Palestinians and Israelis: Clashing Polticial Identities

 

I think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be most usefully understand as a clash of ethno-political identities. There are two communities whose identity is rooted in the same land. These identities have co-evolved in the 20th Century, making the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians a modern phenomenon. [The facile "those people have been hating and fighting for thousands of years" and the implicit corollary shrugging of shoulders and "it's hopeless" attitude is false and trivializing.]

In the late 19th Century Zionism emerged as a modern Jewish identity, focused on a people (ethnicity) and a potential state. By the turn of the 20th Century Zionism was a political ideology dedicated to creating a nation-state that would be Jewish ethnically but secular and socialist.

World War I saw the rapid emergence of nationalism in the Middle East as the Turkish Ottoman Empire collapsed. When the British and French divided up the Middle East into colonies (complete with borders that made more sense to map makers in Paris and London than the people on the ground), they laid the geographical foundation for modern national identities to emerge.

The first wave of Jewish immigrants, most of whom were fervent Zionists, began to arrive in Palestine with the support (most of the time) of the British colonial administration. They were largely Western European and North American in origin and thought of Palestine as a "land without people for a people without land." But a sense of Palestinian nationalism was emerging at the same time, creating a people who were already on the land. The fact that the Jewish immigrants were European and supported by the occupying British basically guaranteed that "we" Palestinians would view the new arrivals as "the other."

A distinctive Israeli identity emerged in the 20s and 30s as more Jews arrived and the community found itself increasingly at odds with the British. In the immediate aftermath of World War II a wave of survivors of the war and Holocaust arrived in Palestine and an armed struggle broke out between the British and the Zionists, even as the Palestinians were resisting continued British rule.

The experience of persecution in Eastern Europe and the genocide of World War II led to an emphasis on toughness, self reliance and assertive self-defense among the new Israelis and the attack on the new state in 1948 by Arab armies cemented a sense of being surrounded by enemies and under constant threat of annihilation. After the 1948 war a large number of Jews came to Israel from ancient Jewish communities in North Africa and the Middle East, often because they now feared their Arab (and Persian) neighbors. That sense persists today and has been reinforced by suicide bombings and other acts of violence by Palestinians. At some profound level Israelis feel deeply insecure and surrounded by enemies who wish them dead.

At the same time, the Palestinians experienced several events that defined them (to themselves) as victims of grave injustice. The Naqba, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from their homes in what is now Israel and the conquest of the West Bank by Israel in the 1967 war has led to three generations of refugees who live in refugee camps. All Palestinian live with day-to-day hassles and indignities as they go about their lives in the occupied West Bank or Gaza.

In the 21st Century Israeli politics has been dominated by a series of right wing governments featuring a growing role for representatives of the million or so settlers in the West Bank, predominantly Russian immigrants and highly ideological Europeans and Americans. An equally important new major force in politics has been the ultra-orthodox Jewish community which is passionately committed to undoing the secular basis of the Zionist Israeli state and turning it into a religiously observant, explicitly Jewish state. Sometimes lost in all the talk about a Jewish state and Israeli identity is the fact that about 20% of the citizens of Israel are Arab and Muslim or Christian, not Jewish.

Historically Israel has been very effective at socializing newcomers and integrating them socially, economically and politically but the wave of Russian immigrants was uninterested in being socialized and set out into the West Bank to establish settlements beyond the reach of the civilian agencies. They continued what they had learned about politics and life as citizens of the old Soviet Union -- not liberal democracy. Netanyahu's various governments have been increasingly anti-Arab, pro-expansion and assertively nationalistic, relying on undemocratic (if not anti-democratic) movements.

At the same time, the hopes of the Palestinians for an independent state, preferably democratic, have faded. When the Palestine Authority (PA) was created by the 1993 Oslo Accords, Yasser Arafat became the President because he headed the (PLO), the biggest faction among the various liberation groups, and positions in the new government were generally filled by former members of armed militant groups.

It seems to be an almost inescapable tragedy that men who are willing to risk their lives for the freedom of a people tend to become corruptly self-serving once they are in positions of power and the PA quickly became riddled with corruption at all levels. The territory covered by the PA is two quite distinct (and physically separated) areas: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In 2006 the militant Hamas movement won legislative elections in Gaza (not, for most voters, because of its pledge to destroy Isreal or willingness to wage continuing war, but because many voters were fed up with the PLO and other parties dominating the PA and voted for Hamas as a protest.) Hamas became the government in Gaza and both Israel and Egypt instituted a policy of boycott and isolation that exacerbated poverty and corruption.

Some conclusions:

Despite overwhelming military superiority, Israelis live in a culture of insecurity. The fact that both Jordan and Egypt have long since made peace with their neighbor and Syria is hardly a threat does not counter the gut feeling of being surrounded by a sea of hostile enemies. The rockets from Gaza may be fairly small and close to 90% intercepted but they have an enormous symbolic and psychological impact.

Netanyahu's governments have increasingly relied on and actively supported anti-democratic, anti-Arab and overtly racist movements, and Israeli public opinion has shifted to the right. There is precious little room for a peace movement.

The Palestinian Authority has lost its initial legitimacy and survives as a political force only because of a refusal to hold elections for parliament. The majority of people on the West Bank have grown up knowing only an inept government and Israeli occupation.

Hamas controls Gaza with an efficient security force; there is no room for political discussion. Half of all Gazans have known nothing but Hamas rule and economic hardship and have little or no sympathy for Hamas' ideology of destroying Israel and creating an Islamic state.

Netanyahu's departure will leave an excruciatingly fragile coalition in his place that will be unable to undertake even modest initiatives. The ONLY thing all members of the coalition can agree on is "Bye Bye Bibi!"

Even if Israel were ready to negotiate a two state future for itself and the Palestinians, there is no one on the other side with whom to negotiate. Even if the Palestinians were ready to negotiate a two state solution for themselves and the Israelis, there is no one on the other side with whom to negotiate.

If a two state solution is impossible, Israel faces an existential crisis: it can absorb the West Bank and Gaza and become a democratic state that offers a vote to each person at the cost of losing a Jewish identity; or it can become a fully Jewish state and continue to occupy the West Bank, at the cost of losing its democratic and traditionally Jewish values of justice and equality.

On the whole, Israel's Arab citizens have kept themselves aloof from the struggles of Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza and focused more on improving their second class status in Israeli society and politics. There were a few signs during the recent war against Gaza that younger Israeli Arabs are beginning to identify themselves as Palestinians and part of the same community as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This may be no more than the flash of heat lightning in the desert night, or it may be the start of a profound shift in the underlying dynamics.

