Iranian Nuclear Agreement?

March 23 is the rapidly approaching deadline for concluding talks between Iran and the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program.  More or less.

While “P5+1" sounds like a jazz combo or an algebraic expression, it is diplomatic short hand for “The Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council [China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States] plus Germany” ...

Often in negotiations the term  “deadline”  is more like the anarchist’s take on rules: there are no laws, merely suggestions.  The first deadline in the current round of talks that began in March 2014 was the end of July but that was extended to November 2014 and then to March of this year.  Sometimes negotiating deadlines are fudged and extended because no one wants to admit that the talks have failed. But more often, as in this case, there is real progress but a final deal can’t be reached quite yet. 

During the initial stages of talks in March 2014, Iran said it would voluntarily suspend those parts of its nuclear program that the P5+1 found most problematic and in return the U.S. and the Europeans lifted some of the economic sanctions that had been imposed over the years.  Although there are skeptics who doubt that Iran has lived up to its word, most observers and the Governments involved are satisfied that Teheran has complied.

As much as you might like an extended discussion of centrifuge numbers and technology, the intricacies of Iran’s nuclear research sites at Fordow and Arak, the details of IAEA inspections or the technology for creating of highly enriched uranium, this essay will concentrate on domestic politics in the U.S.

The old adage “Politics stops at the water’s edge” has been true in the United States only on extremely rare occasions and then only for a short time.  Two perspectives  have defined American attitudes toward Iran since the revolution of 1979: implacable enemy or challenging opponent.

The implacable enemy image is rooted in memories of the revolution of 1979, that saw the pro-American Shah replaced by fiercely anti-American mullahs and the 441 day ordeal for Americans held hostage after the U.S. embassy was invaded.  This image of Iran starkly simple: by its nature as a revolutionary Shi’a theocracy, a dictatorship of mullahs, Iran is fundamentally committed to relentless opposition to Western civilization.  In practice that means undermining and destabilizing moderate Arab governments by exporting radical Shi’a Islam and seeking the destruction of Israel by funding and directing terrorist organizations like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.  In the longer run it means acquiring nuclear weapons, medium and long range missiles to deliver them on Israel and Western Europe.  The Iranian political system is monolithic and radical, there are no “moderate” mullahs or “reformist” politicians.  Negotiations are a fool’s errand; Iran will not keep any promises it pretends to make.  In the long run only regime change will defang the monster.  In the short run, Iranian plots and subversion have to be vigorously resisted and whatever actions can harm the regime: crippling economic sanctions, support for dissidents, “black ops” like the Stuxnet virus [a computer virus that disrupted Iran’s nuclear program in 2010 is widely reputed to be a joint U.S.-Israeli product] and other blows to the nuclear program; should be pursued.

The challenging opponent view of Iran sees the country’s politics as complex and sometimes contradictory.  There are multiple institutions, from the Supreme Leader ostensibly at the top of the hierarchy down through a “Council of Guardians,” an elected President and executive branch and a popularly elected parliament.  The Revolutionary Guards are a military organization with extensive business interests that is independent of the traditional uniformed military establishment.  Particularly in parliamentary and presidential politics, there are factions and degrees of resistance to change, within the rather narrow boundaries permitted by the Supreme Leader and other senior clerics.  Elections, even when every candidate is pre-approved by the guardians of the status quo, do have consequences.  The major Iranian decision makers are rational and act in what it sees as their self interest.  Negotiations are difficult and often frustrating but the right mix of sticks and carrots can lead to an agreement that will be honored.

The Iranian revolution and its contemporary rhetoric is stridently anti-American.  Some Iranian leaders, for example Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have called for the destruction of Israel.  Iran is labeled by the U.S. State Department as a “state sponsor of terror” because of its attempts to destabilize and overthrow governments friendly to the U.S. by using proxies like Hezbollah.  As a result, the implacable enemy image is more deeply entrenched in American politics than in Western Europe, China or Russia.  It is politically easier and more emotionally satisfying to punish your enemies than to reward them.  Thus during the past 25 years the United States has typically played “bad cop,” pushing for economic sanctions and punitive measures to compel Iranian good behavior.  European governments, along with China and Russia have been the “good cops,” offering incentives and rewards to persuade Iran.

This long standing bias toward the implacable enemy image, especially among more conservative politicians and analysts, has been reinforced by an “if Obama is for it; I’m agin it!” attitude among many Republican members of Congress. As rumors of real movement in the current talks have spread and there are indications that a major agreement will be reached before the end of March, the criticism of Obama’s policy and American negotiators has become louder.  The President has wide latitude in reaching agreements with foreign countries and many of the sanctions imposed on Iran over the years can be lifted without prior approval from Congress, so there is relatively little that can be done to scuttle the talks.

The invitation from Speaker of the House John Boehner to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel to address a joint session of Congress is the last, best hope of avoiding a deal with Iran. 
There will, I think, be no surprises in Netanyahu’s speech. 

