Failed Turkish Coup Casts a Long Shadow

While most of us have been amused, bemused or scared stiff by the antics of the U.S. Presidential campaign, or relaxing in full summer mode and letting the world take care of itself for a while, the recent failed coup in Turkey continues to have major consequences for that country and for Turkey’s relationship with the U.S.

I want to address four major questions about the failed coup.

What was behind it?

Why did it fail?

What are the implications for Turkey?

What are the implications for the United States?

Origins. It may be helpful to begin with a sketch the creation of modern Turkey and the broad political trends of the last twenty years.

The Role of the Military Modern Turkey was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in the waning days of World War I. A group of young army officers, led by Mustafa Kemal*, seized power, declared that Turkey a republic, and instituted a sweeping program of reform.

*Mustafa was given the nickname “Ataturk”, meaning “Father of the Turks.” Some of the students in my Middle East classes would be confused early in the semester and try to report on the two important historical figures, Mustafa Kemal and this other guy, Ataturk.

For Kemal and the other Young Turks, the old Ottoman Empire was seen as a backward and stagnant Oriental system. The new Turkey would be a modern European society. A central feature of the founding ideology of modern Turkey (known as “Kemalism”) was secularism. The model was France: religion was strictly a private affair and all public displays of religious practise or symbols were prohibited. For example, both the veil and the headscarf (hijab) were outlawed, Turks were to adopt Turkish instead of Muslim/Arab names, mosques became state property and imams were state employees.

The military played a central role in establishing the new state and reforming society. When Ataturk’s highly authoritarian rule ended with his death and Turkey took the first tentative steps toward a functioning parliamentary democracy, the military retained its unique position in Turkish life. It is the most clearly national institution and continues thinking of itself as the protector of Kemalism and the Turkish national identity.

The military has intervened in Turkish politics at least four times since 1960, twice by forcibly seizing power from civilian governments and twice by making it clear that it would seize power unless the civilian government made drastic changes. In each case power was eventually returned to civilians. None of these episode is remembered fondly. At best, military intervention is regarded as something that may have been an unfortunate necessity at an earlier period in Turkey’s development.

Secularism and Political Islam. A relatively small part of Turkey is in Europe; the majority is across the Bosprous Straits in Asia. A relatively small portion of the Turkish population adheres to the most stringent definition of “secularism” that would completely banish religion form almost all areas of public life. As Turkey has developed socially and economically to become a middle income nation, attitudes toward the role of Islam in society have changed, for both those who could see no role at all and those who hoped for the return of Islam to the center of Turkish life. In the last twenty years, the Justice and Development Party (usually identified by its Turkish abbreviation, AKP) has emerged as the largest party and has provided national leadership since 2003.

The AKP draws on Islam as the inspiration for its emphasis on improving the lives of ordinary Turks and promoting socially conservative values. It has been supportive of a greater role for Islam, including direct support for religious schools and other institutions. At the same time, the AKP has been strongly supportive of Turkey’s free market, liberal capitalist economy and Turkey’s aspirations for membership in the European Union.

The Immediate Context. The government of Recep Erdoğan has lost a great deal of popular support in the past couple of years. Erdoğan has become increasingly autocratic and repressive. There have been 14 major terrorist attacks in Turkey in the past year; the June 28 ISIS assault on Istanbul airport that left 43 people dead was the latest. The government’s attempts to tighten control of the Kurdish areas in the east have been met by a resurgence of militant groups and violence. It has become clear that Turkey will not be admitted to the EU, primarily (many Turks believe) because of anti-Muslim prejudice) but also because the government has become less democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law.

Most observers believe that a significant sector of the Turkish officer corps came to believe that a combination of government support for forces undermining secular values, an increasingly autocratic rule, and the government’s inability to defend against terrorist attacks were creating a grave crisis that required the military to act to defend the legacy of Ataturk. A final precipitating factor may have been the imminent military reorganization that threatened the careers of some officers.

An Alternative Narrative. The Erdoğan government has a radically different explanation for the coup attempt. The coup was the result of a plot by Fethullah Gülen, the head of a terrorist organization with tentacles throughout Turkish society. For some officials and government-friendly media sources, the CIA or some other elements of the U.S. government were involved. American officials either knew the coup was coming and did not inform the Erdoğan government or the U.S. was actively involved in supporting the plotters.

Fethullah Gülen is a prominent preacher, cleric and political activist who has headed a political movement in Turkey since the 1970s.  He has espoused a version of Islam that embraces science, dialog with Jews and Christians, and liberal democracy. His movement has created extensive network of private schools to educate the next generation of Turkish leaders who, he hopes, will lead Turkey into a post-secular, Islamic democracy.
Gülen and his movement were allies of Erdoğan and the AKP until 2013 when Erdoğan accused Gülen of instigating an investigation of corruption in the Erdoğan regime. Gülen left Turkey for the U.S. where he has remained the spiritual and political leader of his movement.  Most observers are unpersuaded that he organized or ordered the coup attempt.

Why Did the Coup Fail? There are three critical factors that led to the failure. First, the plotters did not have the support of the majority of military officers, especially those in command of most of the operational units. Secondly, the police and internal security forces did not join, and actively fought, against the coup. And third, when Erdoğan called for citizens to take to the streets to protest and block the coup, large numbers of people in Turkey’s major cities responded. Whatever citizens may have felt about Erdoğan’s government (which is very unpopular) and the state of Turkish society, they felt a military coup that overthrew a freely elected government was worse.

