The Horror of Syria

Syria has suffered through six years civil war in which civilians have often been deliberately targeted by all sides. There are no signs the ferocity of the war is fading. Millions of people have braved the dangers of migration to Europe, millions more are huddled in crowded, underfunded refugee camps in Turkey or Jordan, millions are trapped in Syria.

It Takes Two To Tango, But ...

We talk about the civil war in Syria and that often conjures up a two sided conflict, like the U.S. Civil War. Not only were there two clear sides but the rest of the world by and large left us alone to battle it out.

But it can be very misleading to call the agonizing conflict in Syria a civil war.

Not Just a Syrian Conflict. Almost as soon as the popular uprising against the Assad regime was met by military repression, the conflict begin to transcend the Syrian borders. As the regime's military moved against the various centers of popular resistance, local militias were mobilized and began to coordinate with each other. From the perspective of Iran and Saudi Arabia, Syria is best understood as another skirmish in the region-wide conflict between Shi'a and Sunni Islam [I tried to clarify this in an earlier blog http://ir-comments.blogspot.com/2014/01/syria-has-become-regional-battleground.html ] Later Russia intervened on behalf of the Assad regime as a way of regaining a foothold in the Middle East and reasserting itself as a force to be reckoned with in the region.

The United States began a fruitless search for a moderate group that at least paid lip service to some version of secular democracy AND could unify the increasingly contentious and squabbling armed groups. Rightly or wrongly, the concern that weapons and supplies not fall into the hands of groups who saw America as the enemy dominated Obama's approach to Syria and led him to refuse significant support to any of the Syrian opposition parties.

The Mirage of “Moderation” When Hafez al Assad led a successful military coup in 1969 that brought authoritarian stability to a chaotic Syrian political scene, the intellectual basis and political vocabulary of opposition to the status quo was secular nationalism. The new regime set about creating a new Syria by following the example of a large number of other Third World countries: government directed and dominated economy, emphasis on education in general and education for a Syrian national identity in place of regional and religious identities in particular, and a strong state that could supplant local land owners and other traditional leaders. Some trappings of democracy were present – an initial emphasis on the rule of law, a relatively vibrant and free press, even tolerance for political parties as long as they did not directly threaten the regime. But after major progress in the 70's and 80's the economy stalled, the regime stagnated, the young idealists who had flocked to government service were either replaced by self-serving careerists or became one themselves, and bribery and corruption become endemic. And, most relevant to today, the intellectual basis and political vocabulary of opposition became political Islam, in particular the version that looks backward to an imagined Golden Age and rejects modernity. A much smaller opposition movement existed in the emerging urban middle class that drew upon European and American conceptions of democracy.

The initial demonstrations against the Assad regime in Damascus and elsewhere in the spring of 2011 were organized and led by the urban middle class opposition but when the regime responded with draconian force, it was armed groups in the smaller cities and villages that came to the fore. And they reflected the dominant Islamist perspective. The armed opposition involved multiple local groups and militias, with more or less rigid ideological positions.

The arrival of Russian equipment and personnel tipped the balance on the battlefield. The regime had been steadily losing ground to the various opposition armed forces; now, with the ability to attack from the air at any time and anywhere, more and more areas were retaken and the opposition groups were increasingly pushed out of urban areas into the countryside.

A War to the Death?

A major factor that distinguishes Syria from other countries where a civil war has raged is the stakes. The most common issue in a civil war is the attempt of one region to break away from an existing country. But in Syria the conflict has come to be defined as a struggle over the identity and survival of the combatants.

Damascus is some 15,000 years old; Aleppo, the other major city in Syria, is a relatively young 5,000 years old. For most of its history Damascus has been a center of intellectual, cultural and commercial activity in the entire Mediterranean region. Damascus and Aleppo experienced the greatest changes during the Assad years, developing a modern economy, a well-educated middle class, and a reputation for producing first-rate medical personnel and engineers. They are also home to the largest state run enterprises and government bureaus, providing career opportunities to upwardly mobile young Syrians.

But the majority of Syrians live in smaller cities, towns and villages where change has been slower and traditional religious and social values predominate. The ideology of most armed opponents of the regime reflects this rural perspective and are antithetical to the perspectives of most city dwellers.

The wanton destruction of monuments in Palmyra, the suffering of the citizens of Mosul and Raqqa, the harshly repressive rule imposed on the portions of Aleppo under opposition control are clear evidence to the regime's supporters that their lives, both symbolically and physically, are at stake in this struggle. And from the perspective of much of the opposition, it is not so much Bashir al Assad, evil as he is, that is at stake. It is a Godless, Westernized, immoral and corrupt urban society that cries out for correction.

Defeat for the regime seems to threaten massive bloodshed and endless suffering; defeat for the opponents entails the sacrifice of religion to secularism and the dismantling of the moral and social order. That, I think, helps explain not only the difficulty of some compromise, but also the ferocity and brutality of the fighting on both sides. While for most Syrians the great desire is to be left alone and spared any involvement in the war, for the people making decisions and carrying weapons on both sides, it is seen as Good versus Evil.

What About ISIS?

