws" passed from 1950 to 1992 that the High Court of Israel has declared to be the equivalent of a written constitution and empower the Court to review and reject laws passed by the Knesset.
In Israel, as in the United Kingdom and all other parliamentary systems, a majority of the members of the Knesset select the Prime Minister and senior government officials. The tension between the executive and legislative branches that is a central feature of the Untried States constitution is absent. The only check on a Prime Minister is the necessity to keep a majority of the Knesset happy. Israel, unlike the United States or United Kingdom, has a single chamber legislature so there is no tension between an upper house (like the U.S. Senate with a Democratic majority) and lower house (like the U.S. House of Representatives with a Republican majority.) And in Israel, as in the United Kingdom and other parliamentary systems but quite unlike the United States, local provincial or state governments are not independent and in tension with the national government.
Israel uses a proportional representation system to allocate the 120 Knesset seats and a party with as little as 5% of the vote may have several seats. As a result Israeli politics can be highly fragmented and a government formed from a coalition of parties, sometimes proving the old adage that politics makes strange bedfellows. In a coalition government that has only a narrow majority, where every vote counts, a party with as few as four or five seats can wield disproportionate power and influence.
The changes the Netanyahu government proposed earlier this year would negate the High Court's role as arbiter of the unwritten constitution embodied in the Basic Laws, replacing judicial review of Knesset legislation with Knesset review of judicial decisions and giving the government of the day exclusive control of judicial appointments. The basic rationale for the changes is that unelected judges should not be able to override the actions of the democratically elected parliament.
The triggering incident for the reform agenda seems to have been the decision last January regarding Aryeh Deri, leader of the ultra-Orthodox party Shas whose 11 votes are critical to the ruling coalition. Netanyahu appointed Deri health and interior minister despite Deri's conviction for tax evasion. When that was challenged on the grounds that Israeli law forbids convicted felons from serving in the cabinet, the Knesset passed a new law stating that as long as the conviction did not involved jail time, it did not disqualify the person. The High Court declared that bit of legislation unconstitutional and Deri was fired from the cabinet (but not the Knesset.) The fact that Netanyahu himself is currently on trial for bribery and corruption is an important part of the context.
The deep divisions in Israeli society make the consequences of this crisis even more serious and explain the depth of the passion and commitment of the hundreds of thousands of protesters. This battle, serious as it is, is seen as only the first episode in a series of events that could change the fundamental nature of Israeli society.
Divisions in Society and Politics
The founding generation of Israeli leadership was marked by social democratic ideals of Western European Zionism and the Utopian socialism of many of the Jews who immigrated to Palestine in the 1920's and 30's. Well before independence in 1949 there was a well-developed system of support for new arrivals to meet their physical needs and to integrate them into the emerging society. The first arrivals after the end of World War II were Holocaust survivors and refugees from Central and Eastern Europe known as "Ashkenazim" or European Jews. The next wave, after Independence, were Jews from the Middle East and North Africa (known as Sephardim) who were culturally and socially more like their former Arab and Muslim neighbors than the Ashkenazim. Despite the best efforts of the settlement agencies, the differences in education and culture meant that many Sephardim and their children ended up with lower levels of education, income and social status.
The different perspectives and experiences of Ashkenazim and Sephardim led to the emergence of political movements opposed to the Labor Party which had dominated Israeli politics. The opposition coalesced around the Likud party. The party's base was Sephardic and its ideology placed more stress on Jewish identity and nationalism than social democratic values. In 1976 it eclipsed Labor in the Knesset and made Menachim Begin Prime Minister. Likud, the party of Benjamin Netanyahu, remains the single largest party in Israel with 32 of the 120 Knesset sets, while Labor has dwindled to a paltry 4 and its adherents have splintered into several centrist parties.
The Ultra-Orthodox
Haredi Judaism, often referred to as ultra-Orthodox, emerged in Eastern Europe in the early 20th Century alongside the earlier Hasidic movement. Both reject the intellectual, social and material transformations that began with the Enlightenment and define modern Europe and North America, as well as the large majority of Israelis. Religious, social and economic behavior is based on a very literal reading of the Torah. The rules and prescriptions in the book of Leviticus for example, are taken at face value.