What Are the Implications for Turkey? The government is using its version of the origins of the coup to launch a wave of repression. Several thousand officers and enlisted men have been dishonorably discharged form the military. Several thousand government employees, including judges, have been summarily dismissed. Media critical of the government have been under pressure for some time; that pressure has intensified with hundreds of newspapers, radio and TV stations and other media outlets closed and many individual journalists have been imprisoned. As of this writing, the crackdown shows little sign of easing.

Both the coup plotters and the government seem all too wiling to suspend or destroy democracy in order to save it.

Equating any criticism of the government with criminal activity and jailing intellectuals, journalists, writers, and religious figures will not destroy Turkey’s lively, diverse, and sophisticated social and intellectual life. But it will force some to emigrate and become even more critical of the regime from Western Europe or the United States, while others will take their dissent to social media or other informal sources where their voices will mingle with advocates of the destruction of modern Turkey. Paradoxically, the very things the regime is doing to stifle dissent are likely to increase criticism and discontent in ways the government will find it more difficult to monitor and control.

What Are the Implications of the U.S. and the Rest of World?

Turkey has been an outstanding example of how a combination of parliamentary democracy with moderate Islam can create a prosperous, middle income country with a vibrant and sophisticated cultural life. Turkey is a major trading partner of many European countries and there is a significant Turkish community in many EU members, particularly Germany. With a hefty subsidy from the EU, Turkey is housing 2 million Syrian refugees and has dramatically reduced the flow of refugees into Europe.

For a long time Turkey has been a key, if unseen, player in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and other regional disputes. Ankara has been trusted by the West, by Arab states, Iran, and Israel to serve as a quiet go between and honest broker.

Turkey is an important member of NATO and a focal point in the fight against ISIS. The Incirlik air base is the primary staging area for U.S. and NATO air strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and Turkey is an important logistical center for supporting operations in Iraq and Syria.

While overall relations have been cooperative and friendly, there have been some continuing strains in Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the U.S. despite the strong economic, political and military ties. A low level, constant irritation has been the EU’s inaction on Turkey’s application for membership even as smaller and less developed states in southeastern Europe were admitted. Turkey is extremely sensitive about references to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Armenians in Turkey between 1915 and 1919 as genocide. And the Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria are seen very differently in Ankara than Washington. The Kurds have established a de facto state in Norther Iraq and the pesh merga are the most effective fighting force against ISIS. But Turkey sees the Iraqi Kurds as natural allies of the Kurdish population in Eastern Turkey, some of whom have waged a long guerrilla war against the government.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the Erdoğan government demanded the extradition of Fethullah Gülen from the United States after formally charging him with treason and terrorism. That demand has been repeated several times and Erdoğan has equated American inaction with complicity in the coup. This is part of his larger complaint that Europe and America are not supporting Turkey the way they have rallied to support other governments who have experienced terrorist attacks.
There is, I think, a real danger that the persistent attempts to blame the coup on Gülen and his followers with U.S. complicity will create a public demand in Turkey for some kind of retaliatory action., such as denial of the use of Incirlik. Erdoğan’s very public resentment of the response of European governments could escalate to disruption of economic ties. At the very least, the demand for the extradition of Fethullah Gülen poses a Hobson’s choice for the Obama administration: risk serous deterioration in the U.S.-Turkey alliance or send a widely admired intellectual and spiritual leader to a certain death sentence.

In the longer run, deeper instability bred by an increasingly unpopular authoritarian regime could have serious consequences for the U.S. and grave consequences for Western Europe.

Should We Stay or Should We Go? The Brexit Question

What’s “BREXIT”

Although it sounds like the latest drug advertised on TV ... ask your doctor about BREXIT ... common side effects include ... Brexit refers to the possibility that the United Kingdom may leave the European Union.  Since “A decision by the United Kingdom, fueled especially by its British citizens, to withdraw from the European Union” is a horridly unwieldy mouthful, the question has long since been simplified as a “Brexit,” this year’s equivalent of 2014's potential Grexit when Greece seemed ready to abandon the euro.

June 23 might not be as critical to British history as “1066, the Norman invasion, and all that” although “invasion” by foreigners and the UK’s relationship to the European continent are at stake.  June 23, 2016 is the date on which citizens of the United Kingdom will vote in a referendum on whether to remain in the European Union or to leave. 

(Most of us think of The United Kingdom, Great Britain, and England as synonyms.  But “Great Britain”  refers to the island that is home to the English, the Scots, and the Welsh.  The United Kingdom, the official name of the country, includes Northern Ireland along with the inhabitants of Great Britain.  This is not pedantic hair splitting: polling data suggests that it is the English who are most likely to favor leaving the EU while the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish are more strongly in favor of remaining.  In fact EU membership played a very different role in 2014's vote on Scottish independence when neither side wanted to leave the EU.  The campaign against argued that leaving the UK would mean leaving the EU and the campaign for argued that Scotland could quickly become an EU member in its own right. )

[click here for an overview of the history and major features of the EU.]