The Shifting Sands of the Middle East

 

The Biden administration has already made it clear that it will have a different approach to the Middle East. This seems like a good time to try to outline some of the major challenges it will face. I think there are three major countries that will command the lion's share of the U.S. attention: Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

This is a necessarily simplistic approach that understates the extent to which relations with one of these countries directly affect relations with the other two. It also ignores the implications of policy for countries outside the Middle East. The obvious case in point is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the official name of the "Iranian nuclear deal") which requires the U.S. to seek the cooperation of not only Britain, France and Germany, but also Russia and China.

Iran: Enemy or Opponent.

The Trump administration made it clear that it regarded Iran as an enemy to be blamed for a wide range of "nefarious actions" and coerced with "maximum pressure" to comply with American demands. Leaving the nuclear deal and reinstating U.S. sanctions that made it extremely difficult for Iran to sell its oil on the open market was intended to inflict serious and widespread economic pain on Iran. And it did. The logic of causing widespread hardship for your enemy's population is that they will blame their leadership and its policies for their suffering and there will be serious anti-regime sentiment. But all the evidence, from studies of bombing Germany in World War II to the reaction of Americans to 9/11, suggests that people do not blame their leaders for their suffering but blame the foreigners who are inflicting the punishment. Iran has not reduced its support for its allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere, nor has it stopped development of short and medium range ballistic missiles. The other five signatories to the nuclear deal have made serious efforts to to ease Iran's economic burdens and maintain the broad outlines of the agreement, while other outside actors have resorted to sabotage and targeted assassinations to try to cripple Iran's nuclear program. Nonetheless Iran has resumed the uranium enrichment that the world found so alarming five years ago.

Announcing the intention to rejoin the nuclear deal is easy; doing it is hard. Rejoining means lifting a series of economic sanctions imposed by the Trump administration and dealing with the fact that Iran is out of compliance with the specific terms of the deal covering the enrichment of uranium. The United States position is that it cannot lift the sanctions until Iran is back in compliance; Iran insists it cannot shut down the centrifuges until the United States lifts the sanctions. It will take some sophisticated diplomacy and hard bargaining behind the scenes to square the circle so each side can get what it needs without seeming to capitulate to the other. The most optimistic feature of the Biden team's approach to Iran is that it includes some of the most important players in the Obama administration's successful negotiation of the original deal. The hope is that the Iranians will respond to people with whom they have dealt in the past and can somehow be persuaded that whatever is agreed to now will not be swept aside by the next administration in Washington.

Which Israel?

The skill of Benjamin Netanyahu in cultivating a personal relations with Donald Trump was matched only by his skill in creating the myth that supporting Israel meant supporting Netanyahu and his right wing government. The governing coalition has pursued conservative religious, social and economic policies, emphasized Jewish national identity, and an anti-Arab attitude that, for some of the more extreme parties, was unabashedly racist. A socially conservative, somewhat xenophobic American administration with a soft spot for tough guy rulers would be predisposed to back Netanyahu. And the prominent place of American supporters of Netanyahu and his more hard line allies in Trump's circle of friends and informal advisors, along the special place support for Israel has in the evangelical Christian community led to a series of actions that undermined any chance America could be seen as an honest broker in peace talks.

March 23 is a momentous day in the history of Israel. For the fourth time in the past two years, Israeli voters will go to the polls to decide whether Benjamin Netanyahu will continue his tenure as Israel's longest serving Prime Minister. Israelis do not actually vote for Prime Minister and the actual question on the ballot is which party the voter prefers. But the national campaign and all the media coverage make it clear that regardless of which party the voter selects, they are voting for a member of a coalition that will either return Netanyahu or replace him.

The Israeli system is quite different from the American Not only is it a parliamentary system in which the leader of the party (or parties) with the most seats in the Knesset becomes Prime Minister, but representatives are not chosen by geographical constituencies. Instead there is only one ballot with all the eligible parties listed. Knesset seats are assigned based on the percentage of the national vote a party receives and each party has its own list of candidates that it uses to fill as many seats as it has won. As long as a party gets 3.5% of the national vote, it is entitled to at least one seat. It has been 50 years since one party actually won a 61 seat majority; Israeli governments are coalitions of medium-sized and small parties creating either a center-left or center-right government. The system has given outsized weight to small parties representing West Bank settlers or ultra-Orthodox religious groups.

Israelis are faced with the fourth national election in two years because the country is deeply polarized between more liberal, secular voters and more conservative and religious voters. The coalitions Netanyahu has put together have collapsed because they have included very small parties that have made demands that other coalition members would not agree to.

There are two elements in the coming election that make it different from the preceding three. One is that Yair Lapid, the opposition leader in the Knesset, is better known and more popular than Netanyahu's previous opponents. The other is the fact that Netanyahu has been charged with several counts of corruption and is actually on trial, with court proceedings suspended until after the election.

A continuation of Netanyahu's government with its close ties to the Republican party, evangelicals and conservative American Jewish groups will provide a direct challenge to the Biden administration's stated desire to have a more even handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, forestall Israeli plans to annex parts of the West Bank, and restrain the rapidly expanding network of settlements. A potentially fragile coalition put together by Netanyahu opponents would be easier for Biden to work with but would be unlikely to significantly curtail support for settlements or countenance the reversal of the most egregious Trump administration moves, including moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and annexing parts of the Golan Heights.

Any Israeli government in the near future would be either flatly opposed to dealing with the Palestinians or too weak to seriously negotiate. At the same time the Palestinian Authority is headed by 1970's era guerrillas and riddled with opportunists for whom a government position is a license to steal via bribes and kickbacks. The regime is not able to spare the Palestinians the indignities and aggravations associated with the Israeli occupation, the encroachments of the settlers, and the frustrations of a venal and largely incompetent bureaucracy and has only tepid support among Palestinians, particularly the half of the population who are less than 23 years old.

The House of Saud: The King's Dilemma

Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud is the King of Saudi Arabia and Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. At 85, he is the last living son of Abdul Azziz ibn Saud, the founder of the kingdom. (Ibn Saud is reputed to have had around 100 wives and even more concubines, making him the literal as well as figurative "father of his country.") His son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (aka MBS) is the heir apparent to the crown and is already regarded as the real ruler of the country.

