Failed Turkish Coup Casts a Long Shadow

While most of us have been amused, bemused or scared stiff by the antics of the U.S. Presidential campaign, or relaxing in full summer mode and letting the world take care of itself for a while, the recent failed coup in Turkey continues to have major consequences for that country and for Turkey’s relationship with the U.S.

I want to address four major questions about the failed coup.

What was behind it?

Why did it fail?

What are the implications for Turkey?

What are the implications for the United States?

Origins. It may be helpful to begin with a sketch the creation of modern Turkey and the broad political trends of the last twenty years.

The Role of the Military Modern Turkey was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in the waning days of World War I. A group of young army officers, led by Mustafa Kemal*, seized power, declared that Turkey a republic, and instituted a sweeping program of reform.

*Mustafa was given the nickname “Ataturk”, meaning “Father of the Turks.” Some of the students in my Middle East classes would be confused early in the semester and try to report on the two important historical figures, Mustafa Kemal and this other guy, Ataturk.

For Kemal and the other Young Turks, the old Ottoman Empire was seen as a backward and stagnant Oriental system. The new Turkey would be a modern European society. A central feature of the founding ideology of modern Turkey (known as “Kemalism”) was secularism. The model was France: religion was strictly a private affair and all public displays of religious practise or symbols were prohibited. For example, both the veil and the headscarf (hijab) were outlawed, Turks were to adopt Turkish instead of Muslim/Arab names, mosques became state property and imams were state employees.

The military played a central role in establishing the new state and reforming society. When Ataturk’s highly authoritarian rule ended with his death and Turkey took the first tentative steps toward a functioning parliamentary democracy, the military retained its unique position in Turkish life. It is the most clearly national institution and continues thinking of itself as the protector of Kemalism and the Turkish national identity.

The military has intervened in Turkish politics at least four times since 1960, twice by forcibly seizing power from civilian governments and twice by making it clear that it would seize power unless the civilian government made drastic changes. In each case power was eventually returned to civilians. None of these episode is remembered fondly. At best, military intervention is regarded as something that may have been an unfortunate necessity at an earlier period in Turkey’s development.

Secularism and Political Islam. A relatively small part of Turkey is in Europe; the majority is across the Bosprous Straits in Asia. A relatively small portion of the Turkish population adheres to the most stringent definition of “secularism” that would completely banish religion form almost all areas of public life. As Turkey has developed socially and economically to become a middle income nation, attitudes toward the role of Islam in society have changed, for both those who could see no role at all and those who hoped for the return of Islam to the center of Turkish life. In the last twenty years, the Justice and Development Party (usually identified by its Turkish abbreviation, AKP) has emerged as the largest party and has provided national leadership since 2003.

The AKP draws on Islam as the inspiration for its emphasis on improving the lives of ordinary Turks and promoting socially conservative values. It has been supportive of a greater role for Islam, including direct support for religious schools and other institutions. At the same time, the AKP has been strongly supportive of Turkey’s free market, liberal capitalist economy and Turkey’s aspirations for membership in the European Union.

The Immediate Context. The government of Recep Erdoğan has lost a great deal of popular support in the past couple of years. Erdoğan has become increasingly autocratic and repressive. There have been 14 major terrorist attacks in Turkey in the past year; the June 28 ISIS assault on Istanbul airport that left 43 people dead was the latest. The government’s attempts to tighten control of the Kurdish areas in the east have been met by a resurgence of militant groups and violence. It has become clear that Turkey will not be admitted to the EU, primarily (many Turks believe) because of anti-Muslim prejudice) but also because the government has become less democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law.

Most observers believe that a significant sector of the Turkish officer corps came to believe that a combination of government support for forces undermining secular values, an increasingly autocratic rule, and the government’s inability to defend against terrorist attacks were creating a grave crisis that required the military to act to defend the legacy of Ataturk. A final precipitating factor may have been the imminent military reorganization that threatened the careers of some officers.

An Alternative Narrative. The Erdoğan government has a radically different explanation for the coup attempt. The coup was the result of a plot by Fethullah Gülen, the head of a terrorist organization with tentacles throughout Turkish society. For some officials and government-friendly media sources, the CIA or some other elements of the U.S. government were involved. American officials either knew the coup was coming and did not inform the Erdoğan government or the U.S. was actively involved in supporting the plotters.