A major complication for all sides emerged when Al Qaeda in Iraq morphed into the Islamic State. Taking advantage of the fact that government forces had given up trying to control a large part of eastern Syria, the group seized control of a significant amount of territory, including the city of Raqqa, and in 2014 declared a caliphate. ISIS, unlike the other major armed groups in Syria, is not primarily seeking regime change in Damascus. It has sought to expand and consolidate its territory in Syria and Iraq and has been as willing to fight other Islamist groups as well as Syrian or Iraqi government forces, since it sees itself as the only authentically Islamic group in the world.

The rapid territorial expansion of ISIS, its gruesomely barbaric videos of beheadings, mass executions and torture, its incredibly harsh and brutal treatment of people in towns and villages that it controlled and its active promotion of terrorist attacks in Europe gave the U.S. and the world a new and frightening enemy, one that the United States would and could oppose militarily. The initial involvement was in Iraq where the U.S

resumed training and equipping the Iraqi army and also working with the Kurdish army and local militias. Within the past year U.S. special forces have been operating in Syria against ISIS positions.

The Trump administration does not seem to have a policy or plan for dealing with Syria but it does appear to have a plan for dealing with ISIS and it differs only in degree from Obama's. The United States will use almost any measure short of direct involvement by major military forces to support the war against ISIS. And it has been a successful war. The fight for Mosul, which is continuing as I write this, has been a vicious house to house, street to street battle but ISIS fighters are slowly being eliminated from the city. That is their last base in Iraq. In Syria, a combination of Iranian and Russian backed militias and Turkish and Kurdish forces supported by the U.S. have begun the battle to retake Raqqa, the capital of the ISIS caliphate and the last remnant of ISIS territory. Very quietly the Trump administration has increased the U.S. presence in the battle for Raqqa and it is possible to see the day when the battle against ISIS shifts from conventional military conflict to more traditional counter-terrorism.

Syria's Future

It is difficult to see anything but profound tragedy in Syria's future. As hard as I try, I just can't imagine any scenario in which there is a negotiated settlement. There might have been some hope when the Russians first intervened. Then the government was losing territory, the Russians seem to make it clear that Bashir al Assad's future was negotiable, and the U.S. and Russia might be able to put together a cease fire leading to a negotiated transition to a new, more inclusive regime. But the fractious rebel forces and the United States could not agree on which rebel groups would actually be represented in any negotiations, and neither the United States nor Russia could get the multiple fighting units to actually honor a cease fire.

Now the Syrian government has no incentive to negotiate; they are winning on the ground. It seems most likely that the government will be able to neutralize, if not totally annihilate the armed opposition. Civilians trapped between the lines will continue to be killed in attacks that do not discriminate between fighters and bystanders. The regime will use poison gas or any other weapon it deems militarily useful; there is nothing the U.S. or the rest of the world can do about it.

And when the killing finally stops, as much a half of all Syrians will be living in refugee camps outside the country, much of the country will be in ruins. It may take generations for Syria to recover.

Fireworks Fun or Fizzle?

In the last few weeks there have been three high profile uses of military force that the President and White House have touted as demonstrating Mr. Trump's decisiveness, resolve, and willingness to use force if necessary.

Big Bang or Little Whimper

The physical damage done by $84 million worth of cruise missiles launched against a Syrian air field was minimal and quickly repaired by the Syrians. If statements by administration spokespeople were meant to be taken literally (we are frequently reminded not to take the President's statements literally; the same may apply to other officials) this was a one time, limited strike and we are assured it does not mean a deeper involvement in the civil war. It also means it cannot be a deterrent to future atrocities since there is no threat of future attacks.

The narrative the White House has constructed around the attack and the way the President himself described it as a reaction to particularly heart wrenching TV images makes it clear that this event was not guided by a long range strategy or clear sense of purpose. For many observers it reinforces the negative image of President Trump as impulsive and undisciplined. But it may also be reassuring to note that he asked for alternatives and the final decision was made in a quite normal group setting after some deliberation.

There is a remarkably similar use of Tomahawk missiles in recent history: Bill Clinton launched Tomahawks to destroy suspected Al Qaeada installations in Sudan and Afghanistan after the bombing of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (to some derisive sneering about how wimpy the response was by some of the same people who are most eager to cast Trump's strike as a bold show of strength and resolve.)

So What Could He Have Done?

The debate over what the U.S. could and/or should do in Syria has been going on for almost as long as the brutal civil war. You don't need access to the top secret planning documents the President saw when he ordered the missile strike to know what the alternatives were and why they were rejected.

No Fly: The Syrian air force, equipped with modern Russian jets, Russian trainers, and sophisticated air defenses has played a major role in the regime's advances on the battlefield in the last year. One option would be to deny the regime this advantage by establishing a “no fly zone” in which U.S. or NATO aircraft would destroy air defenses and shoot down any Syrian planes that entered. The model would be Iraq, from 1992-2003. But 1) Syria's air defenses are far more sophisticated and effective than Iraq's and there is a high risk that U.S. war planes would be shot down; 2) Russian planes are operating in Syria, some from an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean, some from a base in Iran; there would be a high risk of a confutation between American and Russian planes; and 3) creation and enforcer of a no-fly zone would entail a long term, open-ended commitment.