Because its adherents wore distinctive traditional clothing and most lived in small towns, they were exceptionally vulnerable to being swept up in the Holocaust. Most of those who did survive arrived in Israel in the wave of post-war immigrants (others came to the United States.) But unlike other new arrivals, they had no interest in being assimilated into the emerging Israeli society, regarding themselves as the only authentic Jews and the only ones living a truly righteous life. In addition the ultra-Orthodox believe that a Jewish state will not be established until the Messiah comes which makes the Zionist vision of a modern state illegitimate and justifies refusal to comply with governmental regulations.
Successive Israeli governments have been generally tolerant of ultra-Orthodox views and concerns. Two of the concessions made to ultra-Orthodox communities are particularly significant (and irritating to many other Israelis): military service and education. All Israeli citizens are obliged to serve in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) (24 months for women; 32 for men) and then in the active reserve for at least ten years. (Active reserve means that you may be writing code for the latest killer app one day and driving an Abrams tank across the desert the next.) Ultra-Orthodox men and women are exempt. Ultra-Orthodox children may attend religious schools instead of secular state schools and ultra-Orthodox men usually continue their education in a yeshiva studying the Torah and rabbinic commentaries, often until they marry, often with a subsidy from the government. (Women do not go to school beyond the equivalent of high school but are expected to marry and have children as soon as possible.) Ultra-Orthodox and other conservative communities are much more common and influential in Jerusaled than most other cities, such as Tel Aviv.
Because of their narrowly religious education and traditional social roles, ultra-Orthodox men (women do not work outside the home) are usually confined to low paying jobs even as they are trying to support large families. Ultra-Orthodox communities have some of the highest poverty rates in Israel.
Despite deep reservations about the legitimacy of the state, ultra-Orthodox Israelis do participate in politics and there are several ultra-Orthodox parties in the Knesset. These parties have become increasingly important in the ruling coalitions Netanyahu has put together, wielding far more power than their 13% of the population would suggest. Over the past few decades they have become increasing important in social policy, from definitions of who is a Jew and thus entitled to a right of return, to increasing subsides for religious students.
Settlers
In the 1990's the demise of the Soviet Union freed Russian Jews to emigrate and some 190,000 came to Israel. The agencies charged with socializing new immigrants were not equipped to handle such a large number and many new arrivals quickly moved on to West Bank settlements. This major increase in settlers has led to rapid growth in new settlements (often despite High Court rulings that they are illegal,) increased the militancy of settlers' leadership and led to contentious, often violent interactions between settlers and Palestinians. Itamar Ben-Gvir is the leader of one of the most militant pro-settler parties in the current cabinet. He is proud of the fact that he has been indicted over 50 times for hate speech and inciting violence; only one of those indictments resulted in a conviction. One of the concessions Netanyahu made to get the settlers' parties into his coalition was to create a "national guard" to serve under Ben-Gvir's Interior ministry. The guard's vaguely defined mission would be to focus on unrest and violence in the West Bank, on the grounds that the IDF, Shin Bet (equivalent of the FBI), and the regular police force are too busy with other duties and issues.
The threat of a radical change in the role of the courts in Israeli politics, the proposal for a national guard outside the established security system, promises of increased support and benefits for the ultra-Orthodox have driven tens of thousands of Israelis to the streets in recent weeks. A particularly telling clue about how deeply disturbed many middle-of-the-road, moderate Israelis are about the issues is the fact that several hundred reserve officers signed a letter stating that they would not serve in the IDF if the judicial proposal went through. (This is more than 1960's "Hell no, I won't go" Vietnam resistance. The IDF is a proud symbol of Israeli strength and national pride. It is one of the most respected institutions in the country.
The protesters are clear: These proposals are a direct, existential threat to a democratic Israel. Netanyahu has agreed to delay consideration of his judicial program until the end of Passover, on April 13. There is undoubtedly some very serious discussions and negotiations going on behind the scenes, we may soon know if they will succeed.
