The Russian intervention in Syria is
actually a positive step toward an end to the nightmare that the
Syrian civil war has become, To see why what has been widely regarded
in the United States as a major negative event, is a potentially
positive development, it is necessary to dispel some myths..
Myth. # 1: Bashar al Assad is the
bogeyman who singlehandedly turned Syria’s Arab Spring moment into
a nightmare.
The popular image of a “dictator”
is a solitary figure -- probably crazy -- who says “jump” and all
his minions ask “how high?” In fact the Syrian regime that has
grown up in the 40 years since Hafez al Assad came to power in
military coup rests on an interlocking elite sitting atop the
military, economic and political establishments. Bashar is the
accidental face of that regime. (His older bother, who was being
groomed to take over, died in a helicopter crash and Bashar was
called back from his career as a eye doctor in London to take over.)
There was a great deal of hope in Syria
when Bashar took over after his father’s death in 2000. The regime
that had been markedly successful in the 1980s in developing the
economy, expanding education and health care, improving the lives of
rural peasants and creating an urban middle class, had become old and
tired. Instead of infusing new blood into the tired old elite,
getting the economy back on track, reducing corruption, and allowing
greater latitude for political expression, Bashar fell under the sway
of his father’s inner circle and there were no reforms, no
progress, and declining support for the regime.
There is no doubt Bashar al Assad is
ultimately responsible for the decision to respond to peaceful
protests in 2010 with unrestrained force. There is no doubt that
Bashar al Assad is ultimately responsible for the decision to use
chemical weapons against Syrian protesters. But he is not solely
responsible for those decisions and may not have initiated them.
Bashar is the single most influential figure in the Syrian elite.
But faced with strong agreement by the top military brass and/or
governmental ministers, he is powerfully constrained to go along.
Myth #2: Bashar al Assad could have
been thrown under the bus by the Syrian elites.
The relevant example seems to be Egypt.
Faced with massive unrest and protests, the Egyptian military and
political powers that be chose to arrange for the ouster of Hosni
Mubarak rather than engage in bloody repression. The Syrian elite
could have done the same thing.
Yes, they could have, but one of the
most glaring differences between Egypt and Syria is the nature of the
elite. The Egyptian elite was relatively broadly based in Egyptian
society and, particularly the military wing, had a high degree of
legitimacy, even among those most opposed to Mubarak.
But the Syrian elite is drawn heavily
from the Alawite minority. The vagaries of history and geographical
isolation created a tightly knit community in a mountainous area of
rural Syria that was regarded with suspicion and disdain by their
neighbors. Faced with periodic persecution and aggression, the
Alawites developed a distinctive culture that included a version of
Shi’a Islam that relied on esoteric teachings known only to the
elders of the community. French colonial policy in Syria after World
War I, as elsewhere in the world, actively recruited members of
minority communities to participate in the administration. A key to
Hafez al Assad’s rise to power was a cadre of fellow Alawite
military officers.
The Egyptian elites could coolly
calculate that Mubarak could be removed from power without
threatening their own status and position. But the Syrian elite
perceived an attack on al Assad as an attack on the Alawites and
feared that they and their community would be swept away if they
opened the flood gates.
President Obama was widely criticized
for his slow and lukewarm response to the anti-Mubarak movement in
Egypt. He seems to have been determined not to make the same mistake
in Syria and early in the game announced that Assad had to go. That
encouraged the protestors but also made it more likely that the
Damascus elites would resist change.
Myth #3 The “Syrian Civil War”
is a Syrian civil war
There are multiple dimensions of war in
the area marked “Syria” on maps. At the local level, there is
conflict between a shifting array of militias and armed groups and
the Syrian armed forces.
There is no single entity opposed to
the Syrian regime. There are mostly small local militias organized
around a leader, often a local notable or tribal chief and there are
Islamist fighters in several distinct groups. While they all share
the loose goal of getting rid of the Assad regime, they are more
often divided by regional and local issues, and distinct visions of
what the ideal future looks like. On any given day two or more of
these groups may be cooperating; it is equally likely they are
shooting at each other. The distinction often made in the West
between “Jihadists” and “moderates” gets cloudier and less
useful the closer to the Middle East one gets.
Almost from the beginning forces
outside Syria got involved. Some came to support the regime; some
came to oppose it. On the one hand, Iran offered aid and comfort to
its long time friends in Damascus and Hezbollah sent thousands of
fighters from Lebanon to aid in the cause. On the other hand, some
money and arms flowed from the Gulf States and a great deal of money
and arms came from Saudi Arabia to the diverse forces fighting the
regime. For Hezbollah the issue was preserving supply lines for
weapons. For Iran and Saudi Arabia, the immediate issue was
influence in the region. The broader issue was what each perceives
as a struggle between Shi’a and Sunni states for the future of
Islam.