Fethullah Gülen is a prominent preacher, cleric and political activist who has headed a political movement in Turkey since the 1970s.  He has espoused a version of Islam that embraces science, dialog with Jews and Christians, and liberal democracy. His movement has created extensive network of private schools to educate the next generation of Turkish leaders who, he hopes, will lead Turkey into a post-secular, Islamic democracy.
Gülen and his movement were allies of Erdoğan and the AKP until 2013 when Erdoğan accused Gülen of instigating an investigation of corruption in the Erdoğan regime. Gülen left Turkey for the U.S. where he has remained the spiritual and political leader of his movement.  Most observers are unpersuaded that he organized or ordered the coup attempt.

Why Did the Coup Fail? There are three critical factors that led to the failure. First, the plotters did not have the support of the majority of military officers, especially those in command of most of the operational units. Secondly, the police and internal security forces did not join, and actively fought, against the coup. And third, when Erdoğan called for citizens to take to the streets to protest and block the coup, large numbers of people in Turkey’s major cities responded. Whatever citizens may have felt about Erdoğan’s government (which is very unpopular) and the state of Turkish society, they felt a military coup that overthrew a freely elected government was worse.

What Are the Implications for Turkey? The government is using its version of the origins of the coup to launch a wave of repression. Several thousand officers and enlisted men have been dishonorably discharged form the military. Several thousand government employees, including judges, have been summarily dismissed. Media critical of the government have been under pressure for some time; that pressure has intensified with hundreds of newspapers, radio and TV stations and other media outlets closed and many individual journalists have been imprisoned. As of this writing, the crackdown shows little sign of easing.

Both the coup plotters and the government seem all too wiling to suspend or destroy democracy in order to save it.

Equating any criticism of the government with criminal activity and jailing intellectuals, journalists, writers, and religious figures will not destroy Turkey’s lively, diverse, and sophisticated social and intellectual life. But it will force some to emigrate and become even more critical of the regime from Western Europe or the United States, while others will take their dissent to social media or other informal sources where their voices will mingle with advocates of the destruction of modern Turkey. Paradoxically, the very things the regime is doing to stifle dissent are likely to increase criticism and discontent in ways the government will find it more difficult to monitor and control.

What Are the Implications of the U.S. and the Rest of World?

Turkey has been an outstanding example of how a combination of parliamentary democracy with moderate Islam can create a prosperous, middle income country with a vibrant and sophisticated cultural life. Turkey is a major trading partner of many European countries and there is a significant Turkish community in many EU members, particularly Germany. With a hefty subsidy from the EU, Turkey is housing 2 million Syrian refugees and has dramatically reduced the flow of refugees into Europe.

For a long time Turkey has been a key, if unseen, player in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and other regional disputes. Ankara has been trusted by the West, by Arab states, Iran, and Israel to serve as a quiet go between and honest broker.

Turkey is an important member of NATO and a focal point in the fight against ISIS. The Incirlik air base is the primary staging area for U.S. and NATO air strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and Turkey is an important logistical center for supporting operations in Iraq and Syria.

While overall relations have been cooperative and friendly, there have been some continuing strains in Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the U.S. despite the strong economic, political and military ties. A low level, constant irritation has been the EU’s inaction on Turkey’s application for membership even as smaller and less developed states in southeastern Europe were admitted. Turkey is extremely sensitive about references to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Armenians in Turkey between 1915 and 1919 as genocide. And the Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria are seen very differently in Ankara than Washington. The Kurds have established a de facto state in Norther Iraq and the pesh merga are the most effective fighting force against ISIS. But Turkey sees the Iraqi Kurds as natural allies of the Kurdish population in Eastern Turkey, some of whom have waged a long guerrilla war against the government.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the Erdoğan government demanded the extradition of Fethullah Gülen from the United States after formally charging him with treason and terrorism. That demand has been repeated several times and Erdoğan has equated American inaction with complicity in the coup. This is part of his larger complaint that Europe and America are not supporting Turkey the way they have rallied to support other governments who have experienced terrorist attacks.
There is, I think, a real danger that the persistent attempts to blame the coup on Gülen and his followers with U.S. complicity will create a public demand in Turkey for some kind of retaliatory action., such as denial of the use of Incirlik. Erdoğan’s very public resentment of the response of European governments could escalate to disruption of economic ties. At the very least, the demand for the extradition of Fethullah Gülen poses a Hobson’s choice for the Obama administration: risk serous deterioration in the U.S.-Turkey alliance or send a widely admired intellectual and spiritual leader to a certain death sentence.

In the longer run, deeper instability bred by an increasingly unpopular authoritarian regime could have serious consequences for the U.S. and grave consequences for Western Europe.