Sanctuary camps. The other alternative would be to create safe zone refugee camps inside Syria where civilians could be sheltered and cared for without having to fear becoming targets of either the government or the opposition. This wold allow an effective response to the terrible humanitarian crisis in Syria and stem the flow of Syrians into Turkey and Europe. But 1) this would require a massive construction effort in the middle of a war zone; and 2) a robust protective force to fend off attacks on the camps. In short, the deployment of tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of troops who would meet stiff resistance from both the regime and those fighting against it.

Sometimes politics (and life) offers a choice between doing something that makes you feel good and something that is effective. I think the Trump administration was faced with a choice between doing something ineffective that made you feel good and doing nothing.

Be Careful What You Wish For

The Russian government was openly rooting for a Trump Presidency in hopes he would carry through on his promise to repair relations between Washington and Moscow. Campaigner Donald Trump promised to heal any beaches between Washington and Moscow, looked forward to a Russian-American joint effort to destroy ISIS, and portrayed Putin as an admirably strong leader with whom the U.S. could make some really good business arrangements.

After a feeble attempt to spin Assad's use of sarin gas as all Obama's fault, the administration quickly focused on Russia as the culprit. It was Russia's incompetence (or willing collusion) that left Assad with chemical weapons after the 2013 U.S.-Russian agreement to disarm him, the Russians knew the Syrians were carrying out the gas attack and did nothing to stop it, the Russians were undermining any hopes for a peaceful settlement in Syria.

While it is unclear how much of the rhetoric reflects a genuine belief in Russian culpability and how much it is meant to counter the drip, drip, drip of revelations of close relations between Trump campaign figures and Russian intelligence agents, the effect has been to cast a deep chill over the relationship.

Nothing in this episode suggests that the United States has a policy on the Syrian situation. Is President Obama's insistence that Bashir al Assad has to be removed from power still the Untied States' position?Some (UN Ambassador Nikki Haley) seem to say yes; others (Secretary of State Rex Tillerson) seem to say no. The only consistent message is that defeating ISIS is the first (and only?) priority.

MOAB

Candidate Trump promised to “bomb the sh-t” out of ISIS. Clearly the MOAB was a big explosion, even by the standards of a generation accustomed to really cool Hollywood graphics. And the little boy or girl that lurks deep inside many of us likes big explosions.

But is it really “full of sound and fury and signifying nothing?” For starters, before the White House began to promote the big boom as a demonstration of the President's strength and determination, Mr. Trump himself made it clear that he did not personally authorize the weapon's use. The Trump administrator has shifted from the Obama White House's insistence on tight management of the military in the Middle East to permit local commanders to make tactical decisions. Thus the President authorized the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to use whatever weapons he felt were called for.

Attacking Taliban or ISIS or any other fighters from the air is not a new tactic; it's been a feature of America's longest war since the beginning. Killing 96 bad guys and doing unspecified damage to a cave network is not a decisive blow and hardly rates even a footnote in the history of the war.

The Missing Armada

On April 12 the President, discussing the U.S. response to North Korea's nuclear program, missile tests and bellicose rhetoric on Fox News, said “We are sending an armada. Very powerful. We have submarines. Very powerful. Far more powerful than the aircraft carrier. That, I can tell you.” Subsequent briefings by administration officials clearly and consistently portrayed the super carrier USS Vinson and three supporting warships steaming full speed ahead from Singapore north to the seas off the Korean peninsula to send a clear and forceful message to Kim Jung Un.

Except that they weren't. The “armada” in fact sailed south for a week to participate in training exercises with the Australians. That mission was cut short and the Vinson and support ships did turn around and head for Korea. It's pretty hard to hide a big ship like the Vinson from foreign intelligence services, especially when it is on course for previously announced exercises. Even if North Korea was as much in the dark about the ships' location as the White House, they could be quite certain that they were not anywhere near the Korean coast.

Many of us can have a chuckle at the White House's expense, maybe Saturday Night Live will spoof Sean Spicer's contorted explanation of why the President's April 12^th statement wasn't really false, and the episode will probably be quickly replaced by some new amusing or appalling event.

It is easy to imagine what candidate Trump would have thought if this had happened to the Obama administration… #RealDonaldTrump Our stupid leaders lost an armada!!?? Sad Disgraceful …

But from the perspective of foreign governments watching the United States and trying to figure out President Trump and his administration, this may be a very important episode:

• like the Syrian missile strike it looks like an ad hoc response to an immediate situation in which the United States does not have a long term policy;
• it calls into question the ability of the U.S. government carry out even a simple military operation
• it undermines the President's credibility, since once again you shouldn't have interpreted his remarks literally

If you were sitting in Pyongyang, this episode would hardly send a chill down your spine and make you think you'd better behave or else. If you were sitting in Seoul or Tokyo, this episode would not give you a warm fuzzy feeling that United States could be relied on to have your back. This may be the most serious and lasting consequence of all.