The departure of Trump and MBS's BFF Jared Kushner has already begun to rebalance the U.S.- Saudi relationship from a narrow focus on the Saudis as leaders of an anti-Iran coalition and customer for lucrative arms sales to a more nuanced approach that identifies areas in which our interests are similar and areas in which we are sharply opposed. The Biden administration cannot and will not treat the Saudis as either allies who can do no wrong nor pariahs who can do no right. The tacit support the administration gave to releasing the CIA report on bin Salman's direct complicity in the murder of Adnan Kashoggi followed by the administration's refusal to publicly condemn or sanction him is an example of trying to thread the needle of a complex relationship.

Under Mohammed bin Salman's leadership, Saudi Arabia had played a more assertive role in the Middle East, including turning the civil war in Yemen into the worst humanitarian disaster in the world today. The Trump administration , despite bipartisan opposition from Congress, encouraged the disastrous intervention in the name of opposing Iran and arms sales. That support has already been reversed.

The conflict in Yemen began as a revolt against the government in San'a by northern tribes. Since the Houthi tribes of the north are largely Shi'a Muslim and the groups controlling the government in the south are largely Sunni Muslim, the Saudis perceived the hidden hand of Shi'a Iran at work and began a massive military intervention. When Iran did begin to support the Houthis, the violence escalated to include indiscriminate bombing of civilians and blockades of key ports that prevented food and medicine from reaching as much as 80% of the population.

Mohamed bin Salman was initially hailed as a reformer who would removed the most onerous and outrageous restrictions on women and begin to move Saudi Arabia into the modern world. I think it is fair to say that he has pursued a moderately reformist agenda but within the constraints of "the king's dilemma": a would-be reforming monarch can either resort to increasingly harsh and repressive measures to try to control the scope and pace of reform at the risk of a revolution or allow reforms to proceed to the point that the monarchy morphs into a much diminished constitutional monarchy. There are many examples of the failure of the first strategy; from the perspective of an absolute monarchy like Saudi Arabia, the success of a series of British monarchs in giving up the ability to rule in exchange for the right to reign symbolically is not a very attractive model.

Governments, as the Biden team should already have learned, do not have the luxury of asking various parts of the world to just chill and be patient until we can get around to you guys. China, Russia, and Western Europe demand immediate attention. And as the rest of world comes to realize the impact of the Covid pandemic on the less developed nations of world, Americans will no longer be able to echo the 19th Century British Prime Minister who disdainfully dismissed much of the world as "...people about whom we know little and care less."

The Price of the Pandemic

In the middle of a committee mark up session for a major spending bill, one Senator was moved to observe, “A billion here, a billion there … after a while you're talking about real money.” Today, it’s a trillion here, a trillion there adding up to real budget deceits and the National Debt.

I’d like to discuss three things: what are we talking about, why does it matter, and the political battle ahead.  

A really important caveat: my area of expertise has always been international, not U.S. politics, so this piece should be taken with more than the usual grain of salt.

Federal Deficits and National Debt

The Deficit

Most years the Federal government runs a budget deficit because it spends more money than it raises in taxes and fees. There are two main forces driving budget deficits: the politics of taxing and spending and deliberate policy. In an annual ritual of “let’s pretend” the President submits a proposed national budget to Congress. The White House pretends that this is a realistic and thoughtful proposal and Congress pretends that it will take it seriously. In fact the President's budget proposal is deliberately unrealistic, designed to appeal to the base. Members of Congress know that the real budget will come out of an array of House and Senate committees that individually and collectively will make decisions about spending and taxes.

Despite repeated efforts to reform and rationalize the process, the Congressional system for developing a budget is decentralized and piecemeal, with individual committees working through different sections of the budget and not surprisingly, hearing from lobbyists, interest groups, representatives of Executive branch departments, and people dependent on various programs who want to make sure their particular program is funded. Meanwhile other committees are responsible for tax policy, with lots of helpful advice from those who want to make sure their favorite part of the tax code is protected, and a different committee is ultimately responsible for reconciling all these disparate pieces into a package that can be passed by the House and by the Senate.

The second major factor driving deficits is “counter-cyclical spending” – the idea that the Federal government should increase spending or cut taxes, even as revenue declines, during economic downturns. The current series of Coronavirus relief bills is the perfect example. The second half of the counter-cyclical theory – raise taxes and/or cut spending when times are good is a lot harder to implement.

The 2017 tax cuts had already created a major deficit before the Coronavirus hit.* So far about $3 trillion has been spent on emergency relief and Congress is working on another bill that could easily run to another trillion dollars in debt.

*The tax cuts were justified by the promise that they would cause the economy to grow by at least 3% a year and thus pay for themselves in increased revenue. Growth has been well less than that in all but one quarter since then.

The National Debt

The government sells bonds to finance the debt. U.S. bonds are attractive investments for foreign governments and extremely wealthy investors because they are super safe and a source of dollars. Once upon a time governments stored their national treasure as gold. But gold is expensive to store, of limited use in international trade, and just sits there in the vault. U.S. bonds don’t require fortified vaults to store, the dollar is the foundation of global trade, and bonds get you interest payments in U.S. dollars. And government bonds are secure; the United States is not going to default on interest payments or devalue the dollar and wipe out your national treasury.

So What?

The budget deficit tends to stimulate the economy and encourage growth because it means more money out into the hands of consumers. It also means the government is competing with other investors in the bond market and tends to drive up interest rates. Too much deficit leads to inflation; too little deficit can slow the economy by decreasing demand and reducing the money supply. The role of Federal Reserve is to try to regulate interest rates to compensate for the effects of too much or to little deficit spending.

In the short term National Debt matters because paying interest on the bonds that finance it takes a large bite out of the Federal budget, money that could be better spent on infrastructure or expanding health care or reducing taxes.

In the longer term, the size of the Debt impacts the relationship of the U.S. economy to the rest of the world and the ability to maintain a strong and growing economy.

A country's credit rating is not based on the amount of debt but the ratio of debt to Gross National Product. That has varied over the years: immediately after World War II it was at 122%, in 1960 the National Debt was 53% of GDP, in 1980 it dropped to 35%, in 2000 it was 58%.