The United Kingdom’s relationship to the European Union shows the same ambivalence as its historic relationship to the continent.  The UK has been deeply involved in European history and culture since Roman times but has also seen itself as an island nation close to, but not really part of Europe.

The UK did not join in the movement for a common market and European integration until 1973 and then only with conditions that exempted it from some of the obligations of membership.  The UK has deliberately remained outside the eurozone, refusing to the let the Pound Sterling be shoved off the world stage.

Throughout the evolution of European institutions, there have been critics and doubters, quite certain that the enterprise, especially the goal of increasing unity among the people of Europe, would and should collapse.  Eurosceptics, as they are known, are more prevalent and more vocal in the UK than elsewhere and are well represented in both public opinion and the leadership of the major political parties, especially the ruling Conservatives. 

During David Cameron’s successful bid for reelection as Prime Minister last year, he promised to hold a referendum on EU membership.  This was seen as a shrewd political move at a time when his own Conservative Party was deeply divided over EU membership and allowed him to avoid taking a stand that would alienate either those who want to leave or those who want to stay.  It was also seen as a bargaining tactic, designed to encourage the EU to make significant concessions to the UK, and in fact, Cameron did win some major concessions from the EU last December.  The Prime Minister has subsequently taken a strong pro-EU stand and has actively campaigned for a “remain” vote. 

What Are the Issues?

[for a more thorough analysis with a discussion of the best available data on the claims of both sides, click here.]

Immigration, sovereignty and the economic impact of EU membership dominate the emerging campaign.

Immigration

Freedom of movement is a central feature of the European Union.  The “leave” campaign stresses the growing number of immigrants from other EU countries that have come to the UK in the past few years, worrying that this will undermine the uniqueness of British identity and the core values of English society.  Concern about immigration has increased in the past year, as hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria, Africa, and elsewhere have entered Europe.  While Germany and Sweden have been the most popular destinations, a significant number of refugees have sought refuge in the UK.  The terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels have heightened suspicion and fear of refugees and there are charges that lax security by EU members means it is extremely difficult for the UK to protect its citizens from Paris or Brussels style attacks. A second type of immigration is also cited by the “leave” campaign:  “Welfare tourism.”  Migrants from other EU members, especially Eastern Europeans, come to the UK and can immediately claim far more generous welfare benefits than they could get at home.  

The “stay” campaign counters that there have not been that many refugees arriving in the UK, in part because of the added expense of air fare or the cost of traveling through the chunnel.  And unlike the porous open borders of the continent, there are relatively few entry points into the UK and it is far easier to prevent undocumented immigrants from entering.   “Stay” advocates point out a  significant number of British citizens have relocated to other EU countries without a lot of hassle.  Because of UK membership, UK citizens could make 44 million trips to Europe in 2014, for both business and pleasure without having to acquire visas or undergo the enry and exit procedures that non-EU members face.  And the “stay” camp argues that the concessions Prime Minister Cameron got form the EU in December include restrictions on immediate eligibility for welfare benefits.

Natonal Sovereignty and Democracy in the EU

The European Union has several levels of governance.  The issues in the referendum are focused on the Council of the European Union, in which the governments of the 28 members adopt laws and policies for the European Union.  It works on a “one country, one vote” basis, with a qualified majority -- 16 countries with at least 65% of the EU’s population.

The “leave” camp argues that this arrangement means that the governmental elites of foreign countries can pass laws that affect daily life in the UK over the objections of the democratically elected government of the UK.  This often, they argue, means intrusive and burdensome regulations on businesses.

The “remain” camp counters that while it is true that the UK was on the losing side of a vote about 12% of the time over the past five years, most Council decisions are negotiated consensus positions, agreeable to all members and the relatively high rate of UK minority positions reflects the policies of the Conservative party.  And most EU regulations in fact promote the health and safety of consumers, or prevent deceptive and manipulative business practices.

The Europan Union’s long term political goal of greater political integration in Europe has been a major negative for those who want out of the EU who identify far more closely with their national identity than with some transnational community.  Thus one of the major concessions Prime Minister Cameron sought from the EU last December was an agreement that the UK would be exempt from the aspirations for greater European political and cultural integration. 

Follow the Money

There are three big economic issues in contention in the Brexit campaign: the cost of membership, the balance of  trade, and jobs.

Each EU member contributes to the Union’s budget which supports a host of programs, with a significant bias toward assisting the poorer countries and regions in the EU.  The UK receives less money in EU programs than it contributes to the EU budget.  Eurosceptics have long objected to sending UK taxpayer pounds to poorer members (cleverly tabbing Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain as PIGS.)  The image of lazy and spendthrift southerners and East Europeans guzzling at the EU’s public trough is a powerful one.  The “remain” campaign counters that the UK contribution to the EU is less than 1.5% of the annual budget and the UK gets much of that back, plus a host of intangible benefits from membership.

The United Kingdom runs a negative balance of trade with its EU partners and a positive balance of trade with the rest of the world.  That is, the UK imports more from its EU colleagues than it exports to them but exports more to the rest of the world than it imports.  The “leave” camp argues that getting out from under the EU free trade rules wold allow the UK to better control its economic relations with other countries and avoid being taken advantage of by foreign companies and countries.

The “stay” campaign counters by arguing that losing unfettered access to European markets that account for over one third of UK exports would make the trade deficit much worse while not improving trade with the rest of the world.