The interlocking conflicts moved to yet
another dimension with the increasing involvement of the United
States, France and Britain. The use of poison gas, the
indiscriminate bombing of civilians including the use of so-called
barrel bombs, the flood of refugees to neighboring countries and
hundreds of thousands of refugees moving from one part of Syria to
another resulted in the involvement of a host of international
agencies. The UN Security Council called for an end to the conflict.
A series of talks, or at least talks about talks, have gone nowhere.
A seriously complicating factor (as if
the situation were not complicated enough already) has been the
sudden and surprising emergence of the group known variously as ISIL,
ISIS, the self-styled Islamic State, or just plain Islamic State.
Moving quickly out of their original base in Iraq, ISIS fighters have
gained control of a significant area in Syria, often by defeating
local militias or a Jihadist group. The most important fact of ISIS
involvement in Syria has been providing a common enemy for everyone
else.
Myth #4 Putin is Just Out to Cause
Trouble in Syria
Saying “Putin” when what you mean
is “the various groups, organizations, individuals and interests
that shape Russian foreign policy decisions” is convenient
shorthand but it obscures far more than it reveals. The Russian
government is a constellation of large bureaucracies, each with its
own turf and interests. Putin is undoubtedly the most important
player in decision making but he is not alone. And the menu of
options from which Putin and his advisors choose, the assessment of
the risks and rewards of those options, and the details of
implementing decisions are defined by agencies and bureaus with their
own perspectives and ways of doing things.
Vlad did not wake up one morning and
say to himself, “It’s a fine fall morning. I shall send some
troops and a wing of fighter bombers to Syria because Obama is a wimp
and I can get away with it. And, oh yeah, I’ll tell the pilots to
turn off their transponders so they can fool the Americans.”
Governments always have multiple
reasons for what they do. And what they do is always the result of
an interaction between the goals, intentions and interests of the
people making the decision and the situation in which they find
themselves. Political psychologists talk about “the fundamental
attribution error”: when we think about our own behavior we focus
more heavily on the situation we’re in; when we think about other
people, we focus more heavily on what kind of people they are. When
we think seriously about U.S. policy in Syria, we take into account
the difficult and confusing situation on the ground and the assets
available to the U.S., as well as President Obama’s strengths and
weaknesses and the quality of his advisors. But when we think about
Russia’s actions, we tend to put more emphasis on our understanding
of Putin and far less on such factors as the long standing
relationship between Damascus and Moscow, or the consequences for
Russia if the al Assad regime is replaced by Islamists.
The Potential
Positive Consequences
From an international perspective,
there are two primary struggles in Syria: against al Assad and
against ISIS. Of course, it isn’t that simple. For the U.S. and
our friends, making sure that al Assad is not replaced by radical
Islamists is critical, which immensely complicates things. There’s
been a long and frustrating search for “moderate” anti-regime
groups to support, the embarrassing spectacle of the small contingent
of Syrian fighters trained and equipped by the U.S. at enormous cost
who lost or surrendered their equipment to Islamist fighters almost
as soon as they crossed the border into Syria. Groups like al Nusra
are good guys because they are fighting al Assad and sometimes ISIS;
they are very bad guys because they are ideological kin to al Qaeda.
The Russian military has changed the
dynamics in Syria. Their air strikes and cruise missile attacks have
supported a renewed offensive by the Syrian army and the recapture of
a few strategic assets from rebel forces. Any damage done to ISIS is
a more or less accidental bonus. (The bombing of the Russian
airliner over the Sinai Peninsula is unlikely to change Russian goals
or behavior.) Whatever hopes opponents might have had that the Syrian
army and/or regime was on the verge of collapse have vanished.
The immediate impact has been
significant: Iran, a critically important player has now been invited
to join the talks about talking about talks that have been held
periodically in Vienna. And the Russians tabled a proposal for a
transitional regime that was immediately rejected by everyone else.
But reading between the lines it did suggest that al Assad would not
necessarily remain in power indefinitely. If a bus came along some
months from now and al Assad were standing close to the curb ...
For the first time in five horrific
years, it is possible to see the first faint outline of an end game.
The initial stages of the bargaining process include the
understanding that there is a “hurting stalemate”( it’s a
no-win for everyone) and getting the involvement of all the key
players.
The Russian intervention in the Syrian
civil war has shattered any illusions that the regime can be defeated
on the battlefield. But even the regime’s most ardent supporters
do not think the Syrian military can ever hope to regain control of
the country.
If Iran agrees to participate, the
major international players will be involved in talks about Syria’s
future. Getting representatives of the patchwork of rebel factions,
and the al Assad regime to agree to join the discussions will be a
major hurdle.
There is a painfully long way to go
before there will be any hope the suffering of Syrians will end and
certainly no guarantee that some kind of solution will emerge in
Vienna, let alone on the ground.
Whatever he may have intended in
getting involved in Syria, Vladimir Putin has tilted the odds toward
peace.