But today’s 25 trillion (and counting) debt is 115% of the 22 trillion dollar U.S. economy. If this were the situation in any other country in the world alarm bells would be ringing in international financial circles and the dollar would be plummeting like a stone. The fact that neither of these things is true underscores how much the U.S. benefits from the factor that global market runs on dollars. Because the dollar is the basic currency for international transactions, the U.S. is the largest economy in the world, and we have never defaulted on a bond, we are uniquely able to sell bonds to finance our debt. Other rich developed countries can finance their much smaller debt by selling some bonds and borrowing from institutions like the European Central Bank but usually must satisfy bond buyers or lenders that the deficit is only temporary. Poorer countries have a hard time selling their bonds and end up borrowing from international banks at high interest rates or seeking help from the International Monetary Fund which insists that governments adopt a program of reducing spending and raising revenues before they can continue to get loans. Any other country in the world with our pattern of deficit and debt would be forced to impose an austerity program on its citizens, slashing pensions and public spending and raising taxes.

As the global economy expands and other countries catch up to the U.S., international investors and national governments have attractive alternatives to U.S. bonds for their money and the U.S. will have to pay higher and higher interest on its bonds. The interest rate on government bonds affects the interest rates throughout the economy and can simultaneously cause high inflation and retard growth. No one can say for sure when, but if current trends continue, there will come a day when interest on the Debt will become unsustainable. At some point an out of control National Debt will create such high inflation coupled with slow growth and absorb so much of the national budget that other countries and international investors will decide that U.S. bounds are not a good investment and we’ll be forced to turn to the International Monetary fund for a loan to keep us going. And then the United States will get the same treatment other global debtors receive – posterity budgets that slash spending on domestic programs, significantly higher taxes, and pressure to sell off national assets to private investors.

The Politics of Debt Reduction

Taxing and spending are where the political rubber hits the road. Decisions about the budget deficit and reducing the National Debt will be driven by ideology, partisanship, interest groups, and individual legislators’ beliefs about who deserves help from the government. It can’t be done any other way: there is no “objective” or scientific way of making decisions that rest on basic value judgments.

National politics will be dominated by the Covid-19 pandemic for the next few years. I think the 2020 election will be a referendum on President Trump’s handling of the pandemic. The necessity to maintain a reasonable annual deficit and trim the National Debt will cast a long shadow over all tax and spending questions for several years to come. The economic challenges posed by the pandemic will require difficult and painful measures. Most serious economists believe that it is sheer magical thinking to expect the economy to suddenly rebound in the next few months even if Covid were to miracuously disappear.

The politics of coping with the situation are complicated by the current rampant partisanship in Congress. In the past there have been some members of Congress who were focused on governance as well as partisanship and individual issues and could get together behind the scenes to negotiate a compromise package. The fact that many had been in Congress a long time and had established personal relationships helped. That is not true in 2020.

The politics are further complicated by the fact that the Senate and House are controlled by different parties who have had very little interest in cooperating and that fact that the White House does not have the ability or inclination to play an active and effective leadership role in developing and promoting legislative solutions.

But even if control of the White House and/or the Senate and House changes after November, the struggle to respond to the economic challenges facing the Federal government and many state governments will be defined by the clash of two frameworks. Democrats will stress the centrality of increasing taxes to reduce the deficit and begin to pay down the National Debt; Republicans will stress the importance of cutting spending.

The Democrats will propose tax increases that are the mirror image of President Trump’s 2017 package: skewed heavily toward the wealthy and large corporations. They will vigorously resist proposals to reduce spending on social programs aimed at the poor and middle class while trying to eliminate “corporate welfare” programs and reduce defense spending. The emphasis on raising revenue will get an assist in 2025 when the provisions of the 2017 tax package that reduced taxes for individuals expire unless there is a deliberate decision to continue them.

The Republican position will emphasize spending reductions everywhere except defense and oppose tax increases. Republicans tend to be especially skeptical of that part of domestic spending that offers benefits or services to which a person is entitled based on age (Social Security, Medicare), income (Medicaid, SNAP), or status (student loans, disability income). Under the rubric of “entitlement reform” Republicans have frequently sought to reduce benefits and restrict enrollment on the grounds that these programs are spiraling out of control. Cutting entitlements has usually depended on the strengthen of the constituency supporting the program. SNAP (the successor to food stamps), for example, has been vulnerable to cuts because it does not have a large body of passionate defenders in Congress and its recipients, largely low income women and their children, are not a significant voting block. And it has been relatively easy to maintain comparatively low payments to doctors and hospitals for Medicaid because providers can either charge other patients more or decline to accept any Medicaid patients. (Democrats are not immune to the temptation to cut programs with high costs and no potent organized constituency.)

Social Security and Medicare are very large and growing entitlement programs that have passionate Congressional supporters and their beneficiaries tend to be very consistent voters who are extremely sensitive to threats to their benefits. Given their size and impact on the budget, Social Security and Medicare have been prime targets for “entitlement reform” for years but their political foundations make them risky targets for budget hawks. Social Security is funded by payroll taxes that go into a specify fund within the Federal budget. It is easy to see that at some point in the future, as Baby Boomers retire and the U.S. population in general ages, that current levels of payroll tax will not generate enough money to cover the benefits sent to seniors. That leads to three possibilities. 1) raise the retirement age, which was done in 1983, so that from 1983 to 2027 it would gradually creep up from 65 to 67; 2) raise the payroll tax limit. When your income reaches a particular level, $140,000 this year, you and your employer stop paying 6.2% of your wages into Social Security. Perhaps the most logical response, but likely to face strong opposition from everyone making more than $140k and their employers; 3) reduce the monthly Social Security benefit and annual Medicare benefits. The political calculation changes dramatically if you leave benefits intact for people currently in the programs but reduce them for future retirees, especially if the reductions are phased in over a number of years. The expectation would be that future retirees would not miss benefits they’ve never had.

The same budget crunch of rapidly growing expenses and precipitously declining revenue afflict state and local governments as well. Many state and local budgets were already struggling with the twin impacts of escalating unfunded pension costs and the lingering impact of the 2008 recession. The fact that the states hardest hit by both the recession and the pandemic are politically blue, with large urban populations and strong public employee unions and are typically struggling with unfunded pension deficits makes Federal assistance a highly partisan issue. Both President Trump and Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell have been decidedly unsympathetic to their problems and openly reluctant to support “bail out” packages.

When members of Congress from both parties come to believe that the post-pandemic world demands action on both the Federal deficit and National Debt and that states and municipalities can’t just declare bankruptcy and start over, there will be action at the national level.

How much will be done and who will bear the burden will depend on the 2020 election and changes in the political landscape and economy over the next few years.

Mr. Mayhem on the Loose?

Allstate Insurance has gotten a lot of advertising mileage out of Mr. Mayhem. I believe that we are going through a fundamental change in the overall strategic dynamic in the region that threatens to turn Mr. Mayhem loose in the Middle East.