Closely related to the trade issue is the question of jobs.  The “leave” campaign argues that reducing imports from the EU, freeing businesses from unfair and burdensome regulations, and saving the tax payer pounds that now go to the EU will spark significant economic growth and create new jobs for workers in the UK.  They deny the “remain” claim that leaving the EU would have a major negative effect on jobs tht depend on the UK’s ability to freely export to Europe.

The “stay” argument cuts the other way.  Leaving the EU will dramatically undermine the ability to export to Europe and will cost a significant number of jobs.  Moreover, leaving he EU would make the UK much less attractive to foreign investment, particularly from the United States.  A number of major American corporations have set up subsidiaries or manufacturing facilities in the UK, notably Northern Ireland, because that provides access to European markets. (And tax benefits.)

From This Side of the Atlantic?

Very few Americans are paying attention to a possible Brexit.  We have our own campaign season to amuse us and a host of other things to think about.  The few people who are paying attention tend to be very concerned about the negative consequences.  It is believed that a Brexit would hurt America’s ability to trade with Europe, and render the substantial investments in the UK less valuable.  There are worries that a Brexit could make European economies less stable and exacerbate the challenges facing the eurozone which has not yet fully dealt with the Greek crisis of two years ago. 

American foreign policy has been generally supportive of the evolution of the EU and seen the emergence of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Europe as a major benefit to the United States.  A Brexit would not mean the end of the EU but it would be seen as a serous blow stability.  Moreover it would complicate international cooperation in some key areas, including efforts to prevent terrorist attacks. 

Will They or Won’t They?

The polling data on the broad outline of supporters of leaving and staying are quite consistent.  In addition to showing differences between British voters and the rest of the UK, they show that the “leave” option is supported more heavily by older voters, those who have the equivalent of a high school diploma or less, and those who work in low paying or uncertain jobs.  Younger, more well educated and more prosperous voters are much more favorable to the “stay” position.

But almost no one seems eager to actually predict the outcome for two reasons.  The first is that everything suggests that opinion is very evenly split and the outcome may depend heavily on which voters actually go to the polls.  The other reason for a reluctance to predict an outcome is a lack of confidence among organizations trying to measure public opinion in the UK.  The shift away from land lines, the growing rate of refusal to participate, and the increasing difficulty in estimating future turnout from past patterns, have all affected polling in the UK and the U.S., making results considerably more difficult to predict.

One group is willing to predict the outcome, and willing to put its money where its mouth is.  It is legal to bet on elections in the UK and London bookies will give you 2-1 odds on the UK staying in the EU.  According the Independent, a prominent London newspaper, “Punters have reportedly been placing bets worth up to £5,000 on success for the remain campaign.”

EU ABC's

The modern European Union has its roots in the immediate aftermath of World War II which left continental Europe devastated and the United Kingdom profoundly weakened.  The European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1950 with the short term goal of accelerating economic recovery by creating a more efficient system for producing coal and steel, two of the most critical industries for reconstruction.  The five countries that initiated the organization agreed to ignore national boundaries, regulations, quotas and tariffs and treat coal and steel as single, integrated industries.  The long term goal of the originators was to transcend the nationalism that had led Europe into two global warts in the first half of the 20th Century.  More precisely, the intent was to bind the German economy so tightly to France and the rest of Europe, and to ultimately create a shared European identity, that war would become unthinkable.

The vision of short term economic gains leading to the long term development of a common European identity based on both tangible benefits and shared liberal democratic values has remained central.  The early success of the Coal and Steel Community led to the creation of the 9 member common market in 1956 and the gradual evolution of a true European economy and the creation of common political institutions that have become the modern European Union. 

Today’s EU has 28 members all of whom participate in a common economy and some pan-European political and legal institutions, and many of whom share the Euro as a common currency.

The most salient dimension of the EU’s economy is the free transit of goods, services, and people.  There are no tariffs (taxes on goods imported from other countries) and many national regulations on product safety, quality, and standards have been replaced by EU standards.

Licensing rules for occupations from acupuncturist to zookeeper have been standardized.  A barber from Sevilla can move to Berlin and open a shop as easily as if he were merely moving down the block.  A London bank can open a branch in Brussels or Lisbon or Prague under the same terms and conditions as a Belgian, Portugese or Czech bank. 

And people can move freely.  A citizen of an EU country does not need a visa or have to go through customs to for a vacation abroad or to settle permanently n a new country. 

The EU features a common currency, the euro, but not all its members are part of the system.  Some, like the UK, prefer to keep their own currency because it gives the national government greater control over its economy and a national currency is an important symbol of sovereignty and independence.  Others, particularly the newer Eastern European members, cannot meet the eurozone’s requirements for a balanced budget and fiscal policy.

At the political level, the EU has a rather complex governance structure, with some institutions representing the governments of its member states, others consisting of representatives elected by popular vote, and others enforcing and interpreting a common legal system.

The EU has a common foreign policy which is not always consonant with its individual members’ policies, a flag, and an anthem (Ode to Joy).  However, it fails the Frank Zappa test.  The late rock artist and leader of the Mothers of Invention insisted that a real country had to have a beer.  An airline or some atomic weapons were good, but a national beer was a necessity.  There are many, many excellent beers originating in the 28 member countries of the EU, but there is no European Union brew.

