The first part of this look at the Arab Spring focused on two cases that have gone relatively well. Neither Tunisia nor Egypt experienced a revolution, in the sense of a fundamental change in the structure of society, but both saw a change in regime and a significant opportunity for the development of more democratic politics. Other countries in the Middle East have not fared as well.
Using the same set of variables: structure and cohesion of the old regime, nature of the opposition groups, and role of outsiders, we can take a look at three countries that have had less optimistic outcomes. In Libya the weakness and disarray of the opposition groups stands out; in Syria the structure and dynamics of the old regime seem most important and in Bahrain outsiders played the decisive role.
The Libyan story is widely known: NATO air strikes played a central role in Qadhafi’s demise. The distinction between intervening to prevent mass bloodshed and intervening to support rebel military operations was clear enough in Washington and New York; it was meaningless on the ground.
The base of Qadhafi’s rule of a country created out of three historically distinctive regions was traditional tribal alliances, lubricated by oil wealth and effective control of military force. When the uprising began in the east anti-regime forces were able to create a large number of small local militias. As the battles raged on, these militias became more effective even as the air strikes degraded the capability of units loyal to Qadhafi. (One suspects that the British Special Air Service members who were embarrassingly captured and then released were not the only foreign advisors and trainers in Libya.)
Even when Tripoli fell to rebel forces, the identities and backgrounds of the rebel leaders were obscure. At best the new leadership is a loose coalition of returned exiles, local notables and Islamists. Plans for the future are largely irrelevant right now because the new regime has not solidified its hold on the capital. The streets of Tripoli remain overrun by militiamen whose first loyalty is to their immediate leadership, not some broader Libyan policy. There has been a certain amount of looting and of settling scores with supporters of the Qadhafi regime. Fire fights between groups are fairly common. Many of the militia groups are reluctant to disband lest their home towns and villages be assaulted by other militias. Despite the resumption of oil sales and continued political support from Europe, the future of Libya is very much up in the air.
Why has Syria gone so dreadfully wrong? First of all, the Syrian military political and economic elite is deeply entangled with the Assad family. Since 1969 Syria has been dominated by men from the Alawite sect, a small group among Syria’s minority Shi’a community. The sense of being a minority among a minority that has been historically at the bottom of Syrian society contributes to a great feeling of solidarity among the leadership and resistance to change and reform. It may well be that much of the Syrian elite fears that if the al-Assads go, so too will everyone else.
The Syrian state has developed a very effective repressive apparatus over the past 40 years and bolstered it with propaganda images of regime opponents as either tools of Western Imperialists hell bent on undermining the leading proponent of Arab nationalism or stalking horses for reactionary Muslim Brothers who would destroy secularism and tolerance.
The Damascus regime acts as if they are under serge and fighting for their lives. That may help explain the widespread use of brute military force against civilians, especially in cities like Homs that have long been centers of opposition to Alawite rule.
The Syrian opposition has been hampered by the fact that is it centered in peripheral areas like Homs and Latakia and not at the center of the system, Damascus. It has developed a military wing from units who have defected from the Syrian military but cannot effectively protect civilians in the areas where it dominates. The opposition is split between London-based exiles and groups within Syria itself and it is not clear if the agreement signed last month in Cairo will result in more effective cooperation and coordination.
Outsiders have played a public but ineffective role in Syria. The Arab League continued the pattern it first showed in Libya by criticizing one of its members and then taking the remarkable step of expelling Syria for human rights abuses. The first stage of the Arab League observer mission in Syria could do nothing but verify that the violent assaults continued. While the misson has been extended, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia and the small countries bordering the Persian Gulf) have withdrawn their personnel and called for more active involvement by the UN Security Council.
Calls for more robust external intervention seem to me to be cynically manipulative. Both the United States and the European Union have implemented sanctions against the Assad regime. But the UN Security Council will not take any action on Syria. Russia and China have been extremely reluctant to sanction Iran for its nuclear program because of both a general reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of any country and some more tangible economic and political ties to Teheran. They are highly unlikely to support a Security Council resolution that would matter in Syria and the members of the GCC know this full well. Many of the rulers and policy makers in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States are convinced that Iran is the central problem in the region. Syria is seen as Iran’s most important ally in the Arab world. I think it is fair to suggest that calls from Gulf States and others for more robust UN involvement in Syria are far more aimed at dealing a blow to Iran than supporting the concept of a Responsibility to Protect that figured so prominently in the justification for Libya.
I hope I am wrong, but I do not see anything good happening in Syria in the near future. The situation increasingly resembles a civil war. It could drag on for months, even years. The regime may survive, ruling a sullen and resentful population ground down by both physical repression and increasingly difficult economic times.
Outside intervention has been decisive in Bahrain.
Bahrain was briefly part of the Arab Spring, when protests erupted against the reluctance of the monarchy to make modest democratic reforms. The regime in Bahrain is a traditional, patriarchal monarchy, in which citizens are expected to forgo political involvement in return for lavish subsidies of everything from gasoline to education. One important reality of Bahrain is that the ruling family and allied members of the elite are Sunni Muslim and the majority of the Bahraini citizens are Shi’a. This has been a source of discontent and agitation for greater democracy for the past two decades and in the 1990s there were some attempts to increase public involvement in consultations without undermining royal supremacy.
When protesters shut down traffic and commerce in Manama, Bahrain’s capital and home to over 10% of the population, both Bahrain’s rulers and their neighbors in Saudi Arabia framed it as a Shi’a assault on Sunni power, fomented by Iran. Saudi Arabia responded to a request form the king of Bahrain for help by sending military units across the 15 mile long causeway that connects the island of Bahrain to mainland Saudi Arabia. After “restoring order” the Saudi units have remained in Manama and effectively suppressed further demonstrations.
If we broaden our perspective from the dramatic events of the past year in the Middle East and take into account developments in the rest of the world in the last three decades we may gain some insight. Beginning in the 1980s what scholars dubbed “The Third Wave of Democracy” spread over Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Long standing authoritarian regimes gave way to multi-party liberal democratic and stagnant command economies were replaced by market systems.
Some of those dramatic regime changes have stuck and former dictatorships have become functioning relatively democratic systems. Others have stagnated or even (e.g. Russia) drifted back toward authoritarian rule.
An important variable in explaining success and failure of nascent democracies has been economic development. Regimes that succeed in meeting basic needs and expanding opportunities for everyday people have tended to maintain their democratic gains. Those that have either not been able to meet basic physical needs or have seen rapidly widening gulfs between a wealthy few and a less affluent many have been more likely to back slide.
The second thing a broader perspective reveals is the reminder that politics is a process, a series of events and underlying dynamics, not an overnight stand. We’re back to Yogi, and it ain’t over until its over.
No comments:
Post a Comment