He will say that Iran is hell bent on getting nuclear weapons to destroy Israel, the emerging deal does nothing to end Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  Iran cannot be trusted to live up to any agreement; they have consistently lied to international inspectors and tried very hard to hide their most important facilities.  Netanyahu has been a major figure in Israeli politics or the past thirty years; his view of the world is clear and consistent.  Netanyahu’s approach to Iran is shaped, I think, in a larger perspective on the world rooted in post-World War II Zionism.  Anti-Semitism is a permanent feature of almost every culture in the world and can erupt into violence at any time.  Only in an Israel that is the Jewish national homeland can Jews feel secure and the existence of Israel is the only guarantee that the Jewish people will survive.  (This explains Netanyahu’s response to the Charlie Hebdu murders in Paris and the killings in Copenhagen: urging French and Danish Jews to emigrate to Israel.)  A nuclear armed Iran would have the ability to fulfill the most rabid anti-Semite’s dream, the destruction of the Jewish people.

Boehner’s move plays well with those who think snubbing or insulting the White House is a good thing and with those who hope that Netanyahu’s evocation of an implacable Iran bent on getting nuclear weapons so that it can destroy Israel will sway public opinion to oppose any deal.

Netanyahu’s speech is unlikely to have any impact on public opinion about an Iranian nuclear deal.  It will reinforce those who already knew that any deal with Iran would be a bad deal.  It will not weaken the commitment of those who support the emerging agreement either because they agree with it on the merits or because they are loyal Democrats who want to support their president. 

The invitation to Netanyahu has already had some impact on American politics by highlighting the tensions in U.S.-Israeli relations.  Last year’s failed attempt by Secretary of State John Kerry to broke peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians led to some acrimonious exchanges between U.S. and Israeli officials, with some of the most hawkish and staunchest anti-Palestinian leaders in the Israeli cabinet openly deriding any chance of peace with the Palestinians.  The mid-level State Department official who opined in a conversation with a reporter that Netanyahu was “...too chicken shit ...” to reach a deal with Palestinians and the senior official who earlier seemed to blame the Israelis for the failure of the talks were reflecting the views of many in the white House and State Department.  The personal tension, bordering on overt dislike, between Obama and Netanyahu seems to be rooted in sharp differences in policy, contrasting personal styles, and Netanyahu’s open preference for Mitt Romney in 2012. 

For the past five decades it has been an article of faith in both the U.S. and Israel that the two countries share a special relationship.  Israel has a unique position in American foreign policy because it is the only democracy in the Middle East, it is a trusted and reliable ally in  a dangerous neighborhood, it is widely admired for its David-like ability to defend itself against much larger hostile attackers, and there are a significant number of pro-Israel voters and campaign contributors who are key to success in key Congressional districts and a key part of the traditional Democratic Presidential voter base.  In turn Israel looks to the U.S. for support in the UN, for defense technology, and economic support from the American Jewish community. 

The underpinnings of that traditional relationship have ben slowly changing over the past 30 years. 
The heroic saga of the founding of Israel against overwhelming odds by idealistic young men and women, captured for a wide American audience in the 1960 movie Exodus remains the dominant image, but there has been growing sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians among younger Americans. 

The association between support for Israel and political liberals has been attenuated by the political emergence of fundamentalist Christians (often to the chagrin of both religious and secular Jews) who see the establishment of Israel as fulfillment of prophecies about the beginning of “The End Times” and the imminence of the Battle of Armageddon in which the forces of evil will be decisively defeated, Christ will return, and the world will end. 

The first generation of Israeli leaders shared a generally liberal ideology that stressed secular democracy, social welfare, and the integration of waves of immigrant into society.  The divisions in Israeli society between secular Jews and religious, especially conservative religious,  Jews have deepened and become more obvious and have increasingly complicated American Jews’ views of Israel.

The fact that Netanyahu gave a major address to AIPAC, the most important pro-Israel and increasingly conservative and Republican leaning lobby, the day before he addressed Congress and AIPAC ‘s role in the attempt by predominantly conservative Republican senators to legislate Congressional review for any agreement the White House makes with Iran was coordinated with AIPAC threatens to make U.S.-Israeli relations part of the bitter partisanship that makes Washington D.C. seem so dysfunctional.

The Bottom Line  What I think will happen

1.   The most likely outcome at the end of the month is a “framework agreement” as opposed to final deal with all the “t’s” crossed and “i’s” dotted.  Iran will agree to suspend attempts to enrich uranium beyond the level needed for a power plant reactor and to more robust inspections; the P5+1 will agree to phased reductions in sanctions.  Talks will continue until the details are hammered out.  The agreement will last for ten years.

2.   The U.S.-Israel relationship and the deal with Iran will be issues in the run up to the 2016 Presidential election, as Republican candidates stress foreign policy issues in their critique of the Obama administration.  “Soft on Iran”, “weak on Israel” will join Benghazi and failure to check Putin’s designs in Ukraine as rallying points for the Republican base. 

3.   The U.S.-Israel relationship has been strained at times in the past and will undoubtedly be strained in the future but it will not change dramatically in the next few years. But the increasingly strident partisanship and generational change will make the relationship less “special” and automatic.