Putin the Peacenik

The Russian intervention in Syria is actually a positive step toward an end to the nightmare that the Syrian civil war has become, To see why what has been widely regarded in the United States as a major negative event, is a potentially positive development, it is necessary to dispel some myths..

Myth. # 1: Bashar al Assad is the bogeyman who singlehandedly turned Syria’s Arab Spring moment into a nightmare.

The popular image of a “dictator” is a solitary figure -- probably crazy -- who says “jump” and all his minions ask “how high?” In fact the Syrian regime that has grown up in the 40 years since Hafez al Assad came to power in military coup rests on an interlocking elite sitting atop the military, economic and political establishments. Bashar is the accidental face of that regime. (His older bother, who was being groomed to take over, died in a helicopter crash and Bashar was called back from his career as a eye doctor in London to take over.)

There was a great deal of hope in Syria when Bashar took over after his father’s death in 2000. The regime that had been markedly successful in the 1980s in developing the economy, expanding education and health care, improving the lives of rural peasants and creating an urban middle class, had become old and tired. Instead of infusing new blood into the tired old elite, getting the economy back on track, reducing corruption, and allowing greater latitude for political expression, Bashar fell under the sway of his father’s inner circle and there were no reforms, no progress, and declining support for the regime.

There is no doubt Bashar al Assad is ultimately responsible for the decision to respond to peaceful protests in 2010 with unrestrained force. There is no doubt that Bashar al Assad is ultimately responsible for the decision to use chemical weapons against Syrian protesters. But he is not solely responsible for those decisions and may not have initiated them. Bashar is the single most influential figure in the Syrian elite. But faced with strong agreement by the top military brass and/or governmental ministers, he is powerfully constrained to go along.

Myth #2: Bashar al Assad could have been thrown under the bus by the Syrian elites.

The relevant example seems to be Egypt. Faced with massive unrest and protests, the Egyptian military and political powers that be chose to arrange for the ouster of Hosni Mubarak rather than engage in bloody repression. The Syrian elite could have done the same thing.

Yes, they could have, but one of the most glaring differences between Egypt and Syria is the nature of the elite. The Egyptian elite was relatively broadly based in Egyptian society and, particularly the military wing, had a high degree of legitimacy, even among those most opposed to Mubarak.

But the Syrian elite is drawn heavily from the Alawite minority. The vagaries of history and geographical isolation created a tightly knit community in a mountainous area of rural Syria that was regarded with suspicion and disdain by their neighbors. Faced with periodic persecution and aggression, the Alawites developed a distinctive culture that included a version of Shi’a Islam that relied on esoteric teachings known only to the elders of the community. French colonial policy in Syria after World War I, as elsewhere in the world, actively recruited members of minority communities to participate in the administration. A key to Hafez al Assad’s rise to power was a cadre of fellow Alawite military officers.

The Egyptian elites could coolly calculate that Mubarak could be removed from power without threatening their own status and position. But the Syrian elite perceived an attack on al Assad as an attack on the Alawites and feared that they and their community would be swept away if they opened the flood gates.

President Obama was widely criticized for his slow and lukewarm response to the anti-Mubarak movement in Egypt. He seems to have been determined not to make the same mistake in Syria and early in the game announced that Assad had to go. That encouraged the protestors but also made it more likely that the Damascus elites would resist change.

Myth #3 The “Syrian Civil War” is a Syrian civil war

There are multiple dimensions of war in the area marked “Syria” on maps. At the local level, there is conflict between a shifting array of militias and armed groups and the Syrian armed forces.

There is no single entity opposed to the Syrian regime. There are mostly small local militias organized around a leader, often a local notable or tribal chief and there are Islamist fighters in several distinct groups. While they all share the loose goal of getting rid of the Assad regime, they are more often divided by regional and local issues, and distinct visions of what the ideal future looks like. On any given day two or more of these groups may be cooperating; it is equally likely they are shooting at each other. The distinction often made in the West between “Jihadists” and “moderates” gets cloudier and less useful the closer to the Middle East one gets.

Almost from the beginning forces outside Syria got involved. Some came to support the regime; some came to oppose it. On the one hand, Iran offered aid and comfort to its long time friends in Damascus and Hezbollah sent thousands of fighters from Lebanon to aid in the cause. On the other hand, some money and arms flowed from the Gulf States and a great deal of money and arms came from Saudi Arabia to the diverse forces fighting the regime. For Hezbollah the issue was preserving supply lines for weapons. For Iran and Saudi Arabia, the immediate issue was influence in the region. The broader issue was what each perceives as a struggle between Shi’a and Sunni states for the future of Islam.

The interlocking conflicts moved to yet another dimension with the increasing involvement of the United States, France and Britain. The use of poison gas, the indiscriminate bombing of civilians including the use of so-called barrel bombs, the flood of refugees to neighboring countries and hundreds of thousands of refugees moving from one part of Syria to another resulted in the involvement of a host of international agencies. The UN Security Council called for an end to the conflict. A series of talks, or at least talks about talks, have gone nowhere.

A seriously complicating factor (as if the situation were not complicated enough already) has been the sudden and surprising emergence of the group known variously as ISIL, ISIS, the self-styled Islamic State, or just plain Islamic State. Moving quickly out of their original base in Iraq, ISIS fighters have gained control of a significant area in Syria, often by defeating local militias or a Jihadist group. The most important fact of ISIS involvement in Syria has been providing a common enemy for everyone else.