President Trump’s decision to pull back the token U.S. Special Forces troops working with the Syrian Kurds paved the way for the Turkish incursion. The decision to acquiesce in the potential crushing defeat of our closest allies in the fight against ISIS and push them into the arms of the Russians and Iranians is probably the final stage in the reorientation of U.S. policy. Not that long ago the United States was the most important external player in Middle East politics. Often American diplomacy was sophisticated and skillful and sometimes it was naive and bumbling, but in general, the United States was a force for moderation and conflict avoidance and helped provide a certain amount of stability in the region.

The Bush administration's ill-fated adventure in regime change in Iraq marked a major change in the American role. The military became the driver of U.S. policy in place of diplomats and the aim of policy changed from balance and stability to assertive intervention. The Obama administration promised to pivot away from the Middle East to focus on Asia but events on the ground including the rise of ISIS, the Arab Spring, and the Syrian civil war, as well as a well intentioned but futile attempt to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was probably the dying gasp of a two state solution, drew it back. Obama continued the Bush administration's reliance on the military to shape policy. Now Trump has effectively removed the U.S. as a major player.

At the risk of over-simplification, American policy has been reduced to three simple elements: unquestioned support for whatever Netanyahu and the Israeli right wing want; support for Saudi Arabia as the leader of an anti-Iran coalition; and maximum economic pressure on Iran that has yet to produce any positive results. Missing is even lip service to human rights or democratic values, missing is an active diplomacy that identified and promoted common interests across a range of issues and countries, missing is a sophisticated and multi-dimensional response to Iranian influence.

I want to focus on three countries where the apparent abdication of an active role for American diplomacy and military strategy will have significant short and long term effects.

Syria

The withdrawal of the largely symbolic American military forces removed the only obstacle to an invasion of Northern Syria by the Turkish armed forces. It also removed the United States as a participant in shaping the future of Syria.

In the short term, Turkey will establish a so-called buffer zone in northern Syria which will push Kurdish armed forces 20 miles further away from Turkey. The 5 day truce announced with such great fanfare on October 17 is not a triumph of American diplomacy getting Turkish President Erdogan to do something he wasn't already inclined to do. Since the agreement does not mention, let alone require, Turkish withdrawal from the territory they have conquered, it is merely American acquiescence in Turkey’s success. This will allow the Turks to resettle many of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey and separate Turkey’s Kurdish population from their Syrian compatriots, weakening their ability to resist attempts to destroy their culture and identity.

As a reminder, the Kurds are a distinct ethnic group spread across Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Kurds follow Sunni Islam but they are not Arabs and the Kurdish language unique. Kurdish representatives went to the Versailles Peace Conference at the end of World War I but their hopes that the promise of self determination for nations would apply to them were dashed. The Kurds in Northern Iraq have created a state within a state, with almost complete autonomy from the Baghdad government. The Syrian Kurds, operating as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), defeated ISIS and liberated the territory held by the Caliphate. The United States supplied air power, weapons, and advisors, while Kurdish soldiers fought and died on the ground.

The American withdrawal has left the Kurds feeling abandoned and betrayed and desperate in the face of the Turkish military. After years of intense fighting against the Assad regime, the SDF has announced an agreement to allow regime forces into the areas they controlled until the Turks invaded.

In the short term, the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian backers are the big winners. The last area of resistance will quickly be brought under control and the civil war will be over. What began for many Syrians as a hopeful movement for democracy and regime change will end in abject failure.

In the longer run, Syria will become a grindingly poor country with huge swaths of territory that are not controlled by anyone. The civil war has been devastating to the Syrian economy and imposed immense suffering on millions of people. Armed resistance will end but the divisions and scars of the brutal war will remain. The international community will not participate in the rebuilding of Syria. Neither Iran nor Russia have the economic resources to rebuild the country. The thousands of middle class professionals who have fled the civil war and made it to Europe or Jordan are not likely to return to a shattered and chaotic country.

Somewhere around 12,000 ISIS fighters were being held in camps guarded by Kurdish troops, including many that the United States regarded as “high value.”. Those guards will, if they have not left already, be withdrawn to resist the Turkish invasion and there isn’t any other force that can replace them. It is highly likely that the surviving ISIS leadership and the newly freed fighters will manage to establish control over a significant area and announce the reemergence of the Caliphate. Not only will ISIS itself be reinvigorated in its battle against the West, but the ISIS-inspired groups throughout the Middle East and North Africa will resume their assaults on local governments and western interests.

Israel

Syria is not the only country in the Middle East in the midst of a major change that will be complicated by America’s precipitous withdrawal from Middle Eastern politics.. Benjamin Netanyahu has dominanted Israeli politics for the last 25 years. He has succeeded in making his staunchly nationalist and anti-Arab perspective, that stresses an image of an embattled Israel surrounded by enemies in the Middle East and anti-Semites in Europe, the dominant view, even among those who are opposed to his conservative social views. Since neither the right of center Likud party nor the slightly left of center Labor party has been able to win a clear majority in Israel’s parliament for the past few years, the choice in Israel has been between a Netanyahu led coalition of Likud plus small ultra-right parties representing the most militant settlers and extremely conservative ultra-Orthodox religious groups or a Labor based coalition with small liberal parties. Elections last Apricot revealed declining support for Netanyahu but he managed to patch together yet another ultra-right, ultra-orthodox coalition that lasted only a few months. Another round of elections in September showed further erosion of support for Netanyahu, despite his heavily promoted close ties to President Trump. Netanyahu himself has become a major issue, as he is likely facing prosecution on corruption and bribery charges. In the short run, most observers think that the Netanyahiu era in Israel is over. because any coalition he might cobble together will not be stable, the government will fall quickly and he will end up in court.

In the longer run, Israel will have to deal with the existential crisis of the Palestinians. The threat to Israel’s existence is not from some kind of invasion or even an armed insurrection in the West Bank. The Israeli Defense Forces and security agencies can deal with any violent external or internal assault. But the idea of creating a separate, independent, state for the Palestinians is dead. The 1992 Oslo Accords that seemed to provide a path to a two state solution now seem quaintly antique. Most of the West Bank is walled off from Israel proper, and settlements continue to expand. Some settlements are suburbs around Jerusalem that draw young Israelis seeking affordable housing; some are deeper in Palestinian territory and draw militant settlers (largely immigrants from Russia, the U.S. and Europe) who believe themselves to be fulfilling a religious duty to occupy all the territory God apparently granted to Abraham in the Hebrew Scripture (the Old Testament).

