For Iranians, the relationship with the U.S. began in 1952 when the CIA cooperated with the British in instigating a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and transformed Shah Rez Pahlevi from a largely symbolic figure into a powerful ruling monarch. The new regime played heavily on Iranian nationalism rooted in the glorious heritage of 2500 years of the Persian Empire. The Shah was determined to modernize Iran economically and socially while suppressing any political development. Particularly in the cities, oil revenue was used to create a more balanced economy, a wealthy aristocracy, and an increasingly well educated and westernized middle class. Resentment over the abandonment of traditional social and religious values (westoxification*) in the rural areas and among recent migrants to cities and over the harsh repression of any political dissent among the growing middle class led to widespread unrest and resistance in 1979 and when the military and security forces deserted the regime, the Shah and the regime collapsed.
*a term coined by an Iranian intellectual critical of his countrymen's fascination with Western culture and society and dismissal of traditional values
Much of the opposition was led by religious clergy; Shi'a mullahs have a long tradition of providing secular as well as religious leadership. Shi'a clergy (mullahs) played a leading role in channeling popular discontent with the regime. Capitalizing on the Shah's failing health and disarray among the ruling elite, the mullahs launched a revolution that called for a return to traditional religious values. The new regime emphasized Persian identity as opposed to minority groups, with a central, charismatic figure (the Supreme Leader) and strongly authoritarian style. Ayatollah Khomeini could have dubbed his movement MIGA, making Iran great again.
The foreign policy of the new regime stressed the importance of coming to the aid of oppressed Shi'a minorities in majority Sunni Arab regimes*, combating global imperialism (exemplified by the United States) and combating Israel (a Jewish outpost of Western colonialism in the very heartland of Islam.) Iran damned the United States as "The Great Satan" and the U.S. responded by defining Iran as an enemy.
*Shi'a Islam emerged during a conflict over who was Mohamed's rightful successor. The conflict had more to do with secular issues of Arab versus non-Arab communities than it did with theological questions or the details of prayer. Iran is the only country in the Middle East with a Shi'a majority; elsewhere Shi'a communities were discriminated against.
A good example of the convergence of those themes is Hezbollah which originated as an armed oppositon group in Lebanon's shi'a community. Lebanon's Christian and Sunni Arab elites have historically not only dominated the country but more or less actively excluded the Shi'a minority. When Hezbollah emerged as a powerful counterweight to a pro-Western government. dominated by Christians and Sunni Muslims and willing to cooperate with Israel, Iran saw a natural ally to be supported and encouraged. It is intellectually lazy and very misleading to reduce Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen and other Iranian-backed groups to mere proxies or tools of Teheran. They are indigenous groups with local issues and grievances who are allies, not puppets, of Iran.
The JCPOA
The new Islamic Republic's hostility to modernity led to an early exodus of professionals who had trained in the U.S. or Western Europe. In addiditon,the purge of the Shah's supporters in government and business spurred an exodus of the wealthy upper class. In the face of crippling economic sanctions from the West, the regime came to embrace the remaining engineers and scientists who could develop Iranian technology and manufacturing systems. The nuclear energy sector, perhaps ironically in an oil rich nation, became not only a point of pride in Iranian know-how but an increasingly important component of electricity generation.
Thirty years after the revolution, perspectives among decision makers in the United States and Western Europe had shifted enough to make it possible to contemplate negotiating with Iran to forestall nuclear weapons. (Russia and China did not regard Iran as an enemy but were not happy with the idea of a nuclear armed Islamic Republic.) After a number of false starts, increasing western sanction and credible evidence that Iran was developing a nuclear industry that could develop the resources to create a nuclear weapon, a new round of talks started in 2013 The result was an interesting mix of interlocutors (the U.S., the UK, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union) who negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The JCOPA offered Iran significant relief from crippling economic sanctions in return for limits on nuclear technology and a srict inspection regime. (Back in the day I tried for a more thorough analysis of the JCOPA negotiations. See https://www.blogger.com/u/2/blog/post/edit/4398193451691859469/6127416897469986096 and https://www.blogger.com/u/2/blog/post/edit/4398193451691859469/6127416897469986096)
Supporters of the agreement either accepted Iranian assurances that there was no intent to produce weapons or believed that the inspection and limitations regime would delay an actual weapon for years. Opponents argued that Iran could not be trusted to live up to any agreements and its increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile systems and bad behavior causing terror and chaos around the world made it an existential threat to Israel and a major threat to the Untied States and Western Europe. The skeptics won out when Trump replaced Obama in the White House and loudly and proudly withdrew from the agreement,replacing JCPOA with "maximum pressure" on Iran. I think it is fair to say that in the seven years since the U.S. withdrew, Iran has gone from being a few years away from a full weapons capability to a few months before the recent bombing. Except for the triumphalists in the Trump administration, very few observers believe that Iran's nuclear capabilities have been "obliterated." Assessing the damage is very difficult without physical inspections of a large number of sites but some speculative estimates see delays of as little as a few months while others think Iran is now several years away from a nuclear weapon.
Regime Change?
Israeli politicians and analysts have been very clear in their belief that the Iranian regime must be replaced because its core ideology includes the destruction of Israel. The U.S. policy makers who negotiated the JCPOA believed that Iran could be contained and the regime would ultimately either morph into a "normal" regime or be replaced by internal forces. The Iran hawks who blasted Obama for pursuing the JCPOA and urged Trump to withdraw from it want regime change to be the primary goal of U.S. policy.
The regime is increasingly unpopular. The economy is suffering from the effects of U.S. and European Union sanctions. The excesses of the religious police and the level of repression from the security forces have sparked protests. And the ideology underlying the Islamic Revolution of 45 years ago has become stale and irrelevant in a country where over half the population was not even born then. Regardless of how noble and inspiring the ideology that underlies a regime (including liberal democracies) sooner or later the question becomes, "What have you done for me lately?
But bombing campaigns by hostile powers are notoriously ineffective in undermining support for a government or forcing a surrender. Instead of people thinking that their suffering is due to the policies their government is pursuing, bombing victims blame the (bleeping) foreigners who are dropping the bombs. The Israeli and U.S. assault has resulted in an upsurge of Iranian nationalism and anger and at least short run support for the regime.