Myth #4 Putin is Just Out to Cause Trouble in Syria

Saying “Putin” when what you mean is “the various groups, organizations, individuals and interests that shape Russian foreign policy decisions” is convenient shorthand but it obscures far more than it reveals. The Russian government is a constellation of large bureaucracies, each with its own turf and interests. Putin is undoubtedly the most important player in decision making but he is not alone. And the menu of options from which Putin and his advisors choose, the assessment of the risks and rewards of those options, and the details of implementing decisions are defined by agencies and bureaus with their own perspectives and ways of doing things.

Vlad did not wake up one morning and say to himself, “It’s a fine fall morning. I shall send some troops and a wing of fighter bombers to Syria because Obama is a wimp and I can get away with it. And, oh yeah, I’ll tell the pilots to turn off their transponders so they can fool the Americans.”

Governments always have multiple reasons for what they do. And what they do is always the result of an interaction between the goals, intentions and interests of the people making the decision and the situation in which they find themselves. Political psychologists talk about “the fundamental attribution error”: when we think about our own behavior we focus more heavily on the situation we’re in; when we think about other people, we focus more heavily on what kind of people they are. When we think seriously about U.S. policy in Syria, we take into account the difficult and confusing situation on the ground and the assets available to the U.S., as well as President Obama’s strengths and weaknesses and the quality of his advisors. But when we think about Russia’s actions, we tend to put more emphasis on our understanding of Putin and far less on such factors as the long standing relationship between Damascus and Moscow, or the consequences for Russia if the al Assad regime is replaced by Islamists.

The Potential Positive Consequences

From an international perspective, there are two primary struggles in Syria: against al Assad and against ISIS. Of course, it isn’t that simple. For the U.S. and our friends, making sure that al Assad is not replaced by radical Islamists is critical, which immensely complicates things. There’s been a long and frustrating search for “moderate” anti-regime groups to support, the embarrassing spectacle of the small contingent of Syrian fighters trained and equipped by the U.S. at enormous cost who lost or surrendered their equipment to Islamist fighters almost as soon as they crossed the border into Syria. Groups like al Nusra are good guys because they are fighting al Assad and sometimes ISIS; they are very bad guys because they are ideological kin to al Qaeda.

The Russian military has changed the dynamics in Syria. Their air strikes and cruise missile attacks have supported a renewed offensive by the Syrian army and the recapture of a few strategic assets from rebel forces. Any damage done to ISIS is a more or less accidental bonus. (The bombing of the Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula is unlikely to change Russian goals or behavior.) Whatever hopes opponents might have had that the Syrian army and/or regime was on the verge of collapse have vanished.

The immediate impact has been significant: Iran, a critically important player has now been invited to join the talks about talking about talks that have been held periodically in Vienna. And the Russians tabled a proposal for a transitional regime that was immediately rejected by everyone else. But reading between the lines it did suggest that al Assad would not necessarily remain in power indefinitely. If a bus came along some months from now and al Assad were standing close to the curb ...

For the first time in five horrific years, it is possible to see the first faint outline of an end game. The initial stages of the bargaining process include the understanding that there is a “hurting stalemate”( it’s a no-win for everyone) and getting the involvement of all the key players.

The Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war has shattered any illusions that the regime can be defeated on the battlefield. But even the regime’s most ardent supporters do not think the Syrian military can ever hope to regain control of the country.

If Iran agrees to participate, the major international players will be involved in talks about Syria’s future. Getting representatives of the patchwork of rebel factions, and the al Assad regime to agree to join the discussions will be a major hurdle.

There is a painfully long way to go before there will be any hope the suffering of Syrians will end and certainly no guarantee that some kind of solution will emerge in Vienna, let alone on the ground.

Whatever he may have intended in getting involved in Syria, Vladimir Putin has tilted the odds toward peace.

From Problem to Crisis to Chronic Condition: Refugees In Europe

Over the past few years tens of thousands of people have made an arduous and perilous journey from their homes in Africa to Europe.  Endemic violence and anarchy in Somalia, brutal civil war in Sudan, an increasingly violent and repressive government in Eritrea, and the chaos that has descended on Libya after the ouster of Qadhafi have impelled desperate people to pay smugglers for the opportunity to board boats in Egypt, Libya or Morocco and hope to land in Greece, Spain or Italy.  The journey across the Mediterranean is usually miserable and all too often fatal.  Somewhere between one and two thousand people have drowned each year when overloaded, decrepit boats or flimsy rubber rafts sank.  (As I am finishing this blog entry the Spanish coast guard is announcing that a raft trying to cross the 9 miles from Morocco to Gibraltar overturned in high seas.  Fifteen people were rescued, 11 people died.)

The countries of the European Union have developed processes and policies for dealing with this influx.  Migrants are held in camps until they can be registered, then permitted to travel within the European Union to a country where they can hope to be given a residence permit.  Germany and Sweden have been the preferred destinations because their strong economies and relatively low unemployment have led to more liberal criteria for issuing temporary residence permits that allow people to seek jobs and find a place to live.  France has long been a magnet for people from their former North African colonial possessions, especially Algeria.