There are two fundamental sets of values that define Israelis’ national identity. One is that Israel is a Jewish state, although there is disagreement about the extent to which Jewishness is tied up with religious practice. The other is that Israel is a democracy. If Israel is to continue to control the West Bank and Gaza Strip, perhaps even annexing large areas (as Netanyahu has promised during his latest campaign) either Jewish identity or democracy will have to be abandoned. There are approximately 7 million Jewish citizens of Israel, and 1.7 million Arab citizens. There are roughly 4.7 million Palestinians in the West Bank. If Israel were to annex all of the West Bank, on the grounds that it is historical Judea and Samaria and properly part of Israel, Jews would become a minority within a very few years. But if Israel does not annex the West Bank, it will have to continue to treat the occupied territories (as the rest of the world call the West Bank) as a de facto colony which would threaten both core Jewish values and core democratic values.

Saudi Arabia

In the short run, the Saudis have been big winners under Trump’s foreign policy. The U.S.-Saudi alliance, based on interlocking economic, strategic, and personal ties, has been strengthened by the administration's focus on Iran as the enemy in the Middle East, the public relations campaign to sell Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) as a bold reformer, and the Crown Prince’s ability to establish a close personal relationship with Trump and Jared Kushner. Thus Trump and his administration refused to believe that MBS was responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul last year and the administration has continued to support the bloody Saudi led war in Yemen despite Congressional disapproval. Even as Trump was ordering the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria and acquiescing in Turkey’s invasion, the administration was sending 1,000 additional troops to Saudi Arabia.

In the long run, Saudi Arabia faces some major problems. One is the fact that the Saudis are punching above their weight when they try to lead the fight against Iran. They cannot match the size of the Iranian military, their critical oil facilities are vulnerable to attack, and the restive shi’a dominated western provinces are potentially vulnerable to Iranian influence. As long as the United States is a generous and reliable ally, the Kingdom can lead the anti-Iran coalition. But the extent and consistency of that support is increasingly depended on President Trump and his inner circle. The next American President will not offer the same level of unquestioning support. Even now the Saudis may have some doubts about U.S. support given our inability to assemble an international naval force to deter attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and our failure to orchestrate a response to the September drone and missile attack on Saudi oil facilities. (To be fair the Trump administration has leaked the news that the U.S. did launch a “secret” cyberattack on some Iranian computers.)

A second long term problem is the stability of the regime. It is as if the royal family has made a bargain with the citizens: we’ll provide you with a rich and comfortable life if you forswear politics and accept conservative religious control over public life. “Reforms,” such as the recent granting of driver license to women and some curtailing of the more egregious actions of the Committees for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, suggest that the bargain may be fraying at the edges. A growing population and stable or even declining oil revenues threaten the Kingdom’s ability to support young Saudis in the style to which they have become accustomed.

The region may not feel the full effects of Mr. Mayhem, but it will certainly be less stable and governments will find it increasingly diffident to provide the level of economic and social development and physical security that would allow people to transcend ethnic and religious divisions.

Some Notes on Exercising Power

You can catch more flies with honey than vinegar

Trespassers will be shot

The beatings will continue until morale improves

People have been happily using three basic strategies for exerting power unencumbered by the terms “persuasion,” “deterrence,” or “compellence.” But a more systematic examination of strategies may reveal some wrinkles that are not obvious and may lead to some suggestions for using strategies more effectively.

If you want to exercise power over someone [that is, get them to do something they would not do otherwise] you can promise them rewards if they do what you want (persuasion), threaten to punish them to stop them from doing something you don’t want (deterrence), or threaten to punish them until they do what you want (compellence.) 

It can help understand human behavior if we greatly simplify motives and see people as if they calculated the costs and benefits of different courses of action. Faced with a choice between doing A or B, we act as if we did some mental arithmetic and subtracted the costs of doing A from its benefits and compared that to the benefits and costs of B.

The simplest persuasion situation is when you want someone to do A but if they are left to their own devices, they’ll most likely do B because its benefits minus its costs are better than A’s. We can try to persuade some to do A by promising to increase the benefits of doing it so that it becomes a better deal than B. 

In the simplest deterrence situation, we do not want someone to do B, and may not care much about what they do instead. If we think they might be tempted to do B, we can threaten them with some painful consequence if they do it.

Compellence mixes the two other strategies in an interesting way. We want someone to do A; we think they’ll do B if we leave them alone so we threaten or even punish them until they do A. Instead of promising the increase the benefits of A, we threaten to increase the costs of doing B … the unpleasantness will stop when they do what we want.

Problems and Issues

There are five major problem areas that affect each of these strategies:

• Identification
• Calibration
• Credibility
• Affect
• The Future

Identification: Figuring out what someone will regard as a reward or punishment is not always obvious. The better you know someone, the easier it is to figure out which buttons to push. But when we’re trying to influence people we don’t know very well it is more difficult and when we’re thinking about people from another country or culture, it is even more complicated. 

For example, note President Trump’s repeated promises that North Korea could become fantastically rich with western capital investment, and a real tourist mecca with its outstanding beaches. Does that really sound so wonderful to the leadership of a country proudly based on Juche, a philosophy of self reliance leading to strength and authentic socialism, rooted the ideals of sustainability through agricultural independence and a lack of dependency? Somehow Trump International Hotel, Pyongyang or Trump International Golf Resort at Hungnam don’t seem like great inducements to the regime.

Calibration. How much is enough? Can you offer enough to persuade or threaten enough to compel someone to do what you want, can you threaten enough to deter them from doing what you don’t want? 

Credibility: Are your promises or threats believable? What matters is not how sincere you are when you promise or threaten but what the other party believes.As a wise philosopher once said, "A lie is as good as he truth if you can get someone to believe it."

Affect. It is almost impossible to separate emotional considerations from cold strategic calculations. It just feels wrong to threaten or punish your friends. Even stronger is the aversion to rewarding your foes, It’s nice to be nice to the nice and nice to be not nice to the not nice. It is far more difficult to be not nice to the nice or nice to the not nice.

The Future. International politics is not a one-night stand. The country you are dealing with today is the same country you will be dealing with in the future. It’s the difference between telling the moron who just cut you off in traffic (whom you will never see again) where to go and what to do when he gets there, and reacting to something your significant other does.  

