War With Iran?

A potential catastrophe is brewing in the Persian Gulf. Both the United States and Iran are taking steps that the other side views as aggressive and threatening and responding in kind. By any sober analysis both the United States and Iran would suffer enormous damage if things spiral out of control and a large scale military conflict erupted.

In the worst case, the United States would launch a massive aerial bombardment of Iran designed to destroy their nuclear infrastructure, which would, most likely, both fail to neutralize all the sites and cause immense harm to Iran's infrastructure and already faltering economy. Iran's most obvious strategy would be to try to stop oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. [for more than you might want to know about the Strait, click here.]  Since the U.S. is less dependent on imported oil than Europe, Japan, or China, the loss of oil from the Middle East would not cripple the U.S. economy but it would cause a spike in gasoline  prices and have a substantial negative impact on our major trading partners.  Iran has close working relationships with a number of groups throughout the Middle East, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to a variety of forces in Iraq and various factions in the Gulf States and elsewhere.  The standard American view that Iran controls these groups is probably a gross over estimation, but Iran does have the capacity to inspire its allies to attack American forces and interests in several countries and also threaten Israel.

While I think both sides understand that a major military exchange would be the worst possible outcome, there are three crucial dynamics that create the potential for escalation to spiral out of control.

1.)      First, each country’s decision making is influenced by hawks sees the other as an implacable enemy who desires their destruction. 

Decision makers at the highest level of government are very much like you and me when it comes to understanding history.  What matters is not a careful time line, detailed description and nuanced discussion of events, complete with alternative explanations, but general impressions.  The Iranian regime tends to see Iran as initially a victim of Western Imperialism and then a beacon of resistance.  America and Britain toppled a democratic Iranian regime in 1952 and imposed their puppet Shah; the glorious 1979 revolution created the modern Islamic Republic, liberating Iran from foreigners and giving the world an ideology and living example of freedom from Western capitalist domination. 

From the U.S. perspective, the 1979 revolution replaced a friendly regime with a bunch of religious fanatics who loved to chant “Death to America”, called us the “Great Satan”, are sworn to the annihilation of Israel, and are constantly trying to foment turmoil and rebellion across the Middle East. 

If a belief that a burning desire to destroy you lies at the very core of another country’s policies, you will be powerfully predisposed to interpret whatever they do or say in the worst possible light. 

2) The second pernicious dynamic is each side’s belief that its actions are a measured and appropriate response to the provocative and dangerous actions of the other.

 

 From Iran’s perspective, the current confrontation began when the U.S. pulled out of the nuclear agreement and tried to destroy Iran’s economy by blocking its access to global oil markets.  Then the U.S. publicly backed Saudi Arabia’s newly aggressive foreign policy whose centerpiece is an attempt to isolate Iran and attack its friends and Allies in the Middle East.  

Iran responded by increasing work on medium range ballistic missiles, supporting the Syrian regime, strengthening its ties to friendly militas in countries like Iraq and Lebanon and supporting the rebels after Saudi Arabia intervened in the civil war in Yemen.  

After withdrawing from the Paris nuclear accord, the United States has crippled the Iranian economy with sanctions, escalated its extreme anti-Iranian rhetoric and begun to build up its military forces in the Gulf.  The Iranian response has been to look to Europe to keep its promise to develop a system that would allow the major oil companies to purchase Iran crude and European companies to do business with Iran without being punished by the U.S. for violating America’s unilateral sanctions on Iran. 

The biggest obstacle is the fact that the global financial system ultimately rests very heavily on the U.S. dollar.  Not only are most transactions priced in dollars but most transactions use U.S. banking institutions, either directly or indirectly, to complete the deal.  U.S. sanctions foreclose access to U.S.. financial institutions.  The second stumbling block is a fear that a European company doing business with Iran will have its U.S. operations penalized or curtailed by the U.S. Treasury Department..

 The European Union promised last year to develop an alternative financing mechanism for Iranian business but that has not been fully implemented.  Iran’s most recent moves, the attack on two tankers in the Strait of Hormuz* and the threat to withdraw from the nuclear deal within a week can be understood from Tehran’s perspective as a modest reminder that shipping lanes are vulnerable and a much more pointed demand that the EU moves very rapidly to keep its promise.