Ultimately each migrant=s case will be reviewed by a local court to determine if the person will be allowed to stay or must return home.  The decision will hinge on whether the applicant is deemed an economic migrant or political refugee. [Click here if you want a discussion of the various international legal categories of people who have been left their homes.]

The system worked reasonably well until this summer when the flow of people was more than doubled by desperate Syrians.  The EU countries accommodated some 250,000 migrants in 2014; more than one million will have arrived by the end of this year.  The approaching winter weather will slow the flow somewhat but will make even more miserable for those on their way or who have already arrived.

I want to address three major points: 

• why the sudden influx of Syrians;
• the short term impact of the crisis;
• the longer term implications for Europe

Why the sudden surge in Syrian refugees?

Five years of civil war have forced roughly half of all Syrians to flee their homes.  Around 7.5 million of the  12 million Syrians who have been displaced by the war have stayed within the country.  Those who have left Syria have ended up in Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.  While some have found shelter with relatives or have had enough resources to live on their own, most have ended up in refugee camps in Turkey or Lebanon run by a collection of international NGOs (Non-Governmental Organization).

Desperate Syrian refugees began showing up in significant numbers in the flow of people from North Africa to Europe in the spring of 2015.  The increasing flow of people and some highly publicized sinkings of boats carrying hundreds of refugees led to a shift in strategy by European countries.  Patrols by Spanish, Greek and Italian naval vessels increased sharply in an attempt to curtail the smuggling traffic, as well as respond to ships in distress. 

A combination of push and pull factors has fueled this year’s Syrian exodus. 

The biggest push has been the steadily worsening conditions in the countries of refuge.  More people cross the border from Syria every day, swelling the population in the refugee camps or joining the thousands of their countrymen who have the means to rent some shabby living quarters and buy enough food to survive or who find shelter with relatives.  Syrian refugees get food aid from the UN’s World Food Programme but donations from member countries have not kept pace with demand and the amount of food aid has been slowly decreasing since last January and more cuts loom in the days ahead.  Each day life in Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon or Jordan gets a little more difficult.  The World Food Programme has just announced that they will have to start classifying recipients in terms of how badly they would suffer if food aid were cut off.  The shortage of funding may mean they will have to restrict food aid to individuals and families who would starve without it. 

One major pull factor has been the belief that life in Europe will be better than the camps.  This has been fueled by reports from those who have survived the treacherous journey that Germany is particularly welcoming. 

A second pull factor has been the creation of an overland route to Europe.  The EU crackdown on the Mediterranean routes plus the economics of the sordid business of smuggling desperate and vulnerable people from the Middle East to Europe encouraged the development new routes.  All you need is a long haul truck and driver who meets “clients” somewhere in Turkey,  instead of moving people from Lebanon or Jordan down to North Africa then procuring passage on a boat to cross the Mediterranean. The number of smugglers has increased substantially and the cost of the journey has dropped.  By some accounts the standard rate was $6,000 per person for a trip to Europe in January of this year, while it is now about $1500.  In the same week that the heartbreaking photo of a 3 year old boy who drowned off the coast of Turkey became a social media sensation, a truck with 60 decomposing bodies was discovered in Austria … apparently abandoned by smugglers who were on the verge of being apprehended.

The result was the arrival of thousands of migrants, primarily Syrian but also Afghans and Pakistanis, at the Hungarian border every day beginning in the late spring.  Unable to register and process the wave of migrants, Hungary initially loaded migrants onto buses and trains and expedited their arrival in Austria.  But soon Hungarian authorities tried to stem the flow altogether by building fences and barriers in their borders with Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.  They were quickly forced to relent by pressure from the rest of the EU and the flow of desperate people continues, putting pressure on governments to cope.  Meanwhile thousands of people keep arriving from across the Mediterranean. 

The members of the EU have tried to respond to the administrative, financial and political burdens the migrants have placed on member countries with a package of financial assistance and waiving the requirement that migrants register in the first EU country they enter.  This shifts much of the burden to Austria and Germany, and to a lesser extent France and Sweden.

Germany has shouldered the primary responsibility for housing the migrants and adjudicating their status. Political refugees are entitled to residence permits in Germany and eligible to look for work and accommodations outside settlement camps.  Economic migrants are subject to being returned their home countries.

Some Syrians and many migrants from Pakistan or sub-Saharan Africa would like to make it to the United Kingdom where they have relatives or acquaintances from their home countries.  Since they lack formal authorization to enter the UK, a favored strategy is to make it to the city of Calais, the French terminus of the Chunnel, and hop onto one of the many trains ferrying cars and truck on flatbed rail cars under the English Channel.  “The Jungle” is the aptly named informal settlement that houses some 10,000 migrants outside Calais while they wait to try their luck.

Short Term Impacts

•  For those who survive the perils and rigors of the long trek through the Balkans to Western Europe or the dangerous trip across the Mediterranean in overloaded, often decrepit boats, the major short term impact is that life is markedly better.  Germany may end up housing as many as 800,000 migrants by the end of the year in camps that are cleaner, safer, and with more certain access to food and medical care.
  
  
• For the governments at whose doorsteps the migrants first arrive, particularly Greece, Spain, Hungary and Italy, there is a large financial burden in providing temporary shelter and humanitarian services to a growing number of people.  There is the cost of processing each migrant, examining papers and registering people before they can move on to their desired destination elsewhere in Europe.  And there is the logistical challenge of physically moving people from the entry point across the country. 
  