Offering promises and rewards to persuade is likely to reinforce a positive relationship and make it easier to persuade in the future. 

 

Deterrence, which presupposes the other party could intend to cause you harm, is almost always used directly in an already conflicted or hostile situation. It will certainly not improve the relationship, but it probably will not make the relationship any worse.

Using compellence, especially on a country with whom you have a good relationship and with whom you may need to cooperate in the future, is likely to provoke feelings of resentment and make future cooperation more difficult.

Some Bottom Lines.

The basic goal is to get someone to do something they wouldn't do otherwise. That means changing their assessment of the benefits and costs of complying with you. 

 

1. Given the problems of identification and calibration, it is prudent to be prepared to use both promises and threats, trying to affect both the expected benefits and expected costs of going along with you or saying “no.” That is true even though it may not feel right.

2. Persuasion will usually have a positive effect on a relationship, deterrence will usually have little effect, compellence will usually have a negative effect on a friendly relationship and make future cooperation more difficult.

3. Beginning with promises to try to persuade someone to go along with you and then making an implicit or explicit threat is not the same as starting with threats to compel compliance and then adding some praises if that doesn’t work.

The Trump administration seems to rely on compellence far more often than persuasion. A brief analysis of four examples may help clarify the limitations of compellence.

NATO. A long term American goal has been to get the European members of NATO to spend 2% of their GDP on defense (the latest figure for the United States is 3.2%.) Persuasion has not worked in the past. President after President has urged our Eur open allies to spend more, they have promised to ramp up their defense budgets … and very little happened. (That’s not too surprising, since it is the various parliaments that must pass a budget and the majority of their constituents, across the continent, are not in favor of higher military spending.) Trump took a different approach, trying to compel budget increases by threatening to abandon NATO. Again, lots of promises to raise budgets, and a small increase here and there. But the United States has spent a great deal of time and energy trying to restore the damaged relationship as officials from the Secretaries of State and Defense, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and prominent Republican and Democratic Senators have tried to reassure Europe that the U.S. is as committed to NATO as ever.

NORTH KOREA. The Trump administration adopted a policy of maximum pressure, pushing harsher and harsher sanctions on North Korea and working hard to convince other states, including China, to enforce them. Trump himself added fiery rhetoric and Kim Jung Un responded in kind (experts disagree on whether “Little Rocket Man” or “dotard” is the best epithet.) Amid rumors of U.S. plans for a preemptive military attack, North Korea agreed to a summit meeting in Singapore at which Kim agreed to disable a nuclear site he no longer needed for producing weapons grade material, Trump agreed to hold off on new sanctions and they both agreed to “denuclearize” the Korean Peninsula without even trying to define what “denuclearize” might mean. The second summit in Saigon was a complete failure, either because the Koreans were completely unreasonable, or because Trump was unprepared for a negotiation where the other side started with a maximum position. The recent exchange of “beautiful” letters between Trump and Kim and Trump’s few steps into North Korea hardly represent a rousing success for U.S. strategy.

MEXICO. The Trump administration tried to compel Mexico to stem the flow of asylum seekers from Central America by threatening unilateral tariffs that would cripple the Mexican economic. (The fact that the threat was almost as scary for American businesses and Republican politicians is somewhat beside the point here.) Mexico did agree to do some things, but what Mexico has actually done that they were not already planning to do is not clear. What is clear is that getting the Mexican Congress to ratify the trade deal that is supposed to replace NAFTA will be more difficult.

IRAN. Another cases of maximum pressure on an adversary. The assumption was that pulling out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“Iran deal” is a much more user-friendly term) and crippling Iran’s economy by zeroing out oil exports would being the Islamic Republic back to the bargaining table to make major concessions. The Iranian strategy of putting increasing pressure on the remaining parties to the agreement to circumvent U.S. sanctions. was not part of the plan. Now the United States is stuck, with few punishments to inflict short of a potentially disastrous military adventure and no rewards to promise. About all the hard liners in Washington can do is cross their fingers and hope the Iranian economy collapses completely and by some miracle the people revolt against the regime. And that the new regime is not even more hard line and radical than the old one.

Conclusion. There is no “best” strategy. What is most likely to work depends on your goals, the other party’s goals, and what you can promise or threaten. Compellence differs from persuasion and deterrence because it can undermine long term relationship goals if used on friends or allies. That is the real art of the deal.

War With Iran?

A potential catastrophe is brewing in the Persian Gulf. Both the United States and Iran are taking steps that the other side views as aggressive and threatening and responding in kind. By any sober analysis both the United States and Iran would suffer enormous damage if things spiral out of control and a large scale military conflict erupted.

In the worst case, the United States would launch a massive aerial bombardment of Iran designed to destroy their nuclear infrastructure, which would, most likely, both fail to neutralize all the sites and cause immense harm to Iran's infrastructure and already faltering economy. Iran's most obvious strategy would be to try to stop oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. [for more than you might want to know about the Strait, click here.]  Since the U.S. is less dependent on imported oil than Europe, Japan, or China, the loss of oil from the Middle East would not cripple the U.S. economy but it would cause a spike in gasoline  prices and have a substantial negative impact on our major trading partners.  Iran has close working relationships with a number of groups throughout the Middle East, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to a variety of forces in Iraq and various factions in the Gulf States and elsewhere.  The standard American view that Iran controls these groups is probably a gross over estimation, but Iran does have the capacity to inspire its allies to attack American forces and interests in several countries and also threaten Israel.

While I think both sides understand that a major military exchange would be the worst possible outcome, there are three crucial dynamics that create the potential for escalation to spiral out of control.

1.)      First, each country’s decision making is influenced by hawks sees the other as an implacable enemy who desires their destruction. 

Decision makers at the highest level of government are very much like you and me when it comes to understanding history.  What matters is not a careful time line, detailed description and nuanced discussion of events, complete with alternative explanations, but general impressions.  The Iranian regime tends to see Iran as initially a victim of Western Imperialism and then a beacon of resistance.  America and Britain toppled a democratic Iranian regime in 1952 and imposed their puppet Shah; the glorious 1979 revolution created the modern Islamic Republic, liberating Iran from foreigners and giving the world an ideology and living example of freedom from Western capitalist domination. 

From the U.S. perspective, the 1979 revolution replaced a friendly regime with a bunch of religious fanatics who loved to chant “Death to America”, called us the “Great Satan”, are sworn to the annihilation of Israel, and are constantly trying to foment turmoil and rebellion across the Middle East. 