*I am assuming that Iran was the source of the mines attached to the two tankers. The reluctance of our major European allies to accept the U.S. assertion of Iranian culpability says less, I think, about the likelihood of Iranian involvement and much more about the level of mistrust of the Trump administration and its intentions.

From the U.S. view, the original nuclear deal was fatally flawed because it did not permanently prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and it did not stop Iran’s promotion of terrorism and other “nefarious activities.” Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon: wherever you look the Iranians are stirring up trouble and backing some pretty bad actors.  The recent small increase (a few thousand) troops is in direct response to what the U.S. says are credible threats to American citizens and interests.  

3.)   The third vicious dynamic is a feeling of helplessness.  

Aside from a few super hawks, no one in either government wants things to escalate to a major military clash.  But since each side firmly believes that it has no choice but to react to the hostile and threatening actions of the other, it is the other side that must back down and stop making things worse.  If only the U.S. (or Iran) would change its course, then Iran (or the U.S.) could stand down.

So what will happen?  

I want to present an optimistic view based on three plausible assumptions.

1)      The U.S. government is deeply divided between hawks and doves. The Iranian government may also be divided.

National Security advisor John Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and several prominent Republican Senators epitomize the “implacable enemy” view that the Iranian regime must be overthrown sooner or later.  They are strongly supported by Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States whose current stance is pretty close to “I’ll hold your coat while you go beat them up.”

But President Trump is, clearly opposed to a full scale war with Iran, as is a significant portion of the foreign policy establishment (yes, “the Blob” is back.)  Bolton, Pompeo and other major White House decision makers have reportedly been given detailed and sober briefings on the enormous costs and consequences of a full scale war with Iran. Ironically, Trump’s often criticized tendency to replace the assessments of national intelligence agencies with his own gut feelings is an important restraining force in this situation.  The Defense Department is adamant that Iran deliberately shot down a U.S. multi-million dollar drone in international air space in a provocative violation of international law; President Trump says it was an Iranian “mistake” and not a major escalation.

The Iranian political system is convoluted and opaque.  While it is clear that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, is the highest authority and the Council of Experts is the next most significant body, there are two parallel governmental organizations making military policy and day to day decisions.  The formal government features an elected legislature and President and the usual bureaus and offices, including the military.  At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is technically a branch of the military but has become a functionally autonomous body with a complex of businesses and factories that is capable of acting on its own.  The IRGC, either under orders from the top or a unit acting on its own, is quite capable of shooting down a U.S. drone without the prior knowledge, let alone approval, of the civilian government.  

2)       Both sides so far have shown a certain amount of restraint. 

So far the American response to Iranian moves such as attacking oil tankers and shooting down a drone has been muted:  Sending more troops to the region and threatening rhetoric is far milder than launching a punitive air strike.  President Trump’s very public cancellation of an air strike on Iran to avoid casualties at the very least avoids escalation and may mark the beginning of a de-escalation spiral.  Iran’s announcement that they could have shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane but chose not to may also be a small step back from the brink.  Of course, the danger of disastrous miscalculation remains and there is always the possibility that we are in the same situation as the person who fell off a 30 story building and when someone on the 2^nd floor called out “How are you doing?” the answer was, “so far, so good!” 

The fact that the American government and, I think, the Iranian side, are both divided on how evil and/or rational the adversary is good news … and bad news.  The good news is that it opens up the possibility of cooler heads prevailing and finding a way out of the immediate conflict; the bad news is that the hawkish rhetoric and actions of the hard liners on either side will be taken as representing the “real” position.  

3)      While clearly there’s a sense that if only the other side would back off this confrontation could be resolved, there also seems to be a sense on both sides that they can control the situation and there are options.  

Both sides have long term, non-negotiable demands (the U.S. insistence that there is some sort of iron clad guarantee that Iran will never develop nuclear weapons; the Iranian insistence that the U.S. end its campaign of economic coercion and rejoin the 2015 Paris Agreement), neither has laid out a specific challenge that the other must meet in the immediate future.  There is a potential path to a resolution that might be little more than a gradual easing of tension.

It seems fair to say that the recent history of U.S.-Iranian relations began when the U.S. walked away from the nuclear accord and adopted a policy of highly coercive measures to force Iran to renegotiate.  A reliance on threats and punishments to force someone to do what you want is the basic definition of a compellance strategy.  It may be useful to devote a future blog to a more conceptual discussion of compellance, deterrence and persuasion as strategies.  It may not take six months to get around to it …