• For governments like Germany who have become the destination of choice for migrants, there are the financial and logistical challenges of taking care of such a large number of people.  (One might even say a staggering number of people: if there really are 800,000 migrants by the end of the year, that will be equal to 1% of the German population.  If that were to happen in the U.S. it would mean about 3.2 million people!)
  
• For the European Union as a whole coordinating efforts to deal with the crisis and the impact on local governments has been politically challenging.  Efforts to develop an EU-wide approach have often been stalled by the sharp differences in short term interests among member states.
  
• The EU is attempting to negotiate an arrangement with the government of Turkey to expand and improve refugee facilities in Turkey.  The obvious hope is that better living conditions just across the border from Syria will encourage refugees to stay put.  Turkey has tried to strike a hard bargain, asking for not only more financial support but also progress on the long stalled negotiations to join the European Union.
   
• I think there is relatively little the U.S. can do in this situation.  I think the practical issues, from transporting people to the U.S. to the lack of facilities for housing thousands of people while their status is determined, make it unlikely that we could offer refuge to enough Syrians to make a difference.  In addition, a proposal to bring thousands of refugees to the U.S. in the next few months might well ignite a political firestorm .  The initial reaction to the Obama administration’s announcement of a slight increase in accepting refugees over the next three years included charges by some Republican Presidential contenders that terrorists would lurk among the refugees and put us at risk. 

Longer Term Impacts

• Helping refugees adapt to life in Germany or elsewhere is an enormous task.  Imagine what kinds of help you might need if you suddenly found yourself in a country where you did not speak the language, were unfamiliar with the culture, were priced out of all but the most rudimentary housing, and could not expect to find any but the most menial job.  And if you had young children ....
  
• The longer war rages in Syria, the greater the economic and political strain on host nations.    Europe has far less experience with immigration than the U.S. and arguably less tolerance for diversity.
  
• There has been an initial outpouring of support and sympathy from many people in Europe.  German public opinion has been strongly supportive of the government’s leading role in dealing with the crisis.  Individuals from all over Europe have volunteered money and time to help with the crisis.  But the longer the crisis goes on, the more likely it is that people will become increasingly sensitive to the costs of hosting so many refugees.  The anti-immigrant, xenophobic, faintly Fascist appeals of extreme right wing parties will sound more reasonable to a growing number of people (this is already happening in Hungary) and resentment of and discrimination against refugees will become a significant problem. Neo-Nazis in Germany, the National Front in France, and Greece’s New Dawn are a few examples of parties currently far to the right of the mainstream who might be expected to gain support as the problems posed by refugees and migrants continue.
  
• There are some people who argue that the great wave of migrants is actually a great benefit for Europe.  The optimistic, perspective points out that Europe has a long term demographic problem.  The birth rate in many countries has fallen below replacement level: populations are growing older and smaller.   There are fewer workers to fill available jobs and shoulder the burden of supporting a growing number of retirees.  In the medium to long run, settling both refugees and economic migrants in Europe would offset the graying of the population and forestall an economic crisis.

The road ahead

The sudden addition of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees to a persistent flow of migrants from Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere in the Middle East transformed a persistent problem into a highly visible crisis. 

I think the flow of Syrians refugees will slow sharply as winter sets in and travel to Europe gets even more difficult and dangerous.  The flow may not resume at the same level next spring because conditions in the countries bordering Syria will improve, there will be fewer Syrians with the financial means to pay smugglers, and the challenges imposed on Western European economies and political systems by the large number of refugees who have arrived this year will reduce the attractiveness of those countries to new refugees.

I do not think the hardships and disruptions suffered by Syrians who have been forced from their homes will end very soon.  While there is some reason to think that a political process is beginning to emerge that could lead to an end of the worst of the violence in Syria, that is probably many months away and in the meantime the level of violence will probably escalate.  I will try to address those issues in the next blog entry.

Side Note On International Law

International law and the international community in general recognize three types of migrants.
One is the internally displaced person, someone who has been forced to move by war,
persecution or economic distress who stays within their native country.  The second group is
refugees, who have been forced from their home country by war or persecution.  And the third
group is economic migrants, people who have left their home country in search of jobs.

Internally displaced persons are the responsibility of their own government, which may or may
not choose to accept assistance from international non-governmental organizations and UN
agencies.

There is a significant debate going on among international relations scholars and human rights
organizations over the notion of "sovereignty."  The traditional understanding, rooted in four
centuries of theory and practice and strongly advocated by countries such as China and Russia, is
that "sovereignty " means that how a country conducts affairs inside its own borders is nobody
else's business.  The emerging revisionist perspective argues that the right of sovereignty comes
with a "responsibility to protect" and that gross abuses of people by their own government may
justify intervention by the international community. 

Refugees have a distinctive legal status and there is general acceptance of the idea that countries
are obliged to offer some shelter and haven to people who would be in grave physical danger in
their home country because of war or systematic persecution. 

Economic migrants have no international legal status.  They are at the mercy of the host country,
generally tolerated as long as they fill a need and do not provoke a backlash from the local
citizens, but always vulnerable to abuse by unscrupulous employers and in danger of becoming
scapegoats when the local economy turns down