If a belief that a burning desire to destroy you lies at the very core of another country’s policies, you will be powerfully predisposed to interpret whatever they do or say in the worst possible light. 

2) The second pernicious dynamic is each side’s belief that its actions are a measured and appropriate response to the provocative and dangerous actions of the other.

 

 From Iran’s perspective, the current confrontation began when the U.S. pulled out of the nuclear agreement and tried to destroy Iran’s economy by blocking its access to global oil markets.  Then the U.S. publicly backed Saudi Arabia’s newly aggressive foreign policy whose centerpiece is an attempt to isolate Iran and attack its friends and Allies in the Middle East.  

Iran responded by increasing work on medium range ballistic missiles, supporting the Syrian regime, strengthening its ties to friendly militas in countries like Iraq and Lebanon and supporting the rebels after Saudi Arabia intervened in the civil war in Yemen.  

After withdrawing from the Paris nuclear accord, the United States has crippled the Iranian economy with sanctions, escalated its extreme anti-Iranian rhetoric and begun to build up its military forces in the Gulf.  The Iranian response has been to look to Europe to keep its promise to develop a system that would allow the major oil companies to purchase Iran crude and European companies to do business with Iran without being punished by the U.S. for violating America’s unilateral sanctions on Iran. 

The biggest obstacle is the fact that the global financial system ultimately rests very heavily on the U.S. dollar.  Not only are most transactions priced in dollars but most transactions use U.S. banking institutions, either directly or indirectly, to complete the deal.  U.S. sanctions foreclose access to U.S.. financial institutions.  The second stumbling block is a fear that a European company doing business with Iran will have its U.S. operations penalized or curtailed by the U.S. Treasury Department..

 The European Union promised last year to develop an alternative financing mechanism for Iranian business but that has not been fully implemented.  Iran’s most recent moves, the attack on two tankers in the Strait of Hormuz* and the threat to withdraw from the nuclear deal within a week can be understood from Tehran’s perspective as a modest reminder that shipping lanes are vulnerable and a much more pointed demand that the EU moves very rapidly to keep its promise.

*I am assuming that Iran was the source of the mines attached to the two tankers. The reluctance of our major European allies to accept the U.S. assertion of Iranian culpability says less, I think, about the likelihood of Iranian involvement and much more about the level of mistrust of the Trump administration and its intentions.

From the U.S. view, the original nuclear deal was fatally flawed because it did not permanently prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and it did not stop Iran’s promotion of terrorism and other “nefarious activities.” Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon: wherever you look the Iranians are stirring up trouble and backing some pretty bad actors.  The recent small increase (a few thousand) troops is in direct response to what the U.S. says are credible threats to American citizens and interests.  

3.)   The third vicious dynamic is a feeling of helplessness.  

Aside from a few super hawks, no one in either government wants things to escalate to a major military clash.  But since each side firmly believes that it has no choice but to react to the hostile and threatening actions of the other, it is the other side that must back down and stop making things worse.  If only the U.S. (or Iran) would change its course, then Iran (or the U.S.) could stand down.

So what will happen?  

I want to present an optimistic view based on three plausible assumptions.

1)      The U.S. government is deeply divided between hawks and doves. The Iranian government may also be divided.

National Security advisor John Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and several prominent Republican Senators epitomize the “implacable enemy” view that the Iranian regime must be overthrown sooner or later.  They are strongly supported by Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States whose current stance is pretty close to “I’ll hold your coat while you go beat them up.”

But President Trump is, clearly opposed to a full scale war with Iran, as is a significant portion of the foreign policy establishment (yes, “the Blob” is back.)  Bolton, Pompeo and other major White House decision makers have reportedly been given detailed and sober briefings on the enormous costs and consequences of a full scale war with Iran. Ironically, Trump’s often criticized tendency to replace the assessments of national intelligence agencies with his own gut feelings is an important restraining force in this situation.  The Defense Department is adamant that Iran deliberately shot down a U.S. multi-million dollar drone in international air space in a provocative violation of international law; President Trump says it was an Iranian “mistake” and not a major escalation.

The Iranian political system is convoluted and opaque.  While it is clear that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, is the highest authority and the Council of Experts is the next most significant body, there are two parallel governmental organizations making military policy and day to day decisions.  The formal government features an elected legislature and President and the usual bureaus and offices, including the military.  At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is technically a branch of the military but has become a functionally autonomous body with a complex of businesses and factories that is capable of acting on its own.  The IRGC, either under orders from the top or a unit acting on its own, is quite capable of shooting down a U.S. drone without the prior knowledge, let alone approval, of the civilian government.  

2)       Both sides so far have shown a certain amount of restraint. 

So far the American response to Iranian moves such as attacking oil tankers and shooting down a drone has been muted:  Sending more troops to the region and threatening rhetoric is far milder than launching a punitive air strike.  President Trump’s very public cancellation of an air strike on Iran to avoid casualties at the very least avoids escalation and may mark the beginning of a de-escalation spiral.  Iran’s announcement that they could have shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane but chose not to may also be a small step back from the brink.  Of course, the danger of disastrous miscalculation remains and there is always the possibility that we are in the same situation as the person who fell off a 30 story building and when someone on the 2^nd floor called out “How are you doing?” the answer was, “so far, so good!” 

The fact that the American government and, I think, the Iranian side, are both divided on how evil and/or rational the adversary is good news … and bad news.  The good news is that it opens up the possibility of cooler heads prevailing and finding a way out of the immediate conflict; the bad news is that the hawkish rhetoric and actions of the hard liners on either side will be taken as representing the “real” position.  

3)      While clearly there’s a sense that if only the other side would back off this confrontation could be resolved, there also seems to be a sense on both sides that they can control the situation and there are options.  

Both sides have long term, non-negotiable demands (the U.S. insistence that there is some sort of iron clad guarantee that Iran will never develop nuclear weapons; the Iranian insistence that the U.S. end its campaign of economic coercion and rejoin the 2015 Paris Agreement), neither has laid out a specific challenge that the other must meet in the immediate future.  There is a potential path to a resolution that might be little more than a gradual easing of tension.

It seems fair to say that the recent history of U.S.-Iranian relations began when the U.S. walked away from the nuclear accord and adopted a policy of highly coercive measures to force Iran to renegotiate.  A reliance on threats and punishments to force someone to do what you want is the basic definition of a compellance strategy.  It may be useful to devote a future blog to a more conceptual discussion of compellance, deterrence and persuasion as strategies.  It may not take six months